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Catherine M. Ambler 
 
Understanding how families make economic decisions about how to allocate scarce 
household resources is crucial for the development and implementation of effective development 
policy. This dissertation investigates three specific questions related to this broad area of 
research.  The first chapter demonstrates the importance of information asymmetries in 
transnational households, where physical distance between family members can make 
information barriers especially acute. I implement an experiment among 1,300 Salvadoran 
migrants in Washington, DC and their family members in El Salvador that examines how (1) 
changing the ability of participants to monitor each other and (2) revealing migrant preferences 
can affect the sending and spending of remittances. Migrants make an incentivized decision 
about how much of a cash windfall to keep and how much to send home, and recipients decide 
how to allocate the spending of a remittance. Migrants remit significantly more when their 
choice is observed by recipients, and this effect is concentrated among pairs where recipient 
ability to punish migrants is plausibly high. The results support a model of remittance sending 
where migrants react strategically to being monitored, but only when recipients can enforce 
remittance agreements. Recipients make spending choices closer to the migrants’ preferences 
when they are revealed, suggesting that recipients’ choices may be inadvertently affected by 
imperfect information on migrant preferences. Together, these results indicate that information 
imperfections in families are varied and can affect resource allocation in both strategic and 
inadvertent ways. 
In the second chapter, I examine how the exogenous change in individual income 
provided by eligibility for the South African government pension can affect decision making in 
the household. Exploiting the age discontinuity in pension eligibility, I find that eligible females 
xi 
 
are 13 to 16 percentage points more likely to be the primary decision makers for expenditures 
than non-eligible females--rare direct support for bargaining models of the household. There is 
no corresponding effect for eligible males. Due to labor force withdrawal, male income does not 
increase at the age of eligibility, providing an explanation for the lack of impacts of male 
eligibility on decision making. The increase in female decision-making power translates into 
improved nutritional outcomes for girls and higher levels of durable goods ownership. Because 
male income does not increase, these findings invite a reconsideration of the common 
assumption that women make more productive use of cash transfers than men. 
The third chapter, written jointly with Diego Aycinena and Dean Yang, returns to 
transnational households. We study the intersection of two research areas: educational subsidies 
and migrant remittances. We implement a randomized experiment offering Salvadoran migrants 
cash subsidies for education, which are channeled directly to a beneficiary student in El Salvador 
chosen by the migrant. The subsidies – in the form of matching grants – lead to increases in 
educational expenditures, higher private school attendance, and lower labor supply of youths in 
El Salvador households connected to migrant study participants. We find substantial “crowd in” 
of household educational investments, particularly for female students: for each $1 received by 
female beneficiary students, educational expenditures on that student increase by close to $5. 
There is no evidence of shifting of educational expenditures from other students in the household 
















1.1 Introduction and motivation 
Although the implications of asymmetric information have been well documented in the 
study of important economic institutions such as labor, credit, and insurance markets, theoretical 
models of intra-household resource allocation have largely assumed perfect information 
(Chiappori, 1988, 1992; Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981; Lundberg and 
Pollack, 1993).1,2 Despite this, a growing body of empirical literature has shown that information 
asymmetries do exist in households, and further, that household members take strategic 
advantage of opportunities to use these asymmetries to alter the allocation of resources in the 
household (Ashraf, 2009; Ashraf, Field, and Lee, 2010; Schaner, 2012).3  This paper brings the 
study of how information asymmetries affect intra-household resource allocation to a different 
setting: transnational households, defined as households composed of international migrants and 
their family members in the home country, in this case El Salvador. Using experimental 
methods, I examine the effects of a set of information imperfections on remittance decisions 
made by both migrants and their family members. 
1 Exceptions include Bloch and Rao (2002) and Chen (2013). 
2 Empirical studies including Lundberg, Pollack, and Wales (1996), Duflo (2000), Duflo (2003), Qian (2008) and 
Ambler (2012) have supported some of the predictions of these models but do not account for information 
asymmetries. 
3 In a separate group of empirical studies Udry (1996), Dercon and Krishnan (2000), Goldstein, de Janvry, and 
Sadoulet (2005), and Dubois and Ligon (2011) show that intra-household resource allocation may be inefficient in 
some contexts—results that may be indicative of the presence of information asymmetries. 
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The context of transnational households is significant because migrants and their family 
members are making financial decisions in a situation where information asymmetries are 
especially acute. Because of the physical distance separating family members, families with a 
migrant living away from the household are precisely those where information asymmetries may 
be the most pronounced. A number of studies have documented the existence of these 
asymmetries in households with migrants. For example, De Laat (2008) shows that domestic 
migrants in Kenya spend resources on costly monitoring of their wives. Chen (2006, 2013) finds 
that in China, wives with migrant husbands exhibit non-cooperative behavior more often for 
activities that are more difficult to monitor, and Seshan and Yang (2012) find suggestive 
evidence that Indian migrants underestimate how much their wives at home are saving. However 
the empirical analysis in these papers is largely observational.4 This is the first study to causally 
examine how information asymmetries directly affect behavior, specifically decisions about the 
sending and spending of remittances.  
The importance of understanding how information asymmetries affect decisions in 
transnational households is heightened by the fact that migrants and their family members are 
financially linked through the sending of remittances, a large and important financial flow. 
Global aggregate international remittances to the developing world were $332 billion in 2010, 
more than any other kind of resource flow with the exception of foreign direct investment (Ratha 
and Silwal, 2012). In El Salvador specifically, remittances received were 16 percent of GDP in 
2010 (Ratha and Silwal, 2012). In 2009, 22 percent of households in El Salvador received 
remittances from abroad and average monthly remittances were $168 for families that received 
them, a figure that is almost 50 percent of average monthly household expenditures for 
remittance recipients (DIGESTYC, 2010). Additionally, the receipt of remittances has been 
shown to have large, positive impacts on a variety of measures of well being, underscoring their 
importance as a tool for development (Cox-Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Adams and Page, 2005; 
Yang and Martinez, 2005; Woodruff and Zentano, 2007; Yang, 2008; Adams and Cuecuecha, 
2010). Given the importance of remittances for development, a more complete understanding of 
how these decisions are made is crucial for policy makers hoping to maximize their economic 
impact. 
4 In an exception, McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman (2012) find that potential Tongan migrants underestimate 
earnings in New Zealand, a fact the authors attribute to under reporting of earnings by current migrants. 
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This paper addresses two types of information asymmetries that may affect decisions 
about the sending and spending of remittances. The first are asymmetries that can lead to 
strategic behavior, meaning that migrants and recipients recognize that the asymmetry exists and 
use it for their benefit. The specific asymmetries considered here are the limited abilities of 
remittance recipients to observe migrant income and of migrants to observe recipient spending. 
The second type are those that can have inadvertent impacts, defined as asymmetries that 
unintentionally affect decisions. These asymmetries are represented here as communication 
barriers that result in recipients having an incomplete understanding of migrant preferences for 
how the remittances they send should be spent. Communication barriers should be interpreted 
broadly as any obstacle – social, financial, or logistical – to fully understanding these 
preferences. I first develop a theoretical framework that derives predictions for how these two 
types of information asymmetries can affect remittance decisions, and then I test these 
predictions using experiments conducted with a matched sample of migrants from El Salvador 
and their family members at home. 
The framework views the decisions made by migrants and remittance recipients as being 
driven both by altruism and contracts (whether implicit or explicit) that dictate how much of 
their income migrants should send to recipients and what that money should be spent on when 
received by the recipients. The contracts are enforced through the threat of punishment for 
noncompliance. I show that under imperfect and incomplete information about migrant income 
and recipient spending, strategic deviation by both migrants and recipients can be a characteristic 
feature of these contracts. However, in pairs where the potential for punishment is low, 
remittances will be mostly motivated by altruism, and these strategic effects will therefore be 
less important. Additionally, communication barriers, specifically in regards to migrants’ 
preferences over recipients’ spending habits, may lead to inadvertent deviation from migrant 
preferences by recipients. 
The experiments explicitly test for both strategic and inadvertent behavior. They were 
designed to mimic real life decisions about remittances made by migrants and their family 
members, and by randomly assigning treatment, I am able to causally identify the impacts of the 
informational conditions being tested. An experiment was first conducted among Salvadoran 
migrants recruited in the Washington, DC area. The migrants were asked how much of a 
potential $600 prize they wished to keep and how much they wished to send to a family member 
3
in El Salvador. The decision was incentivized, meaning that participants had the chance to win 
the allocation that they chose. To test whether migrants strategically react to changes in the 
observability of their income, they were randomly allocated into two treatment groups: those 
who were told their decision would not be revealed to their family and those who were told that 
their decision would be revealed.  
These family members then participated in a separate experiment. They made an 
incentivized decision about how to spend a potential $300 remittance prize. To test for strategic 
reactions to the observability of their spending choices, as in the migrant experiment, half of the 
recipients were told that their choice would not be revealed to the migrant and the other half 
were told that their choice would be revealed. In a second, cross-randomized treatment 
addressing the inadvertent effects of barriers to communication, half of the recipients were 
informed of the migrant’s preferences for how they should spend the money, and the other half 
were not. 
I find that migrants remit $24 more on average out of the possible $600 (an increase of 5 
percent over the control group mean of $440 sent) when their decisions are revealed. This effect 
is concentrated (and larger) in subsamples where the recipient’s ability to punish the migrant for 
deviation is plausibly high. There is no corresponding evidence of strategic behavior in the 
recipient experiment: recipients who are told their choice will be revealed do not make choices 
that are more similar to the migrants’ preferences than recipients whose choices are not revealed. 
However, reducing communication costs by revealing migrant preferences to recipients does 
have an impact, resulting in a 10 percent reduction in the difference between migrant preferences 
and recipient choices. 
This paper is related to a set of field experiments that have examined the effects of 
offering migrants varying degrees of control over remittances. The idea behind these 
experiments is that offering control to migrants will mitigate a moral hazard problem in how 
recipients spend remittances. Ashraf et al. (2011) show that savings levels in bank accounts in El 
Salvador increase when migrants are given greater control over these accounts. In another 
experiment among Salvadoran migrants, Torero and Viceisza (2011) find little evidence that 
migrants send more when they are able to control how remittances are spent, but attribute this to 
the fact that the control offered by their experiment (vouchers for groceries) was too limiting. 
Chin et al. (2011) find that the impacts of an experiment that offered migrants assistance in 
4
opening bank accounts in the United States are concentrated among migrants who report having 
no control over how their remittances are spent. This suggests that migrants who are concerned 
that savings sent to El Salvador will be misused choose to keep those savings in the United 
States when given the opportunity to do so. 
The main limitation of these papers is that while they acknowledge that migrants might 
have difficulty controlling recipient spending of remittances, they do not consider that 
information problems might run in both directions. The observational studies documenting 
information asymmetries in migrant households have also focused on migrant monitoring of 
recipient behavior (Chen, 2006, 2013; de Laat, 2008). One of the principal contributions of this 
paper is that it examines the impacts of information asymmetries on both sides of the migrant-
recipient relationship. In fact, in this experiment, it is only migrants and not recipients who react 
strategically to whether or not their choices will be monitored. This demonstrates that recipients 
have important influence in the migrant-recipient relationship, something that has not previously 
been demonstrated empirically. 
This paper also fits into a growing, broader literature on how information asymmetries 
affect intra-household resource allocation. Ashraf (2009) shows that, in the Philippines, men 
whose wives are the household financial managers hide income from their wives when that 
decision is private. When their decision is public, men choose to divert income to committed 
consumption that cannot be undone. Only when spouses communicate about their choices before 
they make them do men choose to share the income with their wives. Schaner (2012) finds that 
spouses are more likely to choose to save in individual (as opposed to joint) savings accounts 
when they are not well informed about each others’ finances.5 
This study builds on this literature in several ways. First, while these papers have largely 
focused on just one choice in the resource allocation process (whether or not to share income), 
the present experiment considers how information asymmetries can affect two different decisions 
made by families about economic resources. Specifically, in addition to the sharing of income, I 
also examine how income is spent once it is shared, and acknowledge that decisions may be 
affected by information asymmetries in both stages. Second, while these studies have focused on 
5 In another experiment in Zambia, women are more likely to take advantage of vouchers for contraception and use 
concealable forms of contraception when these vouchers are given to them outside of the presence of their husbands, 
showing that strategic reactions to information asymmetries extend beyond simply the allocation of funds in the 
household (Ashraf, Field and Lee, 2012). 
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strategic behavior, I study the effects of different types of information asymmetries, strategic and 
inadvertent, allowing me to evaluate their relative effects in the same population. Finally, this 
study documents that information asymmetries can be important outside of the husband-wife 
pair, the setting that has been the context of almost all the previous experimental work in this 
area.6 People in developing countries often transfer resources within extended families (whether 
within or across households) and decisions about resource allocation consequently are likely to 
involve people beyond just the husband and wife. The results show that information asymmetries 
can have important impacts in extended families, but because migrants only react to being 
monitored when recipient ability to punish them is high, they also indicate that they may not 
matter in all families where resources are shared. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes a framework for understanding how 
both the probability of being monitored and communication costs may impact decisions about 
remittances. Section III explains the experiment. Section IV describes the data and the empirical 
strategy. Section V presents the results, and Section VI concludes. 
 
1.2 Theoretical framework 
 In this section I develop a simple model to frame my experimental results that shows how 
information asymmetries can lead to strategic behavior that affects both migrant sending and 
recipient spending of remittances. I achieve this by modeling both decisions as contingent 
contracts with an altruistic component between the migrant and the recipient. The structure of the 
model is similar to Chen’s (2013) description of how male migrants in China monitor their 
wives’ behavior. Specifically, Chen shows that when a migrant has imperfect information about 
his wife’s actions and, further, incomplete information about her preferences, the contingent 
contract offered to the wife by the migrant may not be incentive compatible in all circumstances. 
I adapt a simplified version of this framework to describe the outcomes considered in this paper.  
1.2.1 Migrant remittance decision 
 I characterize migrants’ decisions to remit as being determined by both their altruism for 
their families at home and contingent contracts with those same families, where the families 
6 The dynamics of transfer arrangements in extended family networks has been studied (Foster and Rosenzweig, 
2001) but little is known about how information imperfections affect behavior in these arrangements. Exceptions 
include Jakiela and Ozier (2012) who find that women in Kenya sacrifice investment returns in order to keep income 
secret from family members outside their household and di Falco and Bulte (2012) show that larger kin networks 
lead to higher levels of saving in non-shareable assets. 
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compel the migrants to send remittances through the threat of potential punishment.7 An 
extensive literature exists on the motivations of migrants to send remittances. Commonly cited 
motives include altruism, payments for services provided by the family, loan repayment, 
repayments of other investments made by the family such as education, desire to return, and 
insurance (see Rapoport and Docquier, 2006 for a review). These motives may operate 
simultaneously, and while there is empirical evidence to support the existence of them all, the 
literature has been less successful in defining their relative importance. The purpose of this 
framework is to model the remittance decision in a way that allows both for motivations that may 
be affected by strategic behavior and those that will not be. Although this model is not specific 
about the exact motivations for the remittances sent by migrants, the idea of a remittance contract 
enforced through the threat of a punishment cost encompasses most possible motivations 
previously examined in the literature. The clear exception is altruistically motivated remittances 
which will enter separately in this framework.  
 The potential punishment that enforces the contingent contract will be represented as a 
utility cost to the migrant and can take several forms. One example of such a cost is substandard 
care for or attention to people (children or elderly relatives) or possessions (land, livestock or 
new investments) left by the migrant in the care of his family. Another is social sanctions against 
the migrant: many migrants come from areas with high rates of migration where there are strong 
social norms and expectations regarding the amount of money that migrants send home. 
Particularly for migrants who wish to return home one day, a damaged reputation may be seen as 
quite costly. Finally, migrants refusing to send home as much money as their families expect 
may damage their relationships with their families, relationships that migrants with tenuous 
positions in foreign countries may view as important.8 Many of these potential punishments are 
related to the social closeness of migrants and recipients and, indeed, in a qualitative study of 
Ghanian migrants in the Netherlands, Mazzucato (2009) emphasizes the importance of the social 
7 The incorporation of these two motives together in one framework is drawn from Lucas and Stark’s (1985) 
suggestion of a model of remittance sending that includes both altruism and migrant self-interest. 
8 A similar description of enforcement mechanisms can be found in Rapoport and Docquier (2006). Brown (1997), 
Hoddinott (1994), Lucas and Stark (1985), and Poirine (1997) all describe remittance contracts enforced through one 
or more of the discussed mechanisms. Additionally, in studies of dictator games within social networks Leider, et al. 
(2009) and Ligon and Schecter (2012) document the importance of the expectation of reciprocity in motivating 
giving. 
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proximity of migrants and recipients for the effective enforcement of remittance agreements.9  
Description of the model 
 The model is constructed as a game with two types of players, migrants who send 
remittances and members of their families who receive those remittances. Migrants and 
recipients both get utility from consumption, which is defined for migrants as migrant income (𝐼) 
minus remittances sent to the recipient (𝑟), and for recipients as recipient income (𝑌) plus 
remittances received from the migrant (𝑟). Because they are altruistic, migrants additionally 
derive utility from the consumption of recipients.10 Migrant utility is then defined as 
𝑈𝑀 = 𝑢𝑀(𝐼 −  𝑟) +  𝛾𝑢𝑅( 𝑌 +  𝑟) 
and recipient utility as 
𝑈𝑅 = 𝑢𝑅( 𝑌 +  𝑟). 
For both 𝑢𝑀and 𝑢𝑅, 𝑢′ > 0 and 𝑢′′ < 0. 𝛾 is the migrant’s altruism parameter and is between 
zero and one.11 In every period migrants earn either low income (𝐼𝐿) or high income (𝐼𝐻) where 
𝐼𝐻 >  𝐼𝐿.12 The recipient strategy is to offer migrants a contingent contract that specifies the 
remittance amounts that should be sent for each income level. Migrants then decide whether to 
comply with this contract or deviate from it. Migrants who deviate (and whose deviation is 
discovered by the recipient) will suffer a utility cost (𝐶𝑀) imposed by the recipient. This cost is 
assumed to be exogenous to the model, but will vary across migrant and recipient pairs. Migrants 
and recipients know each other’s preferences and the value of 𝐶𝑀 . 
First consider the case where migrant income is fully observable to both migrants and 
recipients. Migrant payoffs are as follows where 𝑟𝑐𝑖 is the size of the remittance sent when the 
migrant complies and 𝑟𝑑𝑖is the remittance sent when the migrant deviates. 𝑖 is equal to 𝐿 or 𝐻 for 
the low and high income states: 
Comply: 𝑈𝑀 = 𝑢𝑀 �𝐼𝑖 − 𝑟𝑐𝑖�+ 𝛾𝑢𝑅 �𝑌 + 𝑟𝑐𝑖� 
9 Additionally, in focus groups done prior to the start of the project, migrants repeatedly cited high levels of pressure 
from family members as a key reason why they sent remittances home. Relatedly, in their work on Tongan 
migration to New Zealand, McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman (2012) find that suggestive evidence that migrants 
underreport earnings to avoid pressures to remit from family members. 
10 For simplicity the framework does not include recipient altruism toward the migrant. 
11 Migrant altruism has been modeled in similar ways in Lucas and Stark (1985), Stark (1995), and Rapoport and 
Docquier (2006). 
12 Although variation in recipient income can affect migrant remittance decisions (as in Lucas and Stark, 1985) for 
the purposes of this paper, I assume 𝑌 to be fixed and low relative to migrant income.  
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Deviate: 𝑈𝑀 =  𝑢𝑀 �𝐼𝑖 − 𝑟𝑑𝑖� + 𝛾𝑢𝑅 �𝑌 + 𝑟𝑑𝑖� −  𝐶𝑀 
The optimal values of 𝑟𝑐𝑖 and 𝑟𝑑𝑖are solved for using backward induction. First, given 𝐼 and 𝛾, 
migrants choose 𝑟𝑑𝑖 to maximize their payoffs when deviating such that: 
𝑢𝑀′ �𝐼𝑖 −  𝑟𝑑𝑖� =  𝛾𝑢𝑅′ �𝑌 +  𝑟𝑑𝑖� 
This first order condition implies that migrants set the marginal cost of remittances equal to their 
marginal benefit. Any further increase in remittances will therefore incur a higher cost than 
benefit for the migrant and lead to a net loss in utility.13 
In order to induce migrant cooperation, recipients will set 𝑟𝑐𝑖at a level that is incentive 
compatible for migrants. In other words, the utility that the migrants get from complying with the 
contingent contract offered by the recipients must be greater than or equal to the utility they 
would gain from deviating and being punished. Because recipients wish to receive as much in 
remittances as possible, the incentive compatibility constraint will bind, and 𝑟𝑐𝑖 will be set such 
that: 
𝑢𝑀 �𝐼𝑖 −  𝑟𝑐𝑖�+ 𝛾𝑢𝑅 �𝑌 + 𝑟𝑐𝑖� = 𝑢𝑀 �𝐼𝑖 −  𝑟𝑑𝑖� + 𝛾𝑢𝑅 �𝑌 + 𝑟𝑑𝑖� − 𝐶𝑀 
Because the contract is incentive compatible the migrant will always comply. This condition 
implies that when 𝐶𝑀is greater than zero the migrant will always send more than the voluntary 
optimum (𝑟𝑐𝑖 > 𝑟𝑑𝑖). If 𝐶𝑀 = 0, then 𝑟𝑐𝑖 = 𝑟𝑑𝑖and the entire remittance payment is motivated 
by altruism. It is also important to note that 𝑟𝑐𝑖 rises with 𝐶𝑀. The higher 𝐶𝑀, the more power 
recipients have to compel outcomes that are advantageous for them, namely higher remittance 
payments.  
Asymmetric information 
 Now consider the more realistic case where recipients have imperfect information about 
migrant income. At the time of the remittance the only information about migrant income that 
recipients have is what they are told by migrants. However, after the remittance is sent, with 
probability 𝑝 recipients will receive accurate information about migrant income, informing them 
13 I assume that conditions hold for 𝑟𝑑𝑖to be non negative. For example, assuming that both 𝑢𝑀() and 𝑢𝑅() are equal 
to 𝑙𝑛(), 𝑟𝑑𝑖 ≥ 0 if 𝛾𝐼𝑖 − 𝑌 ≥ 0.  
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of whether the migrants earned 𝐼𝐻 or 𝐼𝐿.14 Recipients who do not receive this information 
continue to believe what the migrants have told them about their income. This gives migrants 
who have earned 𝐼𝐻 the opportunity to deviate without being discovered by claiming they earned 
𝐼𝐿 and sending the contracted amount for the lower income level (𝑟𝑐𝐿).15 With probability 1 − 𝑝 
the recipients will not discover the true income level, and the migrants will not have to pay 𝐶𝑀. 
For migrants who deviate in this way, 𝑝 is the probability that that deviation will be detected.  
Furthermore, 𝑝 is not constant and can vary across time for each migrant. In every period 
the migrants know what 𝑝 is, however recipients have incomplete information about 𝑝, knowing 
only the distribution of its possible values. Assume that 𝑝 can be either low (𝑝𝑙) or high (𝑝ℎ) and 
that the recipient believes that 𝑝 = 𝑝ℎ with probability 𝑘.16 The payoffs for migrants earning 𝐼𝐻 
are now: 
Comply: 𝑈𝑀 = 𝑢𝑀�𝐼𝐻 −  𝑟𝑐𝐻� +  𝛾𝑢𝑅�𝑌 +  𝑟𝑐𝐻� 
Deviate: 𝑈𝑀 =  𝑢𝑀�𝐼𝐻 −  𝑟𝑐𝐿� +  𝛾𝑢𝑅�𝑌 +  𝑟𝑐𝐿� −  𝑝𝑖𝐶𝑀 
When deviating the migrant will send 𝑟𝑐𝐿  because that is the only possible method of deceiving 
the recipient and avoiding punishment.17 
 As in the case of observable income, recipients must set contracts that are incentive 
compatible for the migrants. This incentive compatibility constraint will vary by the probability 
that deviation will be detected. 
Periods when 𝑝 =  𝑝𝑙: 
𝑢𝑀�𝐼𝐻 −  𝑟𝑐𝐿� +  𝛾𝑢𝑅�𝑌 +  𝑟𝑐𝐿� −  𝑝𝑙𝐶𝑀 ≤ 𝑢𝑀�𝐼𝐻 −  𝑟𝑐𝐻� +  𝛾𝑢𝑅�𝑌 +  𝑟𝑐𝐻� 
Periods when 𝑝 =  𝑝ℎ: 
𝑢𝑀�𝐼𝐻 −  𝑟𝑐𝐿� +  𝛾𝑢𝑅�𝑌 + 𝑟𝑐𝐿� −  𝑝ℎ𝐶𝑀 ≤ 𝑢𝑀�𝐼𝐻 −  𝑟𝑐𝐻� +  𝛾𝑢𝑅�𝑌 + 𝑟𝑐𝐻� 
Because 𝑝𝑙 <  𝑝ℎ, 𝑟𝑐𝐻 must be lower in periods when 𝑝 = 𝑝𝑙 than in periods when 𝑝 = 𝑝ℎ in 
14 For example, imagine a situation where a migrant earns 𝐼𝐻 because he finds some extra temporary work. The 
recipient may hear about this work from another relative or family friend living in the same community as the 
migrant in the United States. 
15 Note that nothing has changed for migrants earning 𝐼𝐿as the imperfect information does not afford them any more 
attractive deviation possibilities. 
16 Continuing with the example where a migrant earns 𝐼𝐻 because he finds some extra temporary work, 𝑝 may be 
high if another migrant from the migrant’s home village has the same job and can relay this information to family 
members. 
17 Migrants could also deviate by sending 𝑟𝑑𝐻and paying 𝐶𝑀for sure. It is possible that the utility of this strategy is 
greater than the expected utility of sending 𝑟𝑐𝐿 . This would lead to an incentive compatible contract unaffected by 
information asymmetries and therefore will not be considered here.  
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order to satisfy the migrant’s incentive compatibility constraint. Given that recipients do not 
know the value of 𝑝, they must satisfy the constraint for 𝑝𝑙 in order to ensure participation in all 
periods. The constraint for low probability of detection periods will bind, but the constraint for 
high probability of detection periods will not. 
 However, depending on the values of 𝑝𝑙, 𝑝ℎ and 𝑘, recipients have another option. They 
can offer a contract that binds on the high probability of detection period’s incentive 
compatibility constraint but which is not incentive compatible in the low periods. The intuition is 
that recipients might have to lower the contracted amount (𝑟𝑐𝐻) so much to induce cooperation 
in all periods that they would be better off receiving a higher amount in only the high probability 
of detection periods, than the lower amount in all periods. If recipients offer the contract that is 
incentive compatible for all values of 𝑝, then they will receive the amount that satisfies the  
constraint for 𝑝𝑙 in every period, 𝑟𝑐𝐻𝑝𝑙. If they offer a contract that is incentive compatible only 
for 𝑝ℎ then when 𝑝 = 𝑝𝑙 migrants will deviate and the recipients will receive 𝑟𝑐𝐿. However, 
when 𝑝 = 𝑝ℎ the recipients will receive the higher amount that satisfies the incentive 
compatibility constraint for 𝑝ℎ(𝑟𝑐𝐻𝑝ℎ) meaning that they will receive (1 − 𝑘)𝑟𝑐𝐿 + 𝑘 𝑟𝑐𝐻𝑝ℎin 
expectation. Therefore, the recipient will offer the contract that is not incentive compatible for all 
types when: 
𝑟𝑐𝐻𝑝𝑙 <  (1 − 𝑘)𝑟𝑐𝐿 + 𝑘 𝑟𝑐𝐻𝑝ℎ 
 This framework describes a situation in which the optimal contract between migrants and 
recipients is not incentive compatible in all situations. This results in migrants acting differently 
depending on the probability that their income will be observed by the recipient. However, this 
will only happen when 𝐶𝑀is positive; if recipients do not have the power to punish the migrant, 
then the entire remittance is driven by altruism and is not affected by variation in recipient ability 
to monitor migrant income. This can easily be seen in the migrant’s incentive compatibility 
constraints: when 𝐶𝑀 = 0, 𝑝𝑖 vanishes and 𝑟𝑐𝑖 = 𝑟𝑑𝑖.  
 In summary, the model results in the following predictions regarding the migrant’s 
remittance sending behavior: 
Prediction 1: When the probability that recipients will observe migrant income is low, migrants 
earning high income may strategically take advantage of recipients’ imperfect and incomplete 
knowledge of their income to send less money home.  
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Prediction 2: In pairs where the recipient ability to punish migrants is low, migrants’ motivations 
for sending remittances are dominated by altruism, and these altruistic remittances are not 
affected by the probability that migrant income will be observed.  
1.2.2 Recipient spending decision 
 I now consider the recipient’s decision about how to spend remittances in a separate 
framework that can be developed in a parallel way. The decision that recipients make is modeled 
as the extent to which they follow the migrant’s preferences for that spending decision. 
Recipients get utility from spending the remittance money on the things that they prefer, but they 
are also altruistic in that they get utility from spending remittances according to the migrants’ 
wishes.18 Although recipient altruism is modeled here as the recipient getting utility from the 
migrant’s utility, the concept could also include recipients who follow migrant preferences 
simply because they want to. For example, they may value migrant advice on household 
budgeting and investment.  
Migrants offer recipients a contingent contract specifying the extent to which remittances 
should be spent according to migrant preferences. Recipients then decide whether to comply with 
or deviate from that contract. With probability 𝑞 migrants will learn how the recipients spent the 
remittance; otherwise they will only know what they are told by recipients (and believe that to be 
true).19 Recipients who deviate and are discovered by the migrant will pay a utility cost 𝐶𝑅, 
which is the punishment that the migrant can impose on the recipient. Potential punishments in 
this case include withholding of future remittances, social sanctions (to the extent that the 
migrant can impose them from a distance), and familial discord. The size of the punishment (𝐶𝑅) 
need not be equal to the punishment the recipient can use against the migrant (𝐶𝑀), meaning that 
one may well have greater influence than the other. 
𝑑 is what recipients would consume if they followed only their own preferences and 𝑏𝑐 
and 𝑏𝑑are the extent to which the recipients follow migrant preferences when they comply with 
the contract (𝑏𝑐) and when they deviate from it (𝑏𝑑).20 𝛼 is the recipient’s altruism parameter. 
18 For simplicity of exposition I ignore a third category of consumption: expenditures on which the migrant and 
recipient agree. Incorporation of this category does not change the qualitative predictions of the model. 
19 Migrants could find out about recipient spending behavior by, for example, communicating with other family 
members in El Salvador that may have knowledge of what the recipient has done. 
20 For example, imagine that a migrant sends a $200 remittance for which the migrant wants $100 to be spent on 
food and $100 to be spent on education. The recipient wants to spend $200 on home improvements. If the recipient 
actually spends $100 on food and $100 on home improvements then the recipient has followed the migrant’s 
preferences on $100 of the $200 remittance.  
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Recipient payoffs can be expressed as follows: 
Comply: 𝑈𝑅 =  𝑢𝑅(𝑑 −  𝑏𝑐) +  𝛼𝑢𝑀(𝑏𝑐) 
Deviate: 𝑈𝑅 = 𝑢𝑅(𝑑 −  𝑏𝑑) + 𝛼𝑢𝑀(𝑏𝑑) − 𝑞𝑖𝐶𝑅 
The probability of detection when deviating (𝑞𝑖) can be either low or high and varies across 
time. It is known to recipients, but migrants know only its distribution. As in the migrant 
remittance decision this leads to a situation where migrants may offer contracts that are incentive 
compatible only when the probability of detection is high. 
 Therefore, the framework results in the following predictions for recipient remittance 
spending behavior: 
Prediction 1:  When the probability that migrants will observe recipient spending is low, 
recipients may strategically take advantage of migrants’ imperfect and incomplete knowledge of 
their spending to spend less according to migrant preferences and more according to their own 
preferences. 
Prediction 2: In pairs where the migrant ability to punish recipients is low, recipients’ 
motivations for spending remittances according to the migrants’ preferences are dominated by 
altruism, and this altruistic spending is not affected by the probability that recipient spending will 
be observed.  
 The recipient choice is further complicated by the fact that barriers to communication 
may result in confusion on the recipient’s part over what the migrant’s preferences actually are 
and consequently in inadvertent (as opposed to strategic) deviation from those preferences. I will 
refer to these barriers as communication costs, but the concept is broader than just the cost of a 
telephone call. With distance, specificity about preferences may become difficult, migrants may 
feel uncomfortable expressing what they want, and recipients may sometimes have to make 
decisions without time to directly consult with migrants. Family members may also incorrectly 
assume that they know what the migrant would prefer. If these communication costs do play a 
role, decreasing them by making migrant preferences clearer could increase 𝑏, leading to the 
following prediction: 
Prediction 3: Improved information about migrant preferences will increase the extent to which 
recipients follow those preferences. 
 The main point of this discussion is that strategic deviation can be a feature of the optimal 
contracts between migrants and their family members. The extent to which deviation is important 
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will depend on the distribution of the probability of detection and the size of the punishments 
that can be inflicted. At the same time, communication costs can lead to inadvertent deviation 
when recipients make remittance spending decisions. 
 
1.3 Project design 
 Testing for the effects of information asymmetries in the choices made by migrants and 
their family members is difficult for several reasons. First, both the observability of migrant 
income and recipient spending and the extent of communication costs may be correlated with 
unobserved characteristics of the migrant-recipient pair, making it difficult to causally identify 
the impacts of these information asymmetries. Second, precisely measuring any of these 
(observability of income and spending and communication costs) is difficult in a standard survey 
context.21 Finally, capturing reliable information about the behavior of both migrants and their 
family members is logistically complicated. I implemented a randomized experiment to test the 
predictions of the framework discussed in the previous section that solves these problems. This 
experiment is conducted within the context of survey work for a separate field experiment on 
remittances and education among Salvadoran migrants in Washington, DC and their families in 
El Salvador.22 Specifically, I exploit an unusual feature of this data collection exercise; it 
involves surveys with matched pairs of migrants and family members, allowing me to investigate 
the preferences and choices of both. In the experiment, I randomly vary (1) whether migrant 
income and recipient spending are observed and (2) the size of communication costs, allowing 
me to identify the causal impacts of both of these factors on migrant and recipient remittance 
behavior. Demographic survey data is used to explore how impacts vary by punishment ability. 
 Migrants were recruited in the Washington, DC metro area, at the two area locations of 
the Salvadoran consulate23 and were interviewed while they were waiting for consular services.24 
The migrant survey was conducted between late September 2011 and late February 2012. 
Surveyors in the consulate approached migrants and invited them to participate. Because the 
21 For example, directly asking migrants whether they hide income from recipients may not yield truthful responses. 
Additionally, that question would not identify migrants who could hide income but choose not to.  
22 “Subsidizing Remittances for Education: A Field Experiment Among Migrants from El Salvador,” (with Diego 
Aycinena and Dean Yang). 
23 96% of migrants interviewed live in Washington, DC, Maryland or Virginia. The others live in states served by 
these consulate locations. 
24 The most common reason to go to the consulate is passport renewal, but other services include renewal of 
temporary protected status (TPS), registry of births and deaths, and notarization of documents. 
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focus of the companion experiment was remittances and education, participants were required to 
have a high school or college-aged relative in El Salvador.25 Those who qualified and agreed to 
participate were administered a baseline survey followed by the randomized offer of a product 
designed to facilitate the sending of remittances for education to El Salvador.26 The experiment 
described in this paper was conducted at the end of the survey but before the randomized 
marketing treatment.  
Over the course of the survey migrants identified a high school or college aged student in 
El Salvador whom they were interested in supporting.27 Interviews were subsequently conducted 
with a member of the household of that student. If the student was 18 years of age or older the 
student was to be interviewed, and for those students under 18 a guardian was identified to be 
interviewed. If the indicated person was not available, an alternative adult in the household was 
interviewed instead. Of the surveys completed, 45 percent were done with the student, 40 percent 
with the student’s guardian, and 15 percent with another adult in the household. The El Salvador 
survey was conducted by phone in the days following the migrant survey in the United States; 
the median number of days between the US and El Salvador survey was eight. The El Salvador 
surveys concluded in mid March 2012, roughly two weeks after the conclusion of field work in 
the United States. 82 percent of families in El Salvador completed the survey. The experiment in 
the El Salvador survey was also conducted at the end of the survey. Figure 1.1 describes the 
phases of the project in the order that they occurred for each pair of participants.  
1.3.1 Migrant experiment 
The migrant experiment consisted of an incentivized remittance sending decision. 
Migrants were told that they were being given the chance to win $600 and would have to decide 
how much of the prize to keep for themselves and how much to send to their family member in 
El Salvador. Migrants could split the $600 as they wished, but were restricted to using $100 
intervals for simplicity.28 The prize was awarded through a lottery.29 Although budgetary 
25 24% of migrants approached participated. Of those that did not participate, 77% did not know an eligible student 
in El Salvador, 14% refused, 7% were not from El Salvador, and 2% had other reasons.  
26 This was a randomized intervention and migrants received offers of different versions of the product depending on 
their assigned treatment group. Migrants in a control group received only information and no product offer. 
27 Although the migrants were not required to select a family member as the student, in practice 97% did. 
28 In pilot surveys where migrants were not limited to $100 intervals, almost all chose to split the money in $100 
intervals. 
29 Two prizes were awarded. If asked, surveyors told migrants the number of prizes and the date of the drawing. The 
first prize was awarded midway through survey work and the second when survey work had concluded. Migrants 
were eligible for only one drawing. 
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restrictions did not allow for all participants to win the prize, the use of the lottery incentivized 
participants to treat this as a real decision.30 In the Ashraf et al. (2011) study of a similar 
population of Salvadoran migrants, migrant median monthly income was $2,080. Consequently, 
$600 represents a significant increase in monthly income. The question text can be found in 
Appendix A. Migrants were randomly allocated into two groups: those who were told that their 
choice would be revealed to their family member, and those who were told that their choice 
would not be revealed. In all cases the family member referred to in the question was the person 
to be surveyed in El Salvador: the student if the student was 18 or over, or the student’s guardian 
if the student was under 18. A description of the treatments is presented in Figure 1.2. 
By offering migrants the chance to win $600 in extra income, this experiment essentially 
places migrants in the high income state discussed in the framework and randomly varies the 
probability that that extra income will be observed.31 This allows for an explicit test of whether, 
as predicted by the model, migrants are more likely to deviate from their agreements with family 
members and send less money home when the probability that that deviation will be detected is 
low. Because changes in the probability of detection essentially vary the ability of the recipient 
to monitor the migrant’s actions, I refer to this treatment as the migrant monitoring treatment. 
Viewing the experiment in the context of the model leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:  
Migrants in the treatment group where the migrant choice is revealed to recipients (i.e. 
where the probability of detection is one) should send more than migrants whose choice is not 
revealed. However, this effect should vary by migrant-recipient pair. In pairs where recipients 
cannot threaten strong punishments, migrants are not affected by the probability of detection and 
therefore there will be no impact of the monitoring treatment when they make the decision about 
how much money to keep and how much to send to the recipient. Their entire remittance will be 
motivated by altruism. Migrant responses from the baseline survey can be used to proxy for the 
30 Laury (2005) conducts a laboratory experiment in which respondents are shown to make the same choices when 
payoffs are random as when payoffs are guaranteed. 
31 The design of the experiment assigns 𝑝ℎ = 1. 𝑝𝑙 is equal to the baseline recipient ability to observe the migrant’s 
windfall in the absence of the experiment. Use of extreme values does not alter the predictions of the model, 
although information asymmetries are more likely to be important the greater the difference between 𝑝𝑙 and 𝑝ℎ. This 
affects the external validity of the results if the probability that income will be observed is unlikely to be close to 
one. However, given that the networks within which migrants in the United States live and work are often closely 
related to their home country networks (Munshi, 2003), instances when the probability that income will be observed 
is quite high are likely. 
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recipient ability to punish migrants.  
1.3.2 Recipient experiment 
The recipient experiment consisted of an incentivized remittance spending decision. The 
respondents in the El Salvador phone survey were told that because their family member in the 
United States participated in the study, they now had the chance to win a remittance worth $300.  
They had to decide what to spend the remittance on and were asked to split the $300 in any way 
they wished among four spending categories: restaurant meals, education, daily expenses, and 
health expenses. Recipient choices were limited to four categories for simplicity of 
implementation in the context of a phone survey. If among the winners, recipients would receive 
exactly the allocations that they requested.32 Prizes were awarded in kind. The median monthly 
remittance in the Ashraf et al. (2011) study was $325, so a $300 remittance is a standard amount 
for many recipients. The question text can be found in Appendix B. Two separate treatments 
were administered to recipients, the recipient monitoring treatment and the recipient 
communication treatment. 
Recipient monitoring treatment:  
 In a parallel treatment to the migrant monitoring treatment, recipients were randomly 
allocated into two groups: those who were told that their choice would be revealed to the 
migrant, and those who were told that their choice would not be revealed to the migrant. This 
treatment randomly varied the probability that recipient spending would be observed and is an 
explicit test of the model’s prediction that recipients are more likely to strategically deviate when 
the probability of detection is low. 
Recipient communication treatment: 
 During the US survey, migrants were told about the lottery for recipients and asked what 
their preferences were for how the recipients would spend the money. Again, recipients were 
randomly allocated into two groups: those for whom the migrant’s preferences were revealed and 
those for whom the migrant’s preferences were not revealed. Making these preferences clear is a 
proxy for improving communication, and this treatment is therefore a test of whether or not 
communication costs can lead to inadvertent deviation from migrant preferences by the recipient. 
 The two recipient treatments were cross randomized, also allowing for the analysis of 
32 Four prizes were awarded. If asked, surveyors told recipients the number of prizes and the date of the drawing. 
Two prizes were awarded midway through survey work and the other two when survey work had concluded. 
Recipients were eligible for only one drawing. 
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their interaction. They are depicted in Figure 1.3. Viewing the recipient experiment in the 
context of the model results in the following hypotheses for recipient behavior: 
Hypothesis 2: 
Recipients in the treatment group where their choices are revealed to the migrant (i.e. 
where the probability of detection is one) should make choices that are closer to the migrants’ 
preferences than recipients whose choice is not revealed. This effect should not be evident in 
pairs where the migrant cannot threaten a strong punishment. In these cases the extent to which 
the recipient complies with the migrant preferences will depend wholly on altruism. 
Hypothesis 3: 
Revealing migrant preferences to the recipient should decrease the difference between the 
recipients’ choices and the migrants’ preferences when communication problems exist. This 
effect will not necessarily depend on the potential punishment because communication issues 
may affect compliance with migrant preferences compelled by the migrant as well as altruistic 
compliance by the recipient. 
1.3.3 Experiment logistics 
 In order for the experiment to work as intended, respondents must have believed that the 
threat of revealing their choices to their family members was credible. Because the interviewer 
collected contact information for the recipient families from the migrants and allowed the 
migrants to use a project phone during the interview to call their family members and tell them 
about the study, migrants were aware that their family members could indeed be contacted. 
Similarly, because recipients being interviewed knew that they had been contacted through the 
migrant, they also knew that their migrant family members could be contacted. Although it has 
no impact on the results of the experiment, for all respondents in the “choice revealed” treatment 
groups of the monitoring treatments, an effort was made to inform their family member of the 
choice made by the participant. After both the migrant and recipient survey had been completed, 
text messages were sent to the appropriate participants informing them of the choice of their 
family members. Participants without cellular phones received a phone call from a project staff 
member with the information. 
The randomization in this study was performed at the participant level. Surveys were pre-
assigned treatment status before being sent into the field and migrant and recipient treatments 
were randomized separately. Because remittance behavior can vary by season it was important to 
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ensure that treatments were balanced over time.33 I achieved this by stratifying the randomization 
for all treatments within groups of 16 surveys and by the treatment offered in the companion 
experiment. The recipient treatments were additionally stratified by the migrant treatment. 
Because the experiment was conducted in conjunction with the baseline survey it was not 
possible to stratify on individual baseline characteristics. 
1.3.4 Threats to interpretation 
Although the experimental methodology used in this paper allows for the causal 
identification of the effects of information asymmetries that are otherwise difficult to isolate, 
there are several aspects of the experimental design that could lead to arguments that 
participants’ behavior in the experiment is not the same as it would be in their day-to-day lives. 
The first of these is that the experiments, particularly the migrant experiment, ask participants to 
make decisions about windfall income that is given to them rather than earned, and that migrants 
may be more generous with this income than they would be with other income. There are several 
responses to this. First, although it is true that the income in the experiment is transitory and not 
permanent, many of the migrants in this study work in jobs where income is highly variable from 
month to month, making transitory vs. permanent income a less important distinction.  Second, 
studies that have examined earned vs. unearned windfall income have found that people are more 
generous with unearned winnings, but that the effect is small (Jakiela, 2009). Finally, the focus 
of the paper is not on the total amount sent by the migrants, but on the effect of the monitoring 
treatment on the amount sent. The issues discussed here should apply equally to each treatment 
group. If anything, if migrants in the choice not revealed group are more able to keep the funds 
for themselves, the impact of the monitoring treatment should increase as migrants feel more 
ownership over the winnings, meaning that the results in this paper can be considered a lower 
bound on the true effect. 
A second potential issue is that in both the migrant and recipient experiment prizes were 
awarded by lottery, meaning that the expected value of the prize for each participant is much 
lower than the value of the actual prize. There is a concern that participants may be more 
generous or less likely to make decisions that may upset their partner because they know they are 
unlikely to win the lottery prize. Although little research has been done into how experimental 
33 In particular, the time period of the study included December, the most popular month for remittance sending due 
to Christmas. 
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subjects react to lottery prizes, some evidence does exist. Laury (2005) conducts a laboratory 
experiment in which respondents are shown to make the same choices when payoffs are random 
as when payoffs are guaranteed. Additionally, again because the questions in this paper relate to 
the differences between the treatment groups, if the lottery does impact participants’ decisions, 
we can again consider the estimated effect to be a lower bound on the true effect.  
The final issue is that of the fungibility of choices made during the experiment. Both 
migrants and recipients could potentially undo their choices during the experiment through their 
actions afterwards. Migrants could choose to not send a remittance that they would have sent 
otherwise, and recipients could comply with migrant wishes during the experiment and then 
make purchases later that the migrant would not agree with. Although it is possible that some of 
this behavior is occurring, it is again not necessarily important for the interpretation of the 
impacts of the treatment. If the results show differences between the two treatments then that is 
evidence that people are reacting to variations in information.34  
 
1.4 Data and estimation strategy 
1.4.1 Data 
 The migrant baseline survey collected extensive information on migrant and recipient 
demographics and characteristics of migrant family relationships both in the United States and in 
El Salvador. It contained detailed information on remittances sent by the migrant to the recipient 
household and to other households and a set of questions to assess the quality of the migrant’s 
relationship with the recipient household and the migrant’s involvement in household affairs. 
The recipient survey, administered by phone, was shorter and contained demographic 
information and some limited questions on remittances received from the migrant.35  
 Table 1.1 shows summary statistics from both the migrant and the recipient surveys. 
1,581 migrant surveys were performed and, of those migrant surveys, 1,298 recipient surveys 
were successfully completed. This is a completion rate of 82 percent. For the migrant survey, 
summary statistics are shown both for the full sample and the sample with completed recipient 
surveys. No meaningful differences are evident between the two samples; therefore I limit the 
34 Even without evidence of differences between treatments, if participants wish to do something that their partner 
would disagree with it makes sense for them to take advantage of the experiment to do so, when the probability of 
keeping that action secret is high. 
35 It also contained an extensive module on the education of children in the household. 
                                                          
20
analysis sample to the 1,298 migrant-recipient pairs with completed El Salvador surveys.36 This 
allows me to examine the behavior of migrants and recipients in the exact same sample. 
Importantly, results from the migrant experiment do not change significantly between the two 
samples. Additionally, I show that attrition from the full sample of migrant surveys to the sample 
of completed recipient surveys is not related to treatment status (Tables 1.2 and 1.3 below). 
In the final analysis sample, the treatment breakdown is as follows. For the migrant 
monitoring treatment there are 648 migrants in the “migrant choice not revealed to recipient” 
group and 650 in the “migrant choice revealed to recipient” group. In the recipient monitoring 
treatment there are 638 people in the “recipient choice not revealed to migrant” group and 660 in 
the “recipient choice revealed to migrant” group. For the recipient communication treatment 
there are 641 people in the “migrant preference not revealed to recipient” group and 657 in the 
“migrant preference revealed to recipient” group. These breakdowns into treatment groups can 
be seen in Figure 1.2 (migrant experiment) and Figure 1.3 (recipient experiment). 
 The migrants are half male and half female with an average age of 38. Importantly, 85 
percent have sent remittances to the recipient household in the last 12 months, indicating that 
most pairs in the sample have an established remittance relationship. Average annual remittances 
to the recipient household (reported by the migrant) are $2,629.37 Average annual remittances to 
other households in El Salvador are $1,059. The $1,600 difference between average remittances 
to the recipient household and average remittances to other households suggests that in most 
cases the recipient household is the migrant’s primary remittance recipient. The mean number of 
years in the United States is 11, so the sample is composed largely of migrants who are 
established in the United States. 32 percent of migrants report having a son or daughter aged 22 
or under in El Salvador and 69 percent report communicating with the recipient household at 
least weekly. The sample is also low income; half of the migrants report earning $400 a week or 
less.38 Because of the structure of the project, the interviewed recipients are either the student 
identified by the migrant (45 percent) or the student’s guardian if the student is under 18 (40 
percent). The remaining 15 percent of interviews were done with a different adult in the 
36 Additionally 10 observations are lost because respondents did not answer the questions that made up the 
experiment.  
37 Remittance data on the recipient survey was collected by asking the migrant for the average value of remittances 
sent and the frequency of those remittances. The migrant was additionally asked to report the annual amounts of 
remittances sent for special occasions or emergencies. 
38 Respondents were asked to classify the combined income of them and their co-resident spouses into one of four 
categories: $400 weekly or less, $401 - $600 weekly, $601 to $800 weekly, $801 or more weekly. 
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household if the indicated student or guardian could not be reached. The recipient sample is 
heavily female (68 percent) because identified student guardians tend to be female.   
 Because migrants were recruited in the Salvadoran consulate and screened into the study 
on the basis of having a young adult relative in El Salvador, a concern may be that the 
respondents are not representative of the larger migrant community and that the results are 
therefore not indicative of what might be found in a more representative sample. In Table 1.A.1, 
I compare characteristics of the migrants from the baseline survey (gender, age, time in the US, 
household size and education) to migrants in the 2008-2010 American Community Survey 
(ACS). I restrict the ACS sample to non-US citizens aged 18 to 65 who live in the Washington, 
DC metro area who are either Salvadoran born or Hispanic. The study participants are quite 
similar to the ACS samples, in particular to the Salvadoran born sample, suggesting that study 
participants are not overly different from the greater migrant population. 
 Table 1.1 also provides suggestive evidence that information asymmetries may be 
important in these transnational households. Because monitoring and communication costs 
should be much less important when migrants and recipients agree about how remittances should 
be spent, I examine whether migrants and recipients have different preferences. During the 
baseline surveys, both were asked to list the three most important budget priorities for the 
recipient household from a set list of seven categories: food and other basic expenses, health, 
education, savings, entertainment, home improvement and transport. Despite significant 
bunching of responses in the first three categories (food, health and education), only 48 percent 
of pairs report the same three priorities, suggesting that migrant and recipient preferences for the 
spending of remittances do differ to some extent. I also check whether communication costs are 
likely to be important by testing the migrant’s knowledge of the recipient household. Only 24 
percent of migrants could correctly estimate the student’s GPA as reported by the recipient, and 
only 43 percent could correctly report the mode of transport a student uses to get to school.39 
Although this is not the same thing as recipients not understanding how migrants want them to 
spend remittances, it is evidence that knowledge does not necessarily flow freely between 
countries.  
39 The questions about student GPA and transport to school were only asked when the student is reported to be in 
school. Migrants were asked to report the student’s GPA within a 2 point (out of 10) range while recipients reported 
an exact number. The migrant was said to have correctly reported the GPA if the recipient’s response was within the 
range the migrant indicated. 
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 The random assignment of the treatments in this experiment allows for the causal 
identification of their impacts. Randomization should provide treatment groups that are the same 
on average so that any difference between the groups can be attributed to the treatment and not 
some pre-existing difference between groups. Tables 1.2 and 1.3 test whether the treatment 
groups are balanced on observed characteristics from the baseline survey for the treatment 
groups for the migrant experiment and the recipient experiments respectively. In Table 1.2 the 
means for both treatment groups in the migrant monitoring treatment are presented in the first 
two columns and the p-value of the hypothesis test of whether or not those means are equal is in 
the third column. Overall the treatment groups are well balanced: only two of 34 differences are 
significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. Table 1.3 shows the means by treatment 
group for the two recipient treatments and p-values for differences in those means. Again the 
groups are well balanced, only three of the 34 p-values for the recipient monitoring treatment and 
one of the 34 p-values for the recipient communication treatment are less than 0.10. Some 
differences between treatment groups may occur by chance, and these few small differences are 
not cause for concern. However, to allay any concerns of an unbalanced sample affecting results, 
I include regression specifications with control variables.  
 The first row of both Tables 1.2 and 1.3 also test whether attrition from the full sample of 
migrants to the estimation sample of migrant-recipient pairs with completed recipient surveys is 
related to treatment. Attrition is not significantly related to treatment for migrants or recipients. 
1.4.2 Estimation strategy 
Migrant experiment 
 The results of the migrant experiment can be analyzed by estimating the following 
regression using ordinary least squares: 
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖 =  𝛿 + 𝛼𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖 +  𝑋𝑖′𝛾 +  𝜀𝑖                                                           (1)
where 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖 is the dependent variable indicating the amount that the migrant chose to send to 
the recipient, or, alternatively, an indicator for whether or not the migrant chose to send all $600. 
𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖 is the treatment indicator for the monitoring treatment, and it is equal to one 
when the migrant’s choice is revealed to the recipient. The coefficient 𝛼 is the average difference 
between how much migrants choose to send when their decisions are not revealed and when they 
are. If 𝛼 is positive, migrants send more money to the recipients when 𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖 equals 
one. 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of control variables that includes migrant age, gender, education, household 
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size, years in the United States, remittances to recipient household, and other migrant 
background characteristics. It also includes fixed effects for randomization stratification group. 
Because treatment is randomly determined, the inclusion of control variables is not necessary for 
casual inference, but I will show specifications with and without the controls to show that they 
do not affect the results. 𝜀𝑖 is the error term, which I adjust for heteroskedasticity. 
Recipient experiment 
 Unless average migrant preferences and average recipient preferences are different, 
regressions examining the impact of the treatment on the amounts allocated to the four different 
categories by the recipients will be uninformative. However, because the US survey collected the 
migrant’s preferences over the recipient’s choices for all participants, it is possible to examine 
the exact parameter described in the model guiding the experiment: the extent to which the 
recipient’s choices match the migrant’s preferences. I operationalize this concept as the absolute 
value of the difference between the recipient’s choice and the migrant’s preference in each of the 
four categories. I also create a summary measure across the four categories by summing the four 
difference variables and dividing by two to scale the total to 300. I refer to this as the total 
difference, and it is the primary dependent variable of interest. It is a measure of the number of 
dollars out of the 300 on which the migrant and recipient match. For example, a total difference 
of 100 would mean the recipient’s choices matched the migrant’s preferences on 200 of the 300 
dollars, but that they allocated the remaining 100 dollars to different categories.  
 The results of the recipient experiment can be analyzed by estimating the following 
regression:
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 =  𝜑 + 𝛽1𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖 +  𝑍𝑖′𝜃 + 𝜇𝑖      (2)
where 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 is the difference between migrant preferences and recipient choices in each 
of the four spending categories or the total difference. 𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖 is the treatment 
indicator for the recipient monitoring treatment and is equal to one when the recipient’s choice is 
revealed to the migrant. 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖is the treatment indicator for the communication 
treatment and is equal to one when the migrant’s preferences are revealed to the recipient before 
the recipient decides how to allocate the remittance funds. The coefficient 𝛽1 is the average 
difference in the difference between migrant preferences and recipient choices when the recipient 
choice is not revealed as compared to when it is revealed. Similarly, 𝛽2 is the average difference 
in the difference between migrant preferences and recipient choices when the migrant’s 
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preferences are revealed to the recipient as compared to when they are not revealed. If, as 
predicted, revealing the recipients’ choices to the migrants and communicating the migrants’ 
preferences to the recipients causes the recipients to make choices more similar to the migrants’ 
preferences, then the difference variable will be smaller in the “choice revealed” and “preference 
revealed” treatment groups, and 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 should be negative. 𝑍𝑖 includes the same variables as 
𝑋𝑖 in the migrant experiment as well as recipient gender, age, education, household size and the 
number of days between the migrant and recipient survey. Fixed effects for randomization 
stratification variables (survey group and migrant treatment) are also included. 𝜇𝑖 is the error 
term, which I adjust for heteroskedasticity.  
I also examine the interactions of the two treatments. It is possible, for example, that any 
impacts of the monitoring treatment could be amplified by revealing migrant preferences. 
Therefore, I also estimate an alternative specification with indicators for each unique 
combination of the monitoring and communication treatments. 
 
1.5 Results 
1.5.1 Migrant experiment 
 I first analyze the results of the migrant experiment in which migrants make an 
incentivized decision over how much of a potential $600 windfall to send to the recipient and 
how much to keep. Figure 1.4 shows the distribution of the amount sent by migrants, separately 
by treatment group. Because the experimental protocol limited migrants to splitting the money in 
100 dollar increments, the distributions are discrete. The first observation to be made from this 
figure is that the migrants send large amounts: over half of the migrants in both treatment groups 
choose to send the entire $600 to the recipient. The other smaller spike in both distributions is at 
$300 where migrants decide to split the money equally between themselves and the recipient. 
Despite the fact that the two distributions follow the same basic shape, differences are evident. 
Specifically, the spike at sending everything is smaller when choices are not revealed (53 percent 
versus 58 percent) and the percent of migrants choosing to send $400 and less is higher (44 
percent versus 38 percent). The difference between the two treatment groups is visually clearer 
in Figure 1.5 which graphs the cumulative distributions of the amount sent by the migrant by 
treatment group. The spikes at $300 and $600 are clearly apparent, and it is also easy to see that 
the distribution of the choices in the “choice revealed” treatment group is always below the 
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distribution of choices in the “choice not revealed” group.  
The fact that almost all migrants in the “choice not revealed” treatment group choose to 
send something is consistent with the model presented in Section II, where migrants who deviate 
when the probability of detection is low still send positive amounts in remittances. Additionally, 
given that the experimentally induced “low” probability that recipients will observe migrant 
income is small, the fact that most migrants in this group choose to send the entire $600 is 
suggestive that the altruistic component of remittances is high.40 However, the differences 
between the two distributions are evidence that information asymmetries also seem to play a 
role. Migrants whose choices are not revealed are choosing to send less home. 
 These results are formalized in Table 1.4 using a regression framework that estimates 
regression equation 1 from Section IV of this paper. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show results for amount 
sent by the migrant and columns 4, 5, and 6 for an indicator variable indicating whether or not 
the migrant sent everything. Columns 1 and 4 are a simple regression of the dependent variable 
on treatment status, columns 2 and 5 include stratification cell fixed effects, and columns 3 and 6 
further add the demographic control variables.41 The results are robust to the exclusion of control 
variables, although the impact of treatment on the migrant sending everything is no longer 
significant when controls for stratification cell are included because the magnitude of the 
coefficient drops slightly. Migrants send $20 to $24 more when their choice will be revealed, 
which represents a 5 percent increase over the “not revealed” group mean. Additionally, 
migrants are 4 to 5 percentage points more likely to send everything when their decision will be 
revealed to the recipient, but the coefficient is not quite statistically significant at standard levels 
when control variables are added. 
 Table 1.4 also reports the coefficients on the demographic control variables included in 
columns 3 and 6. Five characteristics predict the migrant’s choice. Female migrants send on 
average $26 less than male migrants. Although women keep more on average than men, the 
effect of the treatment does not vary by gender (results not shown, available from the author on 
40 The amount sent by the “not revealed” treatment group is not necessarily completely due to altruism. Recall that, 
according to the framework, migrants must send an amount that makes their deviation credible. Additionally, 
migrants may be reacting to a certain level of baseline recipient monitoring that exists outside of the experimental 
construct. 
41 Control variables are migrant gender, age, years of education, household size, years in the US, whether the 
migrant lives with his/her spouse, whether the migrant has a child 22 or under in El Salvador, whether the recipient 
is the migrant’s close relative, whether the migrant is in the lowest income bracket, migrant’s annual remittances to 
the recipient household and whether the migrant communicates with the recipient household weekly. 
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request). Migrants who have been in the United States for longer send more, although the effect 
is small. Migrants who live with their spouses send $29 less than those who do not. This is likely 
because they have greater financial obligations in the United States and are more likely to have 
their immediate family with them in the United States. Migrants in the lowest income bracket are 
estimated to send $22 less on average than those in the other income brackets. Finally, total 
annual remittances sent are positively correlated with amount sent in the experiment. The 
coefficient is small, but the relationship suggests that migrant behavior in the experiment is 
related to real world migrant behavior. 
 The results in Table 1.4 show that information asymmetries can affect migrants making 
remittance decisions, and that at least some migrants take strategic advantage of a situation 
where the probability that their income will be observed is very low. The size of the effect (a $20 
increase in amount sent when the migrant’s choice is revealed) is not large, but it is similar to the 
size of the documented correlations with the demographic variables in column 3 of Table 1.4. 
The size of the effect is also comparable to those in experimental studies in families (Hoel, 2012) 
and social networks (Leider et al., 2009; Ligon and Schechter, 2012) that study the effects of 
making choices in dictator games known to the recipient. For example, Ligon and Schechter find 
that 91 percent of sharing in their experiment is related to altruistic motives. However, they also 
find that strategic behavior in their games predicts real-world strategic behavior, while altruistic 
behavior in the games does not predict any real-world activity. This suggests that strategic 
behavior may in fact be even more important outside of the experimental context than within it.42 
 Information from the baseline survey allows for further investigation of the mechanics of 
this result. Specifically, the model presented in Section II predicts that information asymmetries 
are only important in pairs where the recipients are inducing migrants to send remittances above 
what they would have sent altruistically through the threat of punishment. If recipients cannot 
threaten punishment then no differences between treatment groups should be observed. 
 Several variables from the baseline survey can plausibly be thought to proxy for 
punishment costs described in Section II. I examine how the treatment effect varies by these 
variables. I do not have a perfect measure of these potential punishment costs (and certainly one 
42 The effect size can also be compared to other studies with experimental designs that are not as similar. Jakiela and 
Ozier (2012) estimate a 4 percent kin tax on income in an experiment where participants sacrifice returns on income 
in order to keep it secret. Goldberg (2011) estimates a 7 percent sharing tax on income in an experiment where she 
compares the spending of the winners of public lotteries to the winners of private lotteries. 
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would be hard to obtain), but by showing a consistent pattern with all five of these variables the 
argument that ability to punish is important is convincing. The five variables, the predicted 
relationship with punishment ability, and the rationale for choosing them are described below. 
• Migrant years in the United States (negative correlation with punishment ability): A 
migrant’s reputation at home is important for migrants who wish to return, and the 
probability of return may decline with length of time in the United States. With time it is 
also more likely that the migrant has paid off any debts related to his initial migration 
costs. The median number of years in the United States is 10.  
• Migrant has a child 22 or under in El Salvador (positive correlation with punishment 
ability): Migrants who have left a non-adult child in El Salvador may have left that child 
in the care of the recipient. The possibility of child care that does not meet the migrant’s 
preferences could be a powerful tool to compel migrants to send more money home. 34 
percent of migrants have a son or daughter aged 22 or under in El Salvador. 43 
• Migrant and the recipient are closely related (positive correlation with punishment 
ability): This is defined as spouses or parent and child. Being closely related can mean 
both that migrants have entrusted recipients with the care of things that are important to 
them and that positive relationships with the recipients are valuable to the migrants.  31 
percent of migrants and recipients are closely related.  
• Migrant communicates with recipient household at least once a week (positive 
correlation with punishment ability): Frequent communication is a sign that migrants 
value their relationships with recipients. 71 percent of migrants report communicating at 
least weekly with the recipient household. 
• Remittances sent by migrant to recipient household (positive correlation with punishment 
ability): Because remittance relationships where recipients induce migrants to send 
money result in higher remittance payments, higher remittances may indicate high 
punishment costs. The median annual remittance total to the recipient household reported 
by the migrant is $1,800. 
 Although these variables are all plausible proxies for punishment costs, given that they 
43 The 22 and under cutoff is used because it was available on the survey which measured the number of young 
relatives up to college age the migrant had in El Salvador. The structure of the question does not allow me to 
identify whether the child is in the recipient’s home or not. 
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generally indicate a stronger or closer relationship between migrant and recipient it could be 
argued that they may also be proxies for higher levels of altruism. It is true that in general 
punishment costs and altruism may be correlated, but as described in the model, altruistic 
remittances should not be affected by variations in monitoring. In other words, if these variables 
were proxies for only altruism and not punishment ability, the treatment effect of monitoring in 
the high altruism sub-groups should not be higher than in low-altruism sub-groups. Additionally, 
the mean amount sent in the treatment group where decisions are not revealed is in every case 
lower in the high punishment cost sub-groups than in the low punishment cost sub-groups. 
Because payments in this “choice not revealed” treatment group should be largely motivated by 
altruism, this is evidence that the variables chosen are representing more than just higher levels 
of altruism. 
 Table 1.5 presents regression results by subsamples of these variables. For the continuous 
variables (years in the US and remittances) the sample is split at the sample median, and for the 
binary variables (child in El Salvador, close relationship, and weekly communication) the sample 
is split according to the two values of the variable. Panel 1 presents regressions without any 
control variables and Panel 2 presents regressions with stratification group fixed effects. The 
results are striking in that for each of these variables, the treatment effects are almost entirely 
concentrated in the subsample where punishment costs should be higher (columns 2, 4, 6, 8 and 
10). These treatment effects are larger and more precisely estimated than in the full sample: 
depending on the subsample, coefficients range from 32 to 56 more dollars sent when the choice 
is revealed. These numbers are about 7 to 13 percent of the average amount sent in the “choice 
not revealed” group. In the subsamples where punishment costs should be low (columns 1, 3, 5, 
7, and 9) the coefficients are all small and do not approach statistical significance. The table also 
reports the p-values on the test for equality of the treatment effects in the two subsamples for 
each of the five proxy variables. Two of the five coefficient pairs in both panels are statistically 
significantly different from each other. An alternate specification that utilizes the first principal 
component of the five proxy variables as a summary measure yields similar results (Table 
1.A.2). These results are consistent with the model’s prediction that when punishment costs are 
low, variation in the observability of migrant income will not affect migrant remittance 
decisions. 
 An alternative explanation of the results in the migrant experiment is that migrants, 
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instead of being motivated by a remittance contract with the recipient, simply care about being 
perceived as altruistic and utilize the “choice revealed” treatment to signal that altruism to their 
family. This concept of signaling altruism was developed by Bénabou and Tirole (2006). I 
cannot definitively rule this out; however, several factors suggest that it is unlikely. For example, 
the strong patterns of heterogeneity by sub-group are directly connected to the theoretical 
framework presented here, but it is not obvious how they would relate to a story about signaling. 
To be consistent with the sub-group results, the variables that describe recipient punishment 
ability would also have to represent groups to which migrants cared about appearing altruistic.  
However, across all sub-groups, the migrants’ allocations in the “not revealed” treatment group 
are high, suggesting that migrants are altruistic to all recipients. If the signaling story were true it 
would then have to be the case that true altruism and the desire to signal altruistic behavior were 
not at all correlated. Additionally, as noted in Table 1.5, the effect of revealing the migrant’s 
choice is concentrated in pairs where actual remittances to the recipient are above the sample 
median. Given that these are migrants who would have repeatedly signaled their generosity 
already, it is not clear why migrants who send fewer remittances overall would not take 
advantage of this low cost opportunity to do so. 44 
 1.5.2 Recipient experiment 
 Analysis of the migrant experiment found that migrants react strategically to variations in 
the ability of recipients to monitor their income. Previous literature examining information 
asymmetries in remittance behavior has suggested that migrant monitoring of recipients should 
also be important (de Laat, 2008; Ashraf et al., 2011; Chen, 2013). To look for these effects in 
the context of this experiment, I now turn to analysis of the recipient experiment in which 
recipients allocated a potential $300 remittance prize among four different spending categories. 
Mean amounts allocated to different spending categories by recipients and migrants are 
presented in Table 1.6. The first two columns show the mean amounts allocated by recipients 
broken down by the recipient monitoring treatment and columns 3 and 4 show mean recipient 
allocations by the recipient communication treatment. The fifth column shows the means of the 
preferences reported by the migrant.45 Across both recipients and migrants education is the most 
44 Although the context is different, in an experiment studying the social networks of Harvard students, Leider, et al. 
(2009) are able to definitely rule out the signaling explanation for non-anonymous giving in favor of one based on 
reciprocity and future interactions. 
45 Recall that migrant preferences for the recipient’s decision were solicited from all migrants. 
                                                          
30
popular choice.46 Daily expenses are the next most popular category, followed closely by health 
and finally restaurant meals. As discussed previously, unless clear differences between migrant 
and recipient preferences are evident in the population on average, an analysis of the impact of 
treatment on amounts allocated to different categories will not be interesting. Although migrants 
allocate less to education than recipients and more to daily expenses, health expenses and 
restaurant meals, regressions of treatment on the raw amounts recipients choose to allocate to the 
different categories do not reveal any interesting patterns (shown in Table 1.A.3). 
 A more revealing analysis utilizes the data collected from both the migrant and the 
recipient to analyze how the treatments affect the pair-level differences between their choices. 
Table 1.7 displays the mean differences by recipient treatment. The results are displayed 
separately for the monitoring treatment and the communication treatment; the means from the 
monitoring treatment and p-values testing the equality of those means are in the first three 
columns and the corresponding information for the communication treatment is in the last three 
columns. Means of the differences for the four spending categories as well as the mean total 
difference are shown. For both treatments the prediction is that the difference will be smaller in 
the “revealed” treatment group. When the probability spending choices will be observed is high 
or when recipients are well informed about migrant preferences, recipients should more greatly 
adhere to those preferences. 
 This prediction is not borne out for the monitoring treatment. For all spending categories 
and the total difference, the means across the two treatment groups are essentially equal. 
However, differences are evident for the communication treatment. In all categories the 
difference between recipient choices and migrant preferences is smaller when the migrants’ 
preferences are revealed than when they are not. Although of the spending categories only the 
difference for education is significant, importantly so is the total difference, implying that 
migrants and recipients are getting closer together overall. The $14 reduction in the total 
difference is driven by the difference in education spending with the corresponding reductions in 
the differences in other categories being split between daily and health expenses and, to a lesser 
46 The preference for education may be partly due to the fact that participants answered this question at the 
conclusion of a survey that was rather heavily focused on questions about education, meaning that they may have 
been primed to consider education. This is not necessarily a problem as there is no reason to believe that either 
migrants or recipients were more primed than the other. 
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extent, spending on restaurant meals.47 
 Table 1.8 shows these results in regression format and adds control variables. Panel 1 
shows the results from estimating the regression equation that estimates the effect of each 
treatment separately and panel 2 presents the results of estimating an alternate specification that 
considers the separate effects of the four distinct treatment combinations. The “recipient choice 
not revealed to migrant, migrant preference not revealed to recipient” group is the omitted 
category. The dependent variables in columns 1 through 4 are the migrant-recipient differences 
in restaurant spending, education spending, spending on daily expenses, and health spending 
respectively. The dependent variable in columns 5, 6, and 7 is the total migrant-recipient 
difference. Column 6 adds stratification cell fixed effects and column 7 additionally adds 
demographic control variables. The control variables are the same as those presented in Table 1.4 
with the addition of recipient gender, age, years of education and household size and a control 
for number of days between the migrant and the recipient survey. 
 The results in panel 1 replicate the results from Table 1.7 almost exactly. Controlling for 
the other treatment does not change either estimate. In addition, the results are robust to the 
addition of all control variables (results for individual spending categories not shown but 
available upon request). The results in panel 2 show that the same conclusion is drawn when 
considering the separate impacts of the four groups. Focusing on the total difference results in 
columns 5 and 6, the coefficients on the “recipient choice not revealed to migrant, migrant 
preference revealed to recipient” and “recipient choice revealed to migrant, migrant preference 
revealed to recipient” groups are both negative and significant, meaning that the total difference 
in these groups is smaller than in the omitted category. These are the two groups where migrant 
preferences are revealed to the recipient and the estimated coefficients are quite similar in 
magnitude to the coefficient on the communication treatment in panel 1. The coefficient on the 
remaining group (“recipient choice revealed to migrant, migrant preference not revealed to 
recipient”) is small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Essentially the specification that 
considers the separate effects of the interacted treatment groups shows the same pattern as the 
specification that considers the treatments separately. Revealing the migrant’s preferences 
lessens the total difference between recipient choices and migrant preferences by $14 or 
47 Mechanically the sum of the differences between the “not revealed” and “revealed” groups over the four 
categories must be equal to twice the difference in the total difference. 
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approximately ten percent of the “recipient choice not revealed to migrant, migrant preference 
not revealed to recipient” mean. The monitoring treatment has no effect. 
 The impact of the communication treatment suggests that migrant preferences do matter 
to recipients and that some deviation from those preferences may be inadvertent. However, the 
lack of impact of the monitoring treatment further implies that recipients do not react 
strategically to changes in the probability of detection. The model presented in Section II 
proposes an explanation for why recipients may not take advantage of the opportunity to hide 
their spending choices from migrants. Migrants simply may have limited ability to punish the 
recipients for not following their preferences. While the results in the migrant experiment are 
that recipient ability to punish varies across recipients, these results from the recipient 
experiment suggest that, in this context, migrant ability to punish is low across the population. In 
practice, this would result in a situation where the migrants have very little power to compel 
recipients to spend the remittances as they wish. 
 Although a limited ability to punish is the explanation for the lack of effect of the 
monitoring treatment that is suggested by the model, it is important to consider other possible 
explanations. The first alternative explanation is that migrant monitoring of recipients is 
essentially perfect and that recipients know that their choices will be discovered if they win. 
However, given that, as reported in Table 1.1, only 24 percent of migrants could correctly report 
student GPA and 43 percent correctly report how students travel to school, it does not seem 
plausible that existing monitoring is good enough across the board as to render the experimental 
variation irrelevant. A second explanation is that migrants and recipients have the same 
preferences for spending, and therefore they make the same choices regardless of punishment 
ability. Certainly this may be true for some families, but if it were true for most, there should not 
be an impact of the recipient communication treatment. Additionally, only 48 percent of migrant-
recipient pairs report the same three budget priorities (Table 1.1), further evidence that there is 
heterogeneity in preferences within families. 
 For completeness, it is instructive to examine how the impacts of the recipient treatments 
may vary by sub-group. For symmetry, I present the results of the recipient experiments broken 
down by the same sub-groups used for analysis in the migrant experiment. Although the ways in 
which the migrant may punish the recipient are less obvious, the variables that indicate valuable 
family relationships should be important, as well as total remittances, given that the threat of 
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withholding remittances may be one of the migrant’s most valuable tools.  
 Table 1.9 shows the results of the recipient experiments by subsample. This table focuses 
only on the total migrant-recipient difference. Panel 1 presents regressions without control 
variables and Panel 2 presents regressions with stratification group fixed effects. In contrast to 
the migrant experiment the subsample analysis reveals no consistent patterns. Other than two 
positive coefficients which may be due to chance, there continues to be no significant impact of 
the monitoring treatment, a result that is not surprising given how close to zero the coefficients in 
the full sample analysis were. The results of the communication treatment are also fairly 
consistent across subsamples. Given that there are no impacts of the monitoring treatment, this 
suggests that any changes due to increased information about migrant preferences will happen 
because of the recipient desire to follow the preferences of the migrant, and this does not 
necessarily vary with the migrant’s ability to punish. The stronger impacts of the communication 
treatment in cases where the migrant has a child 22 or under in El Salvador and where the 
migrant communicates with the recipient household at least weekly could simply suggest that 
recipients in those groups have a greater desire to follow the migrant’s preferences than other 
recipients.  
 A potential criticism of the results in the communication experiment is that recipients 
respond to the information about migrant preferences not because they necessarily want to 
follow the migrants’ preferences, but because they are reacting to being given a suggested 
allocation for the choice they are making. In other words, recipients may have reacted in the 
same way even if the suggested preferences were attributed to someone besides the migrant. I 
can address this concern by examining heterogeneity in the effects of the communication 
treatment by proxies for the quality of information in the relationship. Specifically, in Table 
1.A.4, I estimate regression equation 2 separately by whether or not the migrant can correctly 
report the student’s GPA and mode of transport to school. Although these variables are not direct 
representations of recipient knowledge of migrant preferences, they are likely to be indicative of 
low information quality in general. If recipients are reacting to a lack of knowledge of the 
migrants’ preferences then the effects of the communication treatment should be concentrated 
among pairs where these variables suggest that information quality is low. I find that this is 
indeed the case: effects of the communication treatment are evident only where migrants do not 
know students’ GPAs or modes of transportation to school.  
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1.5.3 Discussion 
 Economic studies of information asymmetries in households with migrants have until 
now focused on migrant monitoring of recipient behavior (Chen, 2012; de Laat, 2008) and the 
impacts of offering migrants greater control over how remittances are spent (Ashraf et al., 2011; 
Chin et al., 2011; Torero and Viceisza, 2011). This is the first study that explicitly looks at the 
effect of information asymmetries on both sides of the remittance relationship – the migrant 
sending of remittances as well as the recipient spending of those remittances. Despite the 
previous emphasis on migrant monitoring, the results of the two monitoring treatments presented 
in this paper are that, in this context, it is only migrants, and not recipients, who strategically 
react to variations in the probability that their actions will be monitored.   
This is an important finding not only because it shows that information asymmetries have 
an important impact on the remittance sending decision, but also because this implies that 
recipients have important power in the migrant-recipient relationship. Although this influence 
has been considered in the extensive literature on the motivations to send remittances, it has not 
previously been rigorously documented empirically. Policymakers who seek to design tools to 
facilitate the sending of remittances and enhance their impacts48 should take the role of the 
recipient in determining remittance amounts into account. Policies that assume that migrants 
have complete autonomy over the manner in which remittances are sent may fall short of their 
full potential. Additionally, the analysis in this paper indicates that because migrants are 
responding to the opportunity to hide income, some of them are already sending home more than 
they would choose to voluntarily. This suggests that, in particular, programs that seek to increase 
remittances will face difficulties within this group. Policy makers should also consider the 
welfare implications of such a policy; the low income status of the migrants in this study 
suggests the possibility that the extra funds could be more efficiently used by the migrants in the 
United States. 
 Additionally, the fact that the monitoring treatment had no effect on the recipient 
spending decision adds a new angle to the recent work on the impact of control on remittance 
behavior (Ashraf et al., 2011; Chin et al., 2011; Torero and Viceisza, 2011). To varying degrees, 
these studies offer migrants direct control over money sent to family members at home. Viewed 
through the framework presented in this paper, control over remittances improves both the 
48 See Yang (2011) for a discussion. 
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monitoring and enforcement of remittance spending contracts, but the existing studies are not 
able to distinguish between the two channels. The results of this study, that migrant monitoring 
of recipient remittance spending does not seem to matter, suggest that if migrants do indeed 
desire control (and the literature is mixed on whether or not they do) it may not be due to an 
inability to monitor the recipients but rather to an inability to effectively punish recipients and 
therefore compel recipients to spend remittances in a certain way. In the absence of punishment 
ability, the ability to control would act as the enforcement mechanism in the migrant-recipient 
contract.  
Overall, the findings that information asymmetries can affect both the sending and 
spending of remittances suggest that interventions or technological innovations that improve 
communication in transnational households could have important effects on financial decisions 
made by both migrants and recipients. In particular, the results of the communication experiment 
imply that for migrants who wish to change the spending behavior of their family members, 
policies that promote improved communication about spending preferences may be an 
inexpensive way to achieve a higher level of compliance with their preferences. Although this 
study only addressed the inadvertent impacts of information asymmetries in the context of 
preferences for the spending of remittances, it is possible that improving communication could 
also alleviate other possible inadvertent effects in the migrant-recipient relationship. For 
example, if recipients do not have a full understanding of migrants’ cost of living in the United 
States, improving that knowledge could lead recipients to expect lower remittance payments. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 This paper analyzes a set of experiments designed to test for the effects of information 
asymmetries in transnational households. First, an experiment among Salvadoran migrants in the 
Washington, DC area examines the extent to which the probability that recipients will observe 
migrant income is a factor in remittance decisions. The migrant’s remittance decision is modeled 
as a combination of money sent for altruistic purposes and money sent because of an agreement 
with the recipient that is enforced with the threat of punishment. The model shows that 
variability in recipient ability to monitor migrant income can lead to migrants strategically 
deviating from this agreement when the probability that their deviation will be detected is low. 
When choosing how much of a potential prize of $600 to keep and how much of it to send to 
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family in El Salvador, migrants send less to their family when the probability that their family 
member will be made aware of their choice is low. Consistent with the model, the effects are 
only present in subsamples of migrants where the cost of the punishment is plausibly high.  
 A second experiment conducted among the family members of the migrant sample 
examines the role of migrant monitoring in the decisions remittance recipients make about how 
to spend the transfers that they receive. The experiment varies whether or not the migrant will be 
informed of how the recipient chose to allocate a potential prize of $300. A simultaneous, cross-
randomized intervention tests whether lowering communication costs by revealing the migrant’s 
specific preferences over the spending decision causes recipients to more closely adhere to these 
preferences. In contrast to the migrant experiment, recipient decisions are not affected by the 
monitoring treatment. However, lowering communication costs by revealing migrant preferences 
does bring recipient choices closer to migrant preferences. 
 This is the first study to explicitly manipulate information asymmetries and causally 
identify their impacts on both sides of transnational households. Although previous work in this 
area has focused on how migrants monitor the actions of recipients or seek to increase control 
over the remittances they send, this study additionally recognizes that recipients have influence 
over how much is sent home by the migrant. In fact, in this experimental context recipient 
influence on migrants is substantially more important than migrant influence on recipients, 
suggesting that recipients hold important power in the migrant-recipient relationship. The results 
also suggest that the desire for migrant control over remittances previously noted in the literature 
(for example, Ashraf et al. 2011) may not be due to the migrants’ inability to monitor recipients, 
but instead to the migrants’ inability to compel recipients to spend remittances as the migrant 
prefers. 
 Although my results are specific to the context of transnational households, they can also 
inform the broader literature on household resource allocation. Whereas previous studies have 
focused only on strategic behavior, I find that both strategic and inadvertent information 
asymmetries can have important impacts on resource allocation. I also find that different types of 
decisions, analogous to the sharing and spending of resources, are affected by information 
imperfections. Finally, I bring the study of information asymmetries outside of the husband-wife 
pair. The heterogeneity in my results suggests that while the strategic effects of information 
asymmetries are important, they may not be relevant for all extended family networks where 
37
resource sharing is observed. However, even when strategic effects are not present, information 
imperfections may still have inadvertent impacts on the final allocation of resources. 
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Figure 1.1: Project timeline 
 
Figure 1.2: Migrant experiment: Treatments 
 





















































N = 327 N = 333 N = 660
N = 641 N = 657
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Figure 1.4: Distribution of amount sent by migrant by treatment group 
 
Notes: Sample is observations with non-missing values for experiment questions and completed recipient survey. 
Choice not revealed: N = 648. Choice revealed: N = 650. 
 
Figure 1.5: Cumulative distribution of amount sent by migrant by treatment group 
 
Notes: Sample is observations with non-missing values for experiment questions and completed recipient survey. 

































0 200 400 600
Amount sent
 Choice not revealed  Choice revealed 
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Mean SD N Mean SD N
Baseline variables from migrant survey
Migrant is female 0.50 0.50 1,581 0.51 0.50 1,298
Migrant age 36.83 9.41 1,538 36.92 9.29 1,264
Migrant can read and write 0.96 0.20 1,554 0.96 0.20 1,275
Migrant's years of education 9.08 4.67 1,560 9.01 4.67 1,282
Migrant's years in the US 11.31 6.38 1,577 11.13 6.27 1,295
Migrant is married 0.62 0.48 1,575 0.63 0.48 1,294
Migrant lives with spouse 0.49 0.50 1,579 0.50 0.50 1,296
Migrant's total number of children 2.28 1.69 1,579 2.34 1.69 1,296
Migrant's number of children in El Salvador 1.01 1.43 1,577 1.07 1.47 1,294
Migrant's number of children in US 1.26 1.32 1,575 1.25 1.29 1,293
Migrant's hh size in US 4.32 1.98 1,581 4.36 1.96 1,298
Migrant has child 22 or under in El Salvador 0.32 0.47 1,581 0.34 0.47 1,298
Recipient is migrant's close relative 0.29 0.45 1,574 0.31 0.46 1,291
Migrant has worked in last 12 months 0.89 0.31 1,581 0.89 0.31 1,298
Migrant in lowest income bracket 0.52 0.50 1,429 0.53 0.50 1,181
Migrant sent remittances to recipient hh 0.85 0.36 1,580 0.87 0.34 1,297
Migrant's annual regular remittances to recipient hh ($) 2,298 2,907 1,565 2,440 2,998 1,283
Migrant's annual irregular remittances to recipient hh ($) 337 706 1,575 344 707 1,293
Migrant's annual total remittances to recipient hh ($) 2,629 3,199 1,563 2,777 3,284 1,281
Migrant's annual total remittances to other hhs ($) 1,097 1,905 1,567 1,123 1,944 1,284
Migrant communicates with recipient hh at least weekly 0.69 0.46 1,578 0.71 0.45 1,295
Baseline variables from recipient survey
Recipient is target student 0.45 0.50 1,298
Recipient is student's guardian 0.40 0.49 1,298
Recipient is female 0.68 0.47 1,298
Recipient age 34.20 15.84 1,295
Recipient is married 0.36 0.48 1,298
Recipient's years of education 9.37 5.27 1,292
Recipient lives in urban area 0.43 0.50 1,298
Recipient's hh size 4.99 2.04 1,296
Annual remittances received from migrant ($) 1,522 1,916 1,203
Baseline comparison variables
Migrant and recipient report same hh budget priorities 0.48 0.50 1,231
Migrant and recipient report same student GPA 0.24 0.43 1,041
Migrant and recipient report same student mode of transport 0.43 0.50 1,107
All Observations Observations with completed recipient survey
Table 1.1: Baseline summary statistics
Notes: All observations sample is respondents with non-missing data for questions in the migrant experiment. Completed recipient 
survey sample additionally conditions on completion of the recipient survey and non-missing migrant and recipient information for 
questions in the recipient experiment. Number of observations varies slightly with missing values. Recipient is defined as close 
relative if migrant reports recipient to be spouse, parent or child. Migrants in the lowest income bracket chose $400 or less as the 
weekly income of themselves plus their co-resident spouses. The other categories were $401-600, $601-800, and $801 and above. 
Annual regular remittances were collected by asking for the frequency of remittances sent and the average amount sent each time. 
Annual irregular remittances are remittances sent for special occasions or emergencies. The recipient variables in all cases refer to 
the person completing the recipient survey. The baseline comparison variables were asked on both surveys and are equal to one if 
the migrant and recipient responses match. Both respondents were asked to choose the three most important budget priorities for 
the recipient hh from a list of seven categories. Student refers to the student identified by the migrant during the baseline survey. 
GPA and mode of transport were only asked when student was reported to be in school.
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Recipient survey completed 0.82 0.83 0.819
Baseline variables from US Survey
Migrant is female 0.53 0.49 0.165
Migrant age 36.90 36.94 0.941
Migrant can read and write 0.95 0.97 0.150
Migrant's years of education 9.01 9.00 0.966
Migrant's years in the US 10.90 11.37 0.178
Migrant is married 0.61 0.65 0.151
Migrant lives with spouse 0.50 0.50 0.956
Migrant's total number of children 2.34 2.34 0.956
Migrant's number of children in El Salvador 1.03 1.10 0.365
Migrant's number of children in US 1.28 1.22 0.410
Migrant's hh size in US 4.34 4.38 0.720
Migrant has child 22 or under in El Salvador 0.32 0.37 0.059
Recipient is migrant's close relative 0.29 0.33 0.178
Migrant has worked in last 12 months 0.90 0.89 0.943
Migrant in lowest income bracket 0.53 0.53 0.886
Migrant sent remittances to recipient hh 0.87 0.86 0.586
Migrant's annual regular remittances to recipient hh ($) 2,494 2,386 0.520
Migrant's annual irregular remittances to recipient hh ($) 354 334 0.627
Migrant's annual total remittances to recipient hh ($) 2,828 2,726 0.579
Migrant's annual total remittances to other hhs ($) 1,059 1,185 0.245
Migrant communicates with recipient hh at least weekly 0.73 0.69 0.057
Baseline variables from recipient survey
Recipient is target student 0.45 0.45 0.907
Recipient is student's guardian 0.42 0.38 0.160
Recipient is female 0.69 0.67 0.331
Recipient age 35.09 33.31 0.043
Recipient is married 0.36 0.36 0.941
Recipient's years of education 9.21 9.54 0.285
Recipient lives in urban area 0.43 0.44 0.649
Recipient's hh size 4.90 5.08 0.111
Annual remittances received from migrant ($) 1,491 1,553 0.580
Baseline comparison variables
Migrant and recipient report same hh budget priorities 0.48 0.48 0.926
Migrant and recipient report same student GPA 0.25 0.24 0.709
Migrant and recipient report same student mode of transport 0.44 0.42 0.573
Table 1.2: Balance tests: Migrant experiment
Treatment group means: P-value for difference 
of means: Choice not 
revealed and choice 
revealed
Notes: Sample is observations with non-missing values for the experiment questions and completed recipient survey. Attrition is measured 
from sample of all migrants who completed the survey and the migrant experiment to sample with completed recipient survey and recipient 
experiment. Sample size for each comparison of means varies slightly by missing values for each variable. The percentage of missing values 
for each variable is also tested for balance across treatment groups with no significant differences. Other notes on variable construction are as 




















Recipient survey completed 0.81 0.83 0.315 0.82 0.83 0.730
Baseline variables from US Survey
Migrant is female 0.52 0.50 0.532 0.49 0.53 0.186
Migrant age 36.56 37.27 0.176 36.90 36.95 0.922
Migrant can read and write 0.95 0.96 0.461 0.96 0.95 0.295
Migrant's years of education 9.02 9.00 0.947 8.97 9.04 0.798
Migrant's years in the US 11.18 11.08 0.774 11.13 11.13 0.993
Migrant is married 0.65 0.61 0.175 0.63 0.63 0.952
Migrant lives with spouse 0.51 0.49 0.543 0.50 0.50 0.957
Migrant's total number of children 2.30 2.38 0.352 2.37 2.31 0.560
Migrant's number of children in El Salvador 1.01 1.12 0.206 1.04 1.09 0.557
Migrant's number of children in US 1.27 1.24 0.725 1.31 1.20 0.105
Migrant's hh size in US 4.43 4.29 0.183 4.43 4.29 0.214
Migrant has child 22 or under in El Salvador 0.33 0.35 0.366 0.34 0.34 0.885
Recipient is migrant's close relative 0.30 0.32 0.539 0.34 0.29 0.059
Migrant has worked in last 12 months 0.89 0.90 0.401 0.89 0.89 0.950
Migrant in lowest income bracket 0.51 0.54 0.229 0.53 0.53 0.934
Migrant sent remittances to recipient hh 0.86 0.88 0.510 0.87 0.87 0.802
Migrant's annual regular remittances to recipient hh ($) 2,435 2,444 0.953 2,315 2,561 0.141
Migrant's annual irregular remittances to recipient hh ($) 382 308 0.062 353 335 0.655
Migrant's annual total remittances to recipient hh ($) 2,802 2,752 0.786 2,648 2,903 0.165
Migrant's annual total remittances to other hhs ($) 1,137 1,110 0.804 1,068 1,177 0.314
Migrant communicates with recipient hh at least weekly 0.73 0.69 0.192 0.70 0.72 0.585
Baseline variables from recipient survey
Recipient is target student 0.44 0.46 0.402 0.46 0.44 0.495
Recipient is student's guardian 0.42 0.38 0.239 0.39 0.41 0.319
Recipient is female 0.68 0.68 0.998 0.68 0.68 0.726
Recipient age 34.44 33.97 0.589 34.29 34.11 0.835
Recipient is married 0.41 0.32 0.001 0.35 0.38 0.243
Recipient's years of education 9.22 9.53 0.294 9.30 9.45 0.622
Recipient lives in urban area 0.41 0.46 0.061 0.42 0.45 0.312
Recipient's hh size 5.04 4.95 0.471 5.06 4.93 0.271
Annual remittances received from migrant ($) 1,534 1,510 0.825 1,484 1,559 0.497
Baseline comparison variables
Migrant and recipient report same hh budget priorities 0.46 0.50 0.189 0.47 0.49 0.401
Migrant and recipient report same student GPA 0.25 0.24 0.844 0.24 0.24 0.952
Migrant and recipient report same student mode of transport 0.41 0.45 0.228 0.43 0.42 0.671
Notes: Sample is observations with non-missing values for the experiment questions and completed recipient survey. Attrition is measured from sample of all migrants 
who completed the survey and the migrant experiment to sample with completed recipient survey and recipient experiment. Sample size for each comparison of means 
varies slightly by missing values for each variable. The percentage of missing values for each variable is also tested for balance across treatment groups with no 
significant differences. Other notes on variable construction are as in Table 1.1. P-values come from a regression of each variable on treatment, with standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity.








Treatment group Treatment group 
P-value for 
difference of 
means: Pref. not 
revealed and pref. 
revealed
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Migrant choice revealed to recipient 24.03** 20.40** 19.50* 0.0507* 0.0424 0.0352
[10.35] [10.27] [10.26] [0.0275] [0.0273] [0.0272]
Migrant is female -26.46** -0.0793***
[11.09] [0.0297]
Migrant age -0.487 0.000173
[0.741] [0.00184]
Migrant's years of education -0.119 0.00251
[1.225] [0.00322]
Migrant's years in the US 1.968* 0.00625**
[1.071] [0.00277]
Migrant lives with spouse -28.75** -0.0586*
[11.83] [0.0312]
Migrant's hh size in US 1.293 0.00404
[2.800] [0.00766]
Migrant has child 22 or under in ES 0.984 0.0379
[12.41] [0.0331]
Recipient is migrant's close relative -0.675 -0.00535
[12.74] [0.0340]
Migrant in lowest income bracket -21.73* -0.0400
[12.65] [0.0338]




Observations 1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298
R-squared 0.004 0.133 0.159 0.003 0.123 0.149
Mean in treatment = Migrant choice not revealed to 
recipient 441.4 0.53
Stratification group fixed effects NO YES YES NO YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Sample is observations with non-missing values for all experiment questions and completed 
recipient survey.  Amount sent by migrant is the amount that migrants chose to send when splitting $600 between themselves and recipients. 
Migrant sent everything is an indicator for whether or not the migrant chose to send everything to the recipient. Recipient is defined as close 
relative if migrant reports recipient to be his spouse, parent or child. Migrants in the lowest income bracket chose $400 or less as the weekly 
income of themselves plus their co-resident spouses. The other categories were $401-600, $601-800 and $801 and above. Annual total 
remittances are the combination of regular and irregular remittances. Annual regular remittances were collected by asking for the frequency 
of remittances sent and the average amount sent each time. Annual irregular remittances are remittances sent for special occasions or 
emergencies. Stratification group fixed effects are dummy variables for the groups of survey numbers within which randomization was 
stratified.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.4: Impact of monitoring treatment on migrant remittance decision
Migrant sent everythingAmount sent by migrant
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
Migrant communicates with recipient hh at least 
weekly
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Migrant choice revealed to recipient 8.824 39.61*** 7.370 56.06*** 13.22 47.36** 5.209 31.94*** 1.612 45.02***
[14.79] [14.49] [12.58] [18.30] [12.45] [18.75] [19.77] [12.12] [15.27] [14.08]
P-value for equality of treatment effect
Observations 639 656 853 445 896 402 379 919 611 670
R-squared 0.001 0.011 0.000 0.021 0.001 0.016 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.015
Migrant choice revealed to recipient 19.83 32.75** 10.45 59.12*** 12.21 36.29* 9.414 24.97** -1.532 36.98**
[15.33] [15.32] [12.79] [20.73] [12.78] [20.11] [22.03] [12.47] [15.91] [14.84]
P-value for equality of treatment effect
Observations 656 639 853 445 889 402 376 919 611 670
R-squared 0.201 0.221 0.154 0.299 0.159 0.314 0.306 0.152 0.236 0.190
Mean in treatment = Migrant choice not revealed to 
recipient 457.8 426.1 449.3 424.3 444.4 433.9 449.4 438.4 447.0 437.5
0.551 0.040 0.318 0.573 0.077
Panel 2: Regressions with stratification group fixed effects
Panel 1: Regressions without control variables
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Sample is observations with non-missing values for all experiment questions, completed recipient survey and non-missing values for variables used for division into sub-samples. 
Amount sent by migrant is the amount that migrants chose to send when splitting $600 between themselves and recipients. Recipient is defined as close relative if migrant reports recipient to be his spouse, parent or child. 
Annual total remittances are the combination of regular and irregular remittances. Annual regular remittances were collected by asking for the frequency of remittances sent and the average amount sent each time. Annual 
irregular remittances are remittances sent for special occasions or emergencies. The median years in the US is 10 and the median remittances sent to the recipient household are $1,800. Stratification group fixed effects are 
dummy variables for the groups of survey numbers within which randomization was stratified.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.5: Impact of monitoring treatment on amount sent by migrant: By proxies for punishment ability
Dependent variable: Amount sent by migrant
Years in the United States Migrant has child 22 or under in El Salvador
Recipient is close relative of 
migrant
Migrant communicates with 
recipient hh weekly
Migrant's annual 
remittances to recipient hh
0.137 0.028 0.111 0.201 0.037
45
Recipient choice 














Restaurant meals 6.11 5.46 5.38 6.17 11.74
Education 175.54 166.22 170.97 170.64 141.41
Daily expenses 66.05 75.59 72.85 68.99 76.56
Health expenses 52.30 52.73 50.80 54.20 70.28
Observations 638 660 641 657 1298
Means of recipient choices by treatment group:
Table 1.6: Mean amounts allocated to spending groups by recipients and migrants: Recipient experiment
Notes: Sample is observations with non-missing values for all experiment questions and completed recipient survey. Means in columns 1 
through 4 are from responses by recipients when asked to allocate $300 across four spending categories. Means in column 5 are responses 
from migrants when asked how they would like the recipient to allocate the funds.
Means of migrant 
preferences:
Monitoring treatment Communication treatment
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means: Pref, not 
revealed and pref. 
revealed
Difference in:
Restaurant meals 15.89 14.80 0.604 16.66 14.05 0.215
Education 107.29 110.92 0.463 116.28 102.17 0.004
Daily expenses 78.02 81.38 0.421 83.01 76.52 0.120
Health expenses 75.02 73.47 0.709 76.55 71.97 0.271
Total difference 138.11 140.28 0.649 146.25 132.36 0.004
Observations 638 660 641 657
Monitoring treatment Communication treatment
Table 1.7: Differences between recipient and migrant choices by treatment group: Recipient experiment
Notes: Sample is observations with non-missing values for all experiment questions and completed recipient survey.  Means are of the absolute difference between 
the recipient's choice and the migrant's preferences in each category. The total difference is the sum across the four difference variables for each observation, 
divided by two. P-values for differences in means were calculated by regressing the dependent variables on treatment, with standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity.
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-1.097 3.582 3.336 -1.567 2.126 3.019 3.330
[2.100] [4.923] [4.172] [4.159] [4.753] [4.775] [4.827]
-2.612 -14.09*** -6.476 -4.588 -13.88*** -13.61*** -13.69***
[2.103] [4.926] [4.168] [4.159] [4.751] [4.753] [4.818]
1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298
0.001 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.105 0.122
15.9 107.3 78.0 75.0 138.1
16.7 116.3 83.0 76.6 146.2
-4.132 -17.56** -0.621 -5.745 -14.03** -14.51** -13.86**
[3.080] [6.819] [5.949] [5.892] [6.673] [6.752] [6.918]
-2.611 0.129 9.164 -2.719 1.981 2.119 3.158
[3.253] [6.942] [5.738] [5.887] [6.489] [6.619] [6.714]
-3.753 -10.61 -2.971 -6.189 -11.76* -10.62 -10.36
[3.128] [6.940] [5.969] [5.735] [6.752] [6.844] [6.922]
1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298
0.002 0.007 0.004 0.001 0.007 0.105 0.122
18.0 116.2 78.3 77.9 145.2
NO NO NO NO NO YES YES
NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
R-squared
Mean in recipient choice not revealed
Mean in migrant preference not revealed 
Panel 1:
Recipient choice revealed to migrant
Migrant preference revealed to recipient
Observations
Total migrant-recipient difference
Dependent variable: Migrant-recipient difference in…
Table 1.8: Impact of monitoring and communication treatments on recipient allocation decision
Dependent variable:
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Sample is observations with non-missing values for all experiment questions and completed recipient survey.   Dependent variables are the 
absolute difference between the recipient's choice and the migrant's preferences in each category. The total difference is the sum across the four difference variables for each observation, 
divided by two. Omitted category in panel 2 regressions is "Recipient choice not revealed, migrant preference not revealed." Stratification group fixed effects are dummy variables for the 
groups of survey numbers within which randomization was stratified and treatment status in the migrant experiment. Control variables are migrant and recipient gender, age, years of 
education,  and household size. Controls also include migrant years in the United States, whether migrant lives with spouse, whether migrant has a child 22 or under in El Salvador, 
whether the migrant and recipient are close relatives, if the migrant is in the lowest income bracket, annual total remittances to recipient household, whether the migrant and recipient 
communicate at least weekly, and the number of days in between migrant and recipient survey.




Mean in recipient choice not revealed, 
migrant preference not revealed
Stratification group fixed effects
Control variables
Recipient choice not revealed to migrant, 
migrant preference revealed to recipient
Recipient choice revealed to migrant,    
migrant preference not revealed to recipient
Recipient choice revealed to migrant,    
migrant preference revealed to recipient
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11.63* -7.420 3.895 -1.768 -1.534 9.902 21.53** -6.626 1.450 1.675
[6.805] [6.647] [5.890] [8.059] [5.813] [8.352] [8.680] [5.674] [6.957] [6.619]
-11.71* -16.83** -9.160 -23.17*** -11.63** -16.89** -7.156 -17.39*** -12.92* -15.56**
[6.818] [6.641] [5.881] [8.080] [5.802] [8.462] [8.705] [5.665] [6.973] [6.607]
639 656 853 445 889 402 376 919 611 670
0.009 0.011 0.003 0.018 0.005 0.014 0.017 0.011 0.006 0.008
16.45** -6.221 3.308 2.945 -1.702 23.58** 21.30* -4.024 1.799 2.731
[7.228] [6.853] [6.013] [9.344] [5.901] [9.986] [10.84] [5.963] [7.462] [7.289]
-16.28** -15.70** -7.565 -22.84** -10.22* -17.37* -4.316 -17.29*** -10.05 -17.86**
[7.306] [6.790] [6.041] [9.235] [5.876] [9.414] [10.52] [5.815] [7.740] [7.064]
639 656 853 445 889 402 376 919 611 670
0.191 0.191 0.156 0.277 0.154 0.275 0.282 0.139 0.186 0.169
134.5 141.3 137.6 139.1 139.0 136.5 134.8 139.4 138.6 138.1
145.8 146.5 144.1 150.3 144.3 149.9 149.0 145.2 145.8 147.0
Migrant preference revealed to recipient
Table 1.9: Impact of monitoring and communication treatments on recipient allocation decision: By proxies for punishment ability
Dependent variable: Total migrant-recipient difference
Years in the United States Migrant has child 22 or under in El Salvador
Recipient is close relative of 
migrant
Migrant communicates with 
recipient hh weekly
Migrant's annual 
remittances to recipient hh
Recipient choice revealed to migrant
Panel 1: Regressions without control variables
Communication treatment




Migrant preference revealed to recipient





*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Observations
R-squared
Mean in recipient choice not revealed
Mean in migrant preference not revealed
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Sample is observations with non-missing values for experiment questions, completed recipient survey and non-missing values for variables used for division into sub-samples. 
Recipient is defined as close relative if migrant reports recipient to be his spouse, parent or child. Annual total remittances are the combination of regular and irregular remittances. Annual regular remittances were 
collected by asking for the frequency of remittances sent and the average amount sent each time. Annual irregular remittances are remittances sent for special occasions or emergencies. The total difference is the sum 
across the four difference variables for each observation, divided by two. The median years in the US is 10 and the median remittances sent to the recipient household is $1,800. Stratification group fixed effects are 
dummy variables for the groups of survey numbers within which randomization was stratified and treatment status in the migrant experiment.
Recipient choice revealed to migrant
P-values for equality of treatment effects:
Monitoring treatment 0.030








born, not US 
citizen
Hispanic, not US 
citizen
Migrant is female 0.51 0.46 0.46
Age of migrant 36.92 36.05 36.39
[9.30] [10.39] [10.85]
Migrant's years in the US 11.13 12.93 11.74
[8.09] [7.89] [8.09]
Migrant's hh size in the US 4.36 4.95 4.64
[1.96] [2.12] [2.14]
Migrant has less than high school education 0.62 0.61 0.47
Migrant has high school education or more 0.38 0.39 0.53
Observations 1,298 2,208 5,420
Table 1.A.1: Comparison of migrants in study with DC-area Salvadorans and Hispanics in the American 
Community Survey
Notes: Baseline survey sample is observations with non-missing values for all experiment questions and completed recipient survey. Sample 
size varies slightly with variable: 1,264 for age; 1,295 for years in US; 1,290 for education variables. ACS sample is the IPUMS three year 
2008-2010 ACS sample restricted to individuals 18-65 in the Washington, DC metro area (as defined by the ACS, includes MD and VA 
suburbs). Standard deviation in brackets for continuous variables.
Baseline survey




Migrant choice revealed to recipient -15.25 -8.737 -5.820
[19.32] [19.32] [19.37]
Punishment index -6.947 -3.488 -3.390
[5.608] [5.674] [5.706]
Interaction: Choice revealed and punishment index 18.11** 13.31* 11.75
[7.648] [7.687] [7.707]
Observations 1,268 1,268 1,268
R-squared 0.009 0.139 0.152
Mean in treatment = Migrant choice not revealed to recipient 441.4
Stratification group fixed effects NO YES YES
Control variables NO NO YES
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Sample is observations with non-missing values for all experiment 
questions and completed recipient survey.  Amount sent by migrant is the amount that migrants chose to send when 
splitting $600 between themselves and recipients. The punishment index is calculated using the first principal 
component of the following five variables: migrant has been in the United States below the sample median number 
of years, migrant has a child 22 or under in El Salvador, migrant and recipient are closely related, migrant and 
recipient communicate weekly, and annual migrant remittances to recipient household are above the sample median. 
Stratification group fixed effects are dummy variables for the groups of survey numbers within which randomization 
was stratified. Control variables are migrant gender, age, years of education, and household size. Controls also 
include whether migrant lives with spouse and if the migrant is in the lowest income bracket.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.A.2: Impact of monitoring treatment on migrant remittance decision: Interaction with 
punishment index
Dependent variable:
Amount sent by migrant
51









-0.650 -9.328* 9.528** 0.450
[1.060] [5.326] [3.881] [3.602]
0.789 -0.365 -3.825 3.401
[1.058] [5.329] [3.887] [3.602]
1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298
0.001 0.002 0.005 0.001
6.1 175.5 66.0 52.3
5.4 171.0 77.9 50.8
0.407 -4.912 4.799 -0.295
[1.474] [7.449] [5.393] [5.122]
-1.030 -13.85* 18.11*** -3.229
[1.355] [7.582] [5.648] [5.119]
0.128 -9.825 5.953 3.743
[1.633] [7.432] [5.236] [5.240]
1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298
0.001 0.003 0.009 0.001
5.9 178.0 63.6 52.5
NO NO NO NO
NO NO NO NO
Control variables
Stratification group fixed effects
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Sample is observations with non-missing values for all experiment questions and 
completed recipient survey.  Dependent variables are the raw amounts allocated by recipient to different spending categories. Omitted 
category in panel 2 regressions is "Recipient choice not revealed, migrant preference not revealed."
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Recipient choice not revealed to migrant, migrant 
preference revealed to recipient
Recipient choice revealed to migrant,    migrant 
preference not revealed to recipient
Recipient choice revealed to migrant,    migrant 
preference revealed to recipient
Observations
R-squared
Mean in recipient choice not revealed, migrant 
preference not revealed
R-squared
Mean in recipient choice not revealed
Mean in migrant preference not revealed 
Panel 2:
Observations
Table 1.A.3: Impact of monitoring and communication treatments on recipient allocation decision: Raw 
amounts
Dependent variable:Amount allocated by recipient to…
Panel 1:
Recipient choice revealed to migrant
Migrant preference revealed to recipient
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
No Yes No Yes
3.760 1.965 -3.549 12.02
[6.001] [10.98] [6.960] [7.660]
-18.99*** -5.573 -20.67*** -2.028
[5.996] [10.98] [6.940] [7.683]
787 254 633 474
0.013 0.001 0.014 0.005
2.248 3.501 -1.354 11.14
[6.215] [14.18] [7.147] [8.461]
-16.77*** 4.624 -23.99*** -4.349
[6.147] [13.94] [7.351] [8.413]
787 254 633 474
0.157 0.397 0.228 0.243
136.9 128.7 139.7 132.9
148.5 132.2 148.5 140.7
Migrant preference revealed to recipient
Table 1.A.4: Impact of monitoring and communication treatments on recipient allocation 
decision: By information quality measures
Dependent variable: Total migrant-recipient difference
Migrant correctly reports 
student GPA
Migrant correctly reports 
student mode of transport to 
school
Panel 1: Regressions without control variables
Recipient choice revealed to migrant
Communication treatment 0.283 0.072
P-values for equality of treatment effects:
Monitoring treatment
P-values for equality of treatment effects:
Observations
R-squared
Panel 2: Regressions with control variables
Recipient choice revealed to migrant
Migrant preference revealed to recipient
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Sample is observations with non-missing values for experiment questions, 
completed recipient survey and non-missing values for variables used for division into sub-samples.  Responses to GPA 
and transport questions were only recorded if student was reported to be in school. Migrant's were asked to report the 
student's GPA within a 2 point (out of 10) range, while recipients reported an exact number. The migrant is said of have 
correctly reported the GPA if the recipient's response was within the range the migrant indicated.  Stratification group 
fixed effects are dummy variables for the groups of survey numbers within which randomization was stratified and 
treatment status in the migrant experiment.
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Bargaining with Grandma: The Impact of the South African Pension on 
Household Decision Making 
 
 
2.1 Introduction and motivation 
The growing importance of government cash transfers as an anti-poverty tool in the 
developing world has highlighted the importance of understanding how households make 
decisions and allocate resources. Over the past three decades the theory of household resource 
allocation has evolved from unitary models that treat the household as a single entity 
(Samuelson, 1956; Becker, 1974, 1981) to bargaining models that recognize that control of 
resources is important for allocation outcomes (Chiappori, 1988, 1992; Lundberg and Pollack, 
1993, 1994; Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981). This shift has been 
supported by a growing amount of empirical evidence rejecting the predictions of the unitary 
model. However, these papers are largely based on the reduced form effect of income transfers 
on household outcomes, negating the unitary model but providing little evidence in direct 
support of alternative explanations. This paper addresses this gap in the literature by examining 
the effects of changes in income dynamics on direct measures of bargaining power, utilizing the 
age discontinuity in eligibility for the South African old age pension to study how household 
decision making is affected by changes in individual income. The pension is distributed on an 
individual, not household, level and is given to both men and women, thereby providing an ideal 
setting for the empirical examination of economic models of household decision making and 




 Empirical work on this topic has generally focused on rebutting the predictions of the 
unitary model by examining outcomes after exogenous changes in income. The unitary model 
has been rejected when it can be shown empirically that these outcomes differ by the gender of 
the recipient. If the model held, the identity of the recipient should not matter for how money is 
spent. For example, using the South African pension, Duflo (2003) finds that living with a 
pension eligible female leads to significant improvement in nutrition indicators of young girls 
(but not boys) while male pension eligibility has no effect on child nutrition.1 These papers 
provide convincing evidence that control of resources matters and have resonated in the policy 
community. In fact, due to studies that suggest that money given to or controlled by women is 
spent in more productive ways than money given to men, particularly for children’s outcomes 
(Thomas, 1990, 1994; Duflo, 2003), many cash transfer programs specifically target their 
benefits towards women. Yet these papers have only been able to examine the reduced form 
impact of income variation on outcomes; they do not shed light on the mechanisms that women 
use to translate control of income into household expenditures that better reflect their 
preferences.  
 This paper will use the South African pension to study how a permanent, large, and 
plausibly exogenous change in individual income affects the identity of the primary decision 
maker within the household. This focus on decision making allows for an understanding of the 
mechanism through which income changes are affecting household outcomes and direct 
observation of how changes in income affect a variable that is a direct representation of 
bargaining power in the household. Given that Duflo’s 2003 paper on the pension and child 
nutrition is widely cited as one of the most important pieces of evidence against the unitary 
household model in the developing world, this is a particularly appropriate setting in which to 
investigate this question. The pension is also one of the most substantial cash transfers in the 
developing world so understanding how pension receipt affects recipient bargaining power is an 
important question for all policy makers considering the implementation of a cash transfer 
program. The structure of the pension is such that a vast majority of age-eligible members of the 
black population qualify simply by meeting an age requirement, allowing for a clean analysis of 
the causal impacts of the pension using the age requirement for pension eligibility to employ a 
regression discontinuity design. 
1 Other examples include Lundberg, Pollack and Wales (1996) and Qian (2008). 
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 Using the South African National Income Dynamics Survey (NIDS) collected in 2008 
and exploiting the fact that pension receipt for black South Africans is almost universal 
contingent on meeting the age requirement, I find that age eligibility for the pension results in 
age-eligible women being 13 to 16 percentage points more likely to be the primary decision 
maker in their household for both day-to-day and large, unusual purchases. There is no 
corresponding effect at the age of eligibility for men. The evidence suggests that this increase in 
decision making power for women comes through a reduction in the decision-making power of 
older men (in households with older men) and the extent to which the households disagree about 
who the decision maker is (in households without older men). The changes in female decision 
making power are direct evidence that bargaining power in the household shifts when control of 
resources changes. 
 The argument that the changes in decision-making power are evidence of increased 
bargaining power for pension-eligible women is strengthened by an analysis of personal income 
share, defined as the percentage of household income that can be attributed to a certain 
household member. Personal income share is highly correlated with reported decision making 
power for both men and women. Mirroring the results for decision making, income share 
increases significantly with pension eligibility for women but not for men. The lack of changes 
in income share and decision making for men is somewhat puzzling, given that men also receive 
the pension at the age of eligibility. However, that new income is offset by a corresponding 
reduction in male labor income. Consequently, there appears to be no change in male status in 
the household upon receipt of the pension. 
 The increase in female decision-making power and income share translates into positive 
household level impacts; female (but not male) pension eligibility results in an increase of 0.6 
standard deviations in young girls’ weight for height z-scores (a confirmation of Duflo’s (2003) 
original result using data collected 15 years earlier) and a 23 percent increase in the number of 
household consumer durables. On their own, these results, like those in Duflo (2003), seem to 
support the argument that transfers, especially those intended for the support of children, should 
be directed towards women and not men. However, the income share results suggest that there 
are no changes in household outcomes when men become pension eligible, not because their 
preferences for expenditures necessarily differ, but because the pension does not result in a shift 




with male eligibility. Indeed, an analysis of the 1993 data used in Duflo (2003) shows a similar 
pattern: increases in income share at pension eligibility for women but not for men. These results 
suggest that large transfers can have complex impacts on household income patterns and that 
results such as those in Duflo (2003) should be more carefully interpreted before drawing the 
policy conclusion that money is better directed to women than men. 
 This paper is related to a small number of other studies that have also tried to examine 
changes in bargaining power directly. De la Brière and Quisumbing (2000) find that transfers 
from the Progresa conditional cash transfer program in Mexico had a statistically significant 
negative effect on the husband being the sole decision maker (as opposed to wife alone or joint) 
in five of eight decision-making categories. Estimates also indicate that women are more likely 
to be the sole decision makers on how they spend their extra income. However, all results are 
very small in magnitude, and because Progresa was not known to be permanent at the time of the 
evaluation, these results may not be generalizable to permanent increases in income for women. 
Additionally, the fact that Progresa transfers were only made to women does not allow for a 
comparison of the effects between genders. 
 Providing poor women with access to financial services and employment opportunities in 
developing countries has long been billed as a tool for women’s empowerment by giving women 
the means to increase their income. However, while a recent randomized evaluation of 
microfinance in India finds impacts of credit access on expenditures in treatment villages, it finds 
no effects on female decision making or child health (Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster and Kinnan, 
2013). Yet, another randomized experiment that provided commitment savings accounts in the 
Philippines found that women with below median decision-making power at baseline who were 
offered the savings account show improvements in an index of decision-making variables. There 
is a corresponding increase in female-oriented consumer durables in the household (Ashraf, 
Karlan and Yin, 2010). Because the authors argue that the savings accounts do not increase 
income overall, just savings, this effect is attributed to the control over resources that women 
gain through their individual savings accounts. Additionally, Majlesi (2013) finds that decreases 
in employment opportunities for women in Mexico decrease the share of household decisions 
made by wives, and has negative impacts on the health of girls.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides background on the South African 




IV provides the main analysis of the impacts of the pension on decision making. Section V 
discusses the analysis of income share. Section VI examines the impact of the pension on child 
nutrition and durable goods ownership. Section VII provides additional discussion of the results. 
Section VIII does a series of robustness checks, and Section IX concludes. 
 
2.2 Background 
2.2.1 The South African pension 
 The old age pension in South Africa originally existed primarily for white workers who 
did not have access to an occupational pension. Although it was gradually introduced for other 
racial groups, the pension system remained discriminatory throughout the apartheid period. 
(Lund, 1993). As the country began to transition from apartheid, the government made the 
commitment to equalize the pension across races. Benefits for blacks were increased throughout 
the 1980s while those for whites fell quickly. In 1992 the means tests was equalized for people of 
all races. (Duflo, 2003).  
 Eligibility for payments is determined by age and a means test. Women ages 60 and older 
are eligible for the pension. At the time the data used in this paper was collected, men did not 
become eligible until age 65.2 The means test considers only the income of the pension eligible 
individual and his or her spouse and therefore should not incentivize potential recipients to alter 
their household structure in order to become eligible. The test is such that the vast majority of the 
black population easily qualifies (even if labor income is taken into account), but the majority of 
whites or anyone with a separate pension do not (Lam, Leibbrandt and Ranchhod, 2006). 
Because of this, as is standard in this literature, my analysis will be restricted to the black 
population. 
 According to the survey data used in this paper, in 2008, 86 percent of age eligible men 
and 92 percent of age eligible women report receiving the pension (NIDS, 2008). The maximum 
pension benefit was R870 during most of the survey period, and was raised to R940 as survey 
work was concluding. Although the structure of the means test is such that there is some phase 
2 In 2008 a law was passed to equalize the age of eligibility between men and women by 2010. This was done in 
stages and the male age of eligibility immediately dropped to 63 (SouthAfrica.info, 2008). Because the law was 
enacted in mid 2008 and the data used in this paper were largely collected in the first half of 2008, the age of 
eligibility for men will be considered to be 65 for the purposes of this analysis. Fewer than 5% of the elderly men in 
the sample used in this study were interviewed in the second half of 2008. 
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out of benefits above certain income levels, in practice fewer than 15 percent of pension 
recipients in 2008 report receiving less than the maximum amount.3 The maximum benefit of 
R870 was 2 times the median per capita household income of non-eligible older women and 1.6 
times the median per-capita income of non-eligible older men in the survey data; a substantial 
sum for most recipients. 
 Because pension receipt is widespread and the size of the grants is large, the pension 
system has prompted extensive research on its impact. Studies include analyses of pension take-
up patterns and behavioral changes (Case and Deaton, 1998), impacts on labor markets 
(Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Miller, 2003; Posel, Fairburn, and Lund, 2006; Lam, et al., 2006; 
Ranchod, 2006; Ardington, Case and Hosegood, 2009), child outcomes (Duflo, 2000, 2003; 
Edmonds, 2006), private transfers to the household (Jensen, 2004) and household composition 
(Edmonds, Mammen, and Miller 2005; Hamoudi and Thomas, 2005). Despite this literature, this 
will be the first study to directly examine how this large change in income affects decision-
making dynamics within the household. Many of the cited studies come from the early years 
after the expansion of the pension to the black population, so this paper will additionally provide 
some of the first longer-term evidence on the effects of the pension fifteen years after its 
expansion. 
2.2.2 Data 
 This paper utilizes data from the first wave of the National Income Dynamics Survey 
(NIDS) conducted by the Southern African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) 
in 2008. NIDS is a nationally representative survey of approximately 7,300 households and 
28,250 individuals. Detailed information was collected both at the household and individual level 
through a household survey and individual adult surveys for all people age 15 and over, as well 
as child surveys for children under 15. This dataset is the first wave of a planned long term panel 
study in South Africa.4 Households were selected through a two-stage cluster sampling design 
based on a master sample of Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) developed by Statistics South 
Africa and dwelling clusters within those PSUs (Leibbrant, Woolard and de Villiers, 2009). 
Survey post stratification weights are used in regression analyses when noted. 
3 The exchange rate over the survey period ranged from 7 to 8 South African Rand to the United States dollar. 
4 The second wave of the NIDS data is also publicly available, but because the identification strategy employed in 
this analysis is cross-sectional only one wave is needed. Wave 1 was chosen for two reasons. First, due to attrition it 
is larger than Wave 2. Second, due to a two phase interview process, the main variable of interest (the decision 
making question) is not available for all respondents in Wave 2. 
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 The main variables of interest for this study are derived from the decision-making section 
of the  individual adult questionnaire. Respondents are asked who in their household makes 
decisions in five different categories: day-to-day household expenditures; large unusual 
purchases such as appliances, vehicles, or furniture; where children should go to school; who is 
allowed to live in the household; and decisions about where the household should live. 
Interviewers note the person code of the main decision maker, and if the decision making is joint, 
they also note the person code of the second decision maker. 
 I define indicator variables for each of the five decision-making categories that are equal 
to one if the person is the primary decision maker in the relevant category and zero otherwise. I 
consider someone to be the primary decision maker if everyone in the household who answered 
the survey question listed this person as the main decision maker and zero otherwise. The results 
in this paper are robust to a definition of the decision-making variables that uses only the self 
reports of the elderly person in questions. 
 In this paper I will focus primarily on the first two measures of decision making (day-to-
day purchases and large, unusual purchases) because, given that they relate to expenditures, they 
are the measures most likely to be affected by a change in income. They are also the most closely 
related to the child nutrition and consumer durable outcomes that I will examine later in the 
paper. Additionally, the measures of decision making are highly correlated and the results are 
similar across the different decision-making categories.  
 Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the sample of older adults that will form the 
main analysis sample broken down by gender and pension eligibility. Differences in several key 
variables including years of schooling, residence in a rural area, percent married and 
employment status are evident. For example, 63 percent and 72 percent respectively of non-
eligible and eligible women live in rural areas and 42 percent and 16 percent respectively of non-
eligible and eligible women are employed. However, these differences alone do not invalidate 
the empirical strategy; pension eligible adults are by definition older than almost eligible adults, 
and these statistics reflect age trends in these variables. For example, the differences in living in 
a rural area and employment may be due to the fact that elderly people tend to stop working and 
return to rural areas they may have grown up in as they age. Consequently, the analysis will 
control for age, estimating a break in an otherwise smooth trend at the age of eligibility.  




younger woman and a lower but still significant fraction live with a younger man. Many also live 
with an elderly adult of the other gender, although that number is higher for men than women, 
reflecting the longer life span of females and the fact that husbands are, on average, older than 
their wives. The presence of other adults in these households in South Africa makes the analysis 
of household decision making particularly interesting because the options for who is the decision 
maker are greater than just the elderly adult and her or his spouse. Studies of household decision 
making are usually concentrated only on spouses, but the presence of many multi-generational 
households in this sample and the format of the survey question allows for the examination of 
changes in decision making across a variety of household members.  
 
2.3 Identification strategy 
 Although a simple comparison of those who receive the pension with those that do not 
would confound the impacts of the pension with systematic differences between the two groups, 
the age requirement for eligibility provides a discontinuity in receipt of the pension that allows 
for estimation of the causal impact of the pension at the age of eligibility using a regression 
discontinuity design.5 Because the means test for eligibility is not binding for the vast majority of 
black South Africans, this paper (and other studies on the pension) considers only the age 
eligibility rule when determining pension impacts. I employ an identification strategy that 
essentially compares people who are age eligible for the pension to those who are almost 
eligible. The identification assumption underpinning the results in this paper is that individuals or 
households just below pension eligibility differ from those just above eligibility only through the 
effect of the pension itself. Even though age trends independent of the effects of the pension are 
expected in many outcome variables (including household decision making), these trends should 
not result in large changes right at the age of eligibility. Therefore, discontinuous changes in 
outcomes that occur at age 60 for women and age 65 for men can be causally attributed to the 
pension. 
 The plausibility of the identification assumption is greater the more similar are the 
individuals included in the analysis. Consequently, as in Edmonds (2006) I limit my main 
5 The empirical strategy utilized in this paper utilizes only cross-sectional data. Although a second wave of NIDS 
data is available panel methods are not employed for two reasons. First, because there are only two years between 
waves, only a small number of respondents become pension eligible between waves. Second, the decision making 
data does not appear to have been consistently collected between the two waves. For example, older women are 
much more likely to be classified as decision makers in Wave 2, independent of pension eligibility. 
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estimation sample to black older adults who are 50 to 75 years old, resulting in a sample of 1,750 
women and 1,092 men.6 However, despite limiting the sample to older individuals, identification 
could still be threatened if there are discontinuities in individual and household characteristics 
other than pension receipt that might be driving the results. An example of this would be if 
another large social program was implemented in the same population with the same eligibility 
rules. Although there are several other government grant programs in South Africa, none of them 
are similar to the pension in ways that might invalidate the identification strategy (Duflo, 2003).  
 A greater concern is that receipt of the pension may induce households to reorganize, and 
that consequently effects that are attributed to the pension are actually characteristics of the types 
of households that form around the pension, rather than the pension income itself. Several papers 
have addressed this problem directly. Edmonds, Mammen and Miller (2005) find evidence of an 
increase in the number of young children and young women in pension eligible households and a 
decrease in the number of women in prime working ages. Hamoudi and Thomas (2005) find that 
adults who live with pension eligible adults are shorter and have lower levels of education, 
characteristics that are presumably not impacted by the pension itself. This work makes it clear 
that it is difficult to argue that the pension has no effect on household composition; rather it is 
important to understand whether or not the reorganization that is occurring is the cause of any 
results that are found. If, for example, an elderly woman were to use the pension income to move 
out of the extended family home and live independently, any increase in decision-making power 
would be due to her new living situation and not her improved position within her original 
household. These issues will be given careful attention in this paper in robustness checks 
presented in Section VIII. The evidence from these tests is convincing that changes in household 
composition are not driving the results. 
 In order to validate the use of the age discontinuity, I must first establish that the pension 
system works as it is described: that is, that there is actually a discontinuity in receipt of the 
pension at age 60 for women and age 65 for men. The NIDS survey asked each adult 
individually whether or not they had received the government old age pension in the past month. 
The averages of these responses in Table 2.1 clearly show that the likelihood of receiving the 
pension increases dramatically among the age eligible, from 9 percent to 91 percent for women, 
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and from 8 percent to 84 percent for men. Figure 2.1 shows the age discontinuity in pension 
receipt graphically, plotting the average receipt by age as well the regression line of pension 
receipt on age calculated on both sides of eligibility. Although there is some slippage in pension 
receipt prior to eligibility, the discontinuity is unmistakable. Some of the slippage may be due to 
age misreporting, but there is also evidence that age ineligible people are able to receive the 
pension in some cases. This is especially true for men, given that the higher age of male 
eligibility was largely considered to be unfair, and the survey was conducted just months before 
the threshold was lowered. Indeed the discontinuity in pension receipt, while strong, is smaller 
for men than for women.  
 The regression analysis will allow for a more precise estimation of effect sizes and an 
exploration of heterogeneity in impacts. I estimate the following linear probability model on the 
sub-sample of females: 
(1)  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 =  𝛼𝑓𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝜃1𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑗  + 𝜃2𝑂𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑗 
+𝛾(𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗) + 𝛿𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
where 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 is an indicator for whether or not woman i in family j is pension eligible. 
𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑗 and 𝑂𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑗 are indicators for whether or not a pension eligible male or any 
male aged 50 or older also lives in the household. (𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗) is a third order polynomial in the age 
of the woman and flexibly controls for smooth age trends in the outcome variable. The inclusion 
of a polynomial to control for trends in the variable that determines treatment is one standard 
method in the regression discontinuity literature (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). A cubic in age was 
chosen because of its high level of flexibility, but the results are robust to the inclusion of linear 
or quadratic trends instead. 
 Included controls are a set of indicators for educational attainment, the number of 
household members aged 0-5, 6-14, 15-24, and 25-49, and rural status. Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the household level, and all regressions make use of survey post-stratification 
weights.7 I estimate the analogous model for the male sample controlling instead for the presence 
of an eligible female and older female. The coefficient 𝛼 on the eligibility indicator is the 
coefficient of interest. It is an estimate of the impact of pension eligibility on the decision-
making outcome variable at the age of eligibility. Although some papers in this literature have 
used pension eligibility as an instrumental variable for actual pension receipt (Duflo, 2003; 
7 The results are robust to the exclusion of the weights. 
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Hamoudi and Thomas, 2005), I choose to focus only on the reduced form impact of pension 
eligibility given the very high rates of pension receipt among the eligible population. The 
reduced form impact of pension eligibility is a lower bound for the impact of actual pension 
receipt. 
 
2.4 Impacts of pension eligibility on decision making 
 The percentages of elderly women and men who are the primary decision maker across 
four categories are listed in the bottom panel of Table 2.1. Both older men and older women are 
highly likely to be the primary decision maker in their households. In all cases those who are 
pension eligible are more likely to be the decision maker than those who are not, but these 
differences are much smaller for men than for women. However, as noted in Section III, this 
simple comparison does not provide a causal estimate of the impact of the pension due the 
probable existence of age trends in decision making that are independent of pension receipt. I 
now turn to the regression discontinuity analysis that will allow for an estimation of the causal 
impact of the pension at the age of eligibility. 
2.4.1 Individual level decision-making analysis 
 As a first step in my analysis, in Figure 2.2, I graph the means of the day-to-day decision-
making variable by age separately for women and men, and as in Figure 2.1, I also plot the 
regression line of decision making on age estimated separately on either side of the discontinuity 
with 95 percent confidence intervals. These graphs are illustrative of the main result of this 
paper. Despite a pronounced negative age trend in decision making for elderly women there is a 
large jump upwards at age 60, a difference that is statistically significant even given wide 
confidence intervals. The same is not true for men. Although the estimated discontinuity is 
positive, it is small and does not approach statistical significance. Despite this large jump in the 
regression lines for women, there is quite a bit of noise evident in the raw means. Figure 2.3 
shows the same data but with the means smoothed over two year (instead of one year) age bins. 
Although this smoothing reduces the number of bins, it also reduces the noise significantly, 
lending further credence to the estimated discontinuity for women. 
 Next, I address the question of how the pension impacts the identity of primary decision 
maker in a formal regression framework to provide precise estimates of the effects. Table 2.2 




an individual-level analysis and includes all black men and women aged 50 to 75. The dependent 
variable in columns 1 and 2 is a binary variable equal to one if everyone in the household agrees 
that the person is the primary decision maker for day-to-day purchases, and in columns 3 and 4, 
it is a binary variable equal to one if everyone in the household agrees that the person is the 
primary decision maker for large, unusual purchases. Columns 2 and 4 include household 
controls. The results for women are in panel 1 and the results for men in panel 2. 
 The results in column 1 show that eligible women are 15.5 percentage points more likely 
to be the primary decision maker for day-to-day purchases, a result that is highly statistically 
significant. The estimated effect is an economically significant 24 percent of the sample mean. 
The coefficient is not sensitive to the addition of control variables, dropping only slightly, to 14.2 
percentage points, in column 2. The stability of this coefficient further strengthens the 
identification assumption in this analysis: if the effects were being driven by other differences 
around the age of eligibility, the additional of control variables should have significantly 
attenuated the coefficient on eligibility. The South African pension has a large and significant 
impact on the decision-making power of eligible women. The impact of pension eligibility on 
decision making for large, unusual purchases is quite similar, 13 to 14 percentage points 
compared to a slightly lower sample mean. The presence of an elderly male in the household has 
a large, negative effect on both outcome variables, but interestingly, it does not matter if the male 
is himself pension eligible. Regressions where the dependent variable is the primary decision 
maker for where the household lives and who can live in the household show quantitatively 
similar, significant coefficients for pension eligibility (results not shown). The consistency of this 
result across decision making categories unrelated to expenditures reinforces the claim that these 
results are evidence of a real shift in women’s bargaining power, not just control over their 
increased personal income. 
 No significant effects of pension eligibility are present for the male subsample, and given 
that the estimated coefficients are negative, there is not even suggestive evidence of a positive 
effect. The coefficients on male eligibility are also more sensitive to the addition of control 
variables and other changes in specification (such as using a linear or quadratic age trend instead 
of a cubic) than the coefficient on female eligibility. These results, combined with the fact that 




negative, for men.8 Possible explanations for this asymmetry between men and women will be 
discussed in Section V. 
2.4.2 Impacts on decision making power of other household members 
 The robust result that women’s decision-making power increases with pension eligibility 
leads to the question of from whom in the household that power is coming. The fact that 
bargaining power appears to be following income controlled by women is an important 
economic finding, but it also has substantial policy implications. For example, advocates for 
female empowerment may argue that this result is evidence in favor of expanding transfer 
programs, but it is possible that this increase comes at the expense of other women in the 
household, leading to no overall increase in female bargaining power. 
 To explore this issue I examine the identity of the primary decision maker for day-to-day 
purchases in different types of households. I create five categories of potential decision makers: 
women 50 and over, men 50 and over, women 18 to 49, men 18 to 49, and cases where the 
household does not agree on the identity of the decision maker. Because these are household 
level designations, analyses are done at the household level, separately for households with a 
woman 50 to 75 and households with a man 50 to 75. The sample differs from that used in the 
individual level analysis only in that households where there is more than one elderly woman or 
elderly man of the same gender are collapsed into one observation. Fewer than 3 percent of 
households have more than one elderly person of the same gender. 
 Table 2.3 presents the percentages of households that fall into the different decision-
making categories separately by whether a household contains a woman or man aged 50 to 75, 
and within those categories, whether an elderly person of the opposite gender is present.9 For 
both older women and men, when no older member of the opposite sex is present, they are the 
primary decision makers in the large majority of households (85 percent for women and 70 
percent for men). When both an older man and woman are present, men dominate: older males 
8 I also find no impact on the likelihood of being the secondary decision maker for either men or women. 
Additionally, to draw a comparison with other papers that utilize survey questions with a more common format that 
focuses on sole and joint decision making, in results not shown I also create and analyze variables that indicate 
whether or not the person in question is the sole decision maker, a joint decision maker, or a joint-primary decision 
maker. This analysis follows the same pattern for men as in the main analyses. The positive effect for women is 
fully concentrated in the sole decision maker variable (there are no increases in women as joint-primary decision 
makers with pension eligibility). 
9 Although columns 2 and 4 represent roughly the same households, the numbers differ slightly because I condition 
on the member of the opposite sex being 50 or over, not age 50 to 75. This restriction best mirrors the regression 
framework employed throughout the paper. 
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are the decision maker in approximately 50 percent of households and older women in 
approximately 30 percent. Interestingly, younger adults play only a small part in decision making 
except in the case of older men living without older women where younger women are the 
decision makers in 14 percent of households. Cases of disagreement over who is the decision 
maker are also important (9 percent of households with an older woman but no older man and 14 
percent of households with an older man but no older woman), and especially so in households 
where there is both an elderly woman and elderly man (22 percent). This is logical as the 
presence of a competitor for decision making power makes it more likely that all household 
members may not agree on the identity of the primary decision maker. 
 I now examine ways in which the distribution of household decision making power may 
have changed when a household member becomes pension eligible. The regression specification 
that I employ is similar to that used to estimate changes in decision making on the individual 
level, but because the outcome variables are at the household level, the regression sample is 
households with an elderly woman (or man) aged 50 to 75. I include a third order polynomial in 
the age of the oldest man or woman in the 50 to 75 age range and indicators for the presence of 
an elderly person and pension eligible person of the other gender. Control variables are the 
number of household members in different age ranges and rural status. Standard errors are 
clustered at the survey cluster level. I focus on the two main competitor categories for decision 
making power: a person 50 and over of the opposite sex and household disagreement over who is 
the principal decision maker. 
 Table 2.4 presents the results. Panel 1 displays the results for households with a woman 
aged 50 to 75 and panel 2 the results for households with a man aged 50 to 75. All regressions 
include control variables. Column 1 displays results for whether or not an older person of the 
opposite sex is the primary decision maker for day-to-day purchases in households where an 
elderly member of the opposite sex is present. The coefficient on female pension eligibility 
estimates that men 50 or over are 15 percentage points less likely to be the primary decision 
maker when a woman becomes pension eligible. The coefficient falls short of statistical 
significance but is suggestive of a negative impact on the decision-making power of elderly men. 
The coefficient on male pension eligibility in column 1 of panel 2 is positive and large (0.16), 
though it is not statistically significant. This coefficient is somewhat puzzling, but it is possible 




husbands become pension eligible. Both these results are only suggestive, and, given the small 
sample size, it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions. 
 Columns 2 and 3 examine the impact of pension eligibility on disagreement over decision 
making in the household separately by whether or not an older member of the opposite sex lives 
in the household. In households with an elderly woman but no elderly man, female pension 
eligibility results in a 15 percentage point decrease in household disagreement, a result that is 
both large relative to the sample mean of 0.09 and highly statistically significant. The result is 
also evident in graphical regression discontinuity analysis. There is no corresponding reduction 
in disagreement in households with elderly men in column 3 and no impact of male eligibility in 
columns 2 and 3 of panel 2. This analysis suggests the following story about where women are 
finding their gains in decision-making power. When they do not live with an older male they are 
benefitting from increased certainty among household members, an indication of increased 
bargaining power. The receipt of the pension has the impact of solidifying the woman’s position 
as the decision maker among the members of the household. In cases where the pension eligible 
woman lives with an older man, there is suggestive evidence that the increase in her power is 
coming, at least in part, from a reduction in the decision making power of older men.  
 
2.5 Pension eligibility and personal income share 
 The household models that have informed the research question that this paper addresses 
are based on the assumption that the control of resources affects decision-making power within 
the household. If this is not true, then the pension should not necessarily have an effect on how 
decisions are made (and how resources are allocated) within the household. However, if the 
interpretation of the result that women’s decision-making power increases when they are eligible 
for the pension is to be guided by these theories, then the non-result in the case of pension 
eligible men becomes puzzling. Given that men also experience a discontinuous increase in 
pension receipt at their age of eligibility (Figure 2.1b), this increase in income should also 
increase their position in the household in regards to decision making.  
 The lack of increase in decision making power for men could be attributed to several 
things. One possibility is that men were already the decision maker and therefore there is no 
room for improvement. However, the breakdown of decision making in the household by age 




are by no means always the decision maker. Being the decision maker prior to the pension may 
have contributed to a smaller increase in decision-making power for men than for women, but it 
should not have erased it altogether. 
 It is instructive therefore to understand whether or not control of resources is actually the 
channel through which the impact on female decision making is operating. First, I examine 
whether or not control of income is correlated with decision making in the household. Using the 
reports of individually earned income from the NIDS adult survey, for each elderly adult I 
calculate his or her income share (the percentage of total household income that he or she reports 
individually10) as a proxy for income control. Figure 2.4 graphs the mean value of the primary 
decision maker for day-to-day purchases indicator variable against this personal income share 
variable in five percentage point bins by gender.11 There is a strong, clear relationship between 
income share and decision making for both men and women, and the relationship holds 
regardless of pension eligibility (not shown).12,13 
 This strong relationship between income share and decision-making power draws a clear 
line to why there are strong impacts of the pension on decision making, at least for women. 
Consequently, we should also see a discontinuity in income share at the age of pension 
eligibility. In Figure 2.5 I plot the mean of the elderly individual’s income share by age and the 
regression line, again estimated on either side of the age discontinuity. The discontinuity is clear 
and striking in the female sample and provides a convincing channel through which the increase 
in decision making occurs. However, the corresponding increase at age 65 in the male sample is 
much smaller and noisy. If household decision making is determined through income control 
then this lack of significant increase in men’s income share provides an explanation for why 
there is no increase in decision making in the male sample. This same pattern is evident, 
although noisier, when examining raw individual income (results not shown). The idea that 
increased income share is driving the increase in decision-making power for women is bolstered 
10 The NIDS survey collects income data individually, except in the case of agricultural income which is collected 
on the household level. 
11 In Figures 2.4 – 2.7 I drop the top half percent of elderly male and female household income earners to eliminate 
several extreme outliers. Dropping the outliers is done only to allow for cleaner presentation of results and does not 
affect the qualitative implication of the figures. All results in the paper are robust to the exclusion of these 
observations.  
12 The relationship also holds in the entire sample of NIDS individuals, not just the elderly population. 
13 To avoid losing observations to missing income data, I utilize income data with imputations done by NIDS. 
However, dropping observations with imputations does not affect the results. 
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by regression results. Adding income share to the main decision-making regressions presented in 
Table 2.2 reduces the magnitude of the coefficient on female eligibility by 40 percent and the 
effect loses statistical significance. There is no change in the coefficient on male eligibility 
(Table 2.A.1). 
 In light of these results for individual income, it is interesting to consider what happens to 
overall household income with pension eligibility. In particular, the increase in individual 
income for pension eligible females but not for pension eligible males suggests that any impacts 
on household outcomes (to be addressed in Section VI) assumed to be a result of increased 
bargaining power for women could simply be a result of the increased income flowing into 
households with eligible females. Figure 2.6 plots the results for household income. 
Interestingly, there is no increase for men or women, suggesting that the pension income is being 
offset by reductions in other income. With no increase in income, any changes in household 
outcomes associated with female eligibility must be due to shifts in bargaining power in the 
household. 
 Although the lack of increase in male income share provides a convincing explanation for 
why there is not an increase in male decision making, it is perplexing given the fact that there is a 
discontinuity in male pension receipt at 65. If male income is not increasing, where is the 
pension money going? Given previous evidence that both men and women exit the labor force in 
large numbers at the age of eligibility (Lam et al., 2006; Ranchod, 2006) one explanation is that 
the pension income received by men is cancelled out by the reduction in labor income caused by 
withdrawal from the labor force. However, given that the drops in employment were found for 
both men and women it is not immediately clear why this cancelling out would occur for one 
gender and not the other.14  
 An examination of labor income is more instructive than a simple examination of 
employment. Figure 2.7 graphs the age trend, separately by gender, for individual labor income 
as a percentage of household, non-pension, income.15 Strong discontinuities are present for both 
genders, but the means prior to pension eligibility for women are much lower than they are for 
14 42% and 16% of non-eligible and eligible women respectively are working. 54% and 22% of non-eligible and 
eligible men respectively are working. It is interesting to note that labor force withdrawal is not a requirement for 
pension receipt for most people as employment income in this population is generally below the means test for 
eligibility. 
15 I perform the calculation in this way to mitigate the mechanical decrease in labor income as a percentage of 
household income if household income were to increase with the pension. 
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men. Men earned more than women in the labor market prior to receiving the pension and their 
labor income was a more important part of the total household budget. Therefore, while the 
pension represents an increase over what women were earning in the labor market, it is more of a 
replacement for what men previously earned. This, combined with the fact that the age 
discontinuity in pension receipt is not as strong for men as for women, can explain why men do 
not see an increase in personal income share when they become pension eligible. Consequently, 
male status in the household remains roughly constant. 
 
2.6 Household outcomes 
 This analysis of how pension eligibility affects decision making and income share in the 
household is interesting largely because we expect these changes to translate into changes in 
measures of well being in the household. Although impacts of the pension have been extensively 
documented in the literature, this is the first study to look for them in the NIDS dataset, and it is 
important to document that they still exist in 2008, 15 years after the expansion of benefits. Here 
I examine impacts on child nutrition and ownership of consumer durables, two measures that are 
likely to be associated with the two main decision-making categories that I have addressed in this 
paper, decisions about day-to-day purchases such as groceries and decisions about large, unusual 
purchases such as many consumer durables.  
2.6.1 Child nutrition 
 One of the most well-known results in the pension literature is Duflo’s finding that 
female pension eligibility results in higher values of anthropometric indicators for young girls 
but not young boys (Duflo, 2003). Utilizing anthropometric data collected from young children, 
she examines the impact of the pension on standardized measures of child nutritional status, 
including weight for height.16 Weight for height is a flow measure of nutrition, a marker that 
responds quickly when a child’s conditions changes. In her main results, Duflo finds a 0.61 
standard deviation increase in the weight for height measure for young girls with the presence of 
a pension eligible woman but a small and insignificant effect with the presence of a pension 
eligible man. There are no statistically significant impacts for boys.  
 Duflo uses a nationally representative household survey from 1993, similar in structure to 
16 Weight for height Z-scores are calculated by subtracting the median and dividing by the standard error for the 
child’s height and sex in a standard reference population. Duflo uses the reference group of well-nourished US 
children provided by the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, standard prior to 2006.  
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NIDS, to conduct her analysis, making this a feasible result to examine with the current data.17 
Additionally, because this result is widely used to make inferences about household models and 
support arguments that giving income to women over men leads to improved outcomes for 
children, it is particularly appropriate in the context of the current paper.  
 The NIDS survey collects anthropometric data from both children and adults, allowing 
for the construction of standardized weight for height z-scores. As discussed earlier, weight for 
height is typically seen as an indicator of acute malnutrition as it responds quickly to 
improvements in nutrition. Children who are severely malnourished are two or more standard 
deviations below the median weight for height. To construct the z-scores I use the WHO 
international child growth standards for children up to age five as the reference population 
(WHO, 2006). In all analyses, I drop observations with z-scores deemed biologically impossible 
(absolute z-scores greater than 5 for weight for height). 
 Standardized weight for height measures are defined only for young children. 
Consequently, I limit my sample to children aged 6 to 60 months.18 Following the empirical 
strategy employed in the rest of the paper, I also limit the sample to black children who live with 
a person aged 50 to 75. There are 593 boys and 572 girls aged 6 to 60 months who live with a 
person aged 50 to 75 in the NIDS database. Unfortunately, a significant amount of the sample is 
lost to missing or unfeasible anthropometric data, leaving 413 boys and 389 girls for analysis 
purposes.19  
In this sample I estimate the following equation: 
(2) 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑟𝐻𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑗 =  
𝛼𝑓𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑗 + 𝛼𝑚𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑗 +  𝜃𝑓𝑂𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝜃𝑚𝑂𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑗
+ 𝛾(𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑗,𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑗) + 𝛽𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗 
 
where 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 and 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 are indicators for the presence of an age-eligible man 
or woman in the household. 𝑂𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 and 𝑂𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 are indicators for whether or not 
17 The 1993 survey is composed only of a household survey; it did not incorporate individual interviews with 
household members and does not contain questions on decision making. 
18 Table 2.A.2 shows that the same patterns in decision making are present among the elderly who live with children 
in this age group, although the effects are somewhat smaller and less precise. 
19 A comparison of children with valid anthropometric data and those without shows few differences across a variety 
of relevant household characteristics. The exception is that children with missing data are more likely to live in an 
urban area.  
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there is a woman or man aged 50 to 75 in the household. Following Edmonds (2006) 
(𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑗,𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑗) is a third order polynomial in the age of the oldest woman and the 
oldest man in the household. In all specifications I include a set of indicators for child’s age and 
mother’s educational attainment and further include controls for the number of household 
members who are 0-5, 6-14, 15-24, and 25-49, and presence of mother and father in the 
household. 20 𝛼𝑓 and 𝛼𝑚 can then be interpreted as the difference in weight for height between a 
child living with a pension eligible woman (man) and a child living with a woman (man) who is 
almost eligible. This specification is similar to those used to estimate the impacts on decision 
making, but because the level of observation is the child, not the older adult, it controls for age 
trends in the age of the oldest man and woman in the household.   
Table 2.5 shows the results of estimating this equation. Columns 1 and 4 present results 
when a single eligibility indicator is used. The coefficient on pension eligibility is large, positive 
and statistically significant for girls, but small and negative for boys. Columns 2 and 5 include 
separate indicators for an eligible woman and an eligible man and control for the presence of a 
woman or man aged 50 to 75 and columns 3 and 6 add the set of control variables. The 
coefficient on woman eligible is large and stable to the addition of control variables for girls. The 
presence of a pension eligible woman increases weight for height of girls by about 0.6 standard 
deviations. The coefficients for eligible man are close to zero and have large standard errors. In 
the boys sample the coefficients on male and female eligibility are small and imprecise. A clear 
pattern emerges from these results, namely that the presence of a pension eligible woman (but 
not a pension eligible man) increases the weight for height of girls. There is no effect of pension 
eligibility of either gender for boys. This pattern of results is the same as those reported by Duflo 
(2003). 
2.6.2 Ownership of consumer durables 
 The significant increase in income provided by the pension provides the opportunity not 
only to improve the quality of day-to-day purchases on food, but also to invest in larger 
household items that have the ability to improve quality of life. Certain consumer durables like 
modern stoves and refrigerators can also contribute to improved health in the household, 
particularly for children. The NIDS survey collects information on 27 separate durable goods 
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that may be owned by households. Here I consider the total number of what I term “household” 
durable goods, which are the 16 goods listed on the survey excluding ownership of vehicles, 
bikes, and large agricultural tools. The household durable goods include radios, televisions, cell 
phones, stoves, refrigerators, washing machines, and living room furniture.21 I observe only 
whether or not a household possesses each type of good and do not know if they have more than 
one of each type. Consequently, I can detect if pension eligible households buy types of goods 
that they did not previously own, but not if they buy more of or replace goods that they already 
had.  
 I estimate the same household level model that I use in Section IV to examine changes in 
decision making by other members of the household; the dependent variable is the number of 
household durable goods. Table 2.6 presents the results. Results are shown for all households 
with an elderly man or woman. Columns 1 and 2 show results for households with an elderly 
woman aged 50 to 75. The results for households with an elderly man are in Columns 3 and 4. 
Columns 2 and 4 include control variables. 
 Among households with an elderly woman, female eligibility results, on average, in 1.1 
more household durable goods, a 23 percent increase in the sample mean of 4.9. This is robust to 
the addition of controls. Women do appear to be channeling some of their pension income into 
the purchase of consumer durables, a complement to the fact that they were found to be 
significantly more likely to be the primary decision maker for large, unusual purchases in the 
household. The increase in consumer durables also provides another channel beyond healthier 
food through with the improvement in girls’ nutrition could be occurring. The coefficient on 
male eligibility is small and imprecise; there is no evidence that male pension income leads to 
the purchase of more consumer durables.  
 
2.7 Discussion 
 Empirical analyses that find positive impacts on household outcomes associated with 
increases in female resources but no such benefits associated with increases in male resources are 
often used to argue that cash transfer funds may be more productively used when given to 
women instead of men. On their face, the results in the previous section (positive impacts on 
21 The full list of included durable goods is: radio; Hi-Fi stereo; CD player; MP3 player; television; satellite dish; 
VCR or DVD player; computer; camera; cell phone; electric stove; gas stove; paraffin stove; microwave; 
fridge/freezer; washing machine; sewing/knitting machine; lounge suite. 
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household outcomes with female eligibility but not with male eligibility) would also seem to 
support this contention. However, when taken together with the income share results described in 
Section V, the interpretation is no longer so clear cut. Given that there is no increase in income 
with male pension eligibility there is no a priori reason to expect to see evidence of positive 
impacts on household well-being as in the case of female eligibility. There may have been 
positive impacts if male income had increased. The results in this study highlight the need for 
caution when interpreting results (such as those on girls’ nutrition and ownership of consumer 
durables in this paper) that seem to indicate that money given to women is better spent than 
money given to men. Even if the narrow goal of a transfer is an improvement in child nutrition, it 
is not possible to predict what would have happened had the transfers been given to, for example, 
younger men and women who would have been less likely to leave the labor force. Indeed, in a 
study in Burkina Faso, Akresh, de Walque, and Kazianga (2012) find that conditional cash 
transfers have the same positive effects on the utilization of preventative health services when 
given to the father as when given to the mother. 
 Given that the Duflo (2003) study on pension eligibility and child health is one of the 
papers that is most widely cited in support of the contention that transfer programs should be 
directed towards women, it is interesting to examine the income dynamics in the data used in 
Duflo’s study. The analysis in that paper was done using the Project for Statistics on Living 
Standards and Development (PSLSD), a 1993 survey similar to NIDS in sample size, goals, and 
structure, although it consisted of a single household level survey. Using the PSLSD data I 
construct figures 8 through 10. Figure 2.8 shows that the discontinuity in pension receipt in 1993 
does exist at age 60 and 65 for women and men respectively, although it is smaller than in 2008, 
particularly for men. Figures 2.9 and 2.10 are analogous to Figures 2.5 and 2.6 from the NIDS 
data examining the changes in personal income share and total household income as a result of 
male and female eligibility. I do this only for elderly people who live with a child 6 to 60 months 
old, as that is the sample of interest in Duflo’s paper.22 Decision making data was not collected 
in the PSLSD, so my analysis is limited to the income data. 
 The results of this analysis roughly replicate the results in the NIDS data. A strong 
increase in personal income share (Figure 2.9) is present for pension eligible females, but not for 
pension eligible males, suggesting that women experience an increase in bargaining power when 
22 As in Section V, I drop observations in the top half percent of household income, by female and male. 
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they become pension eligible while male status in the household remains constant. Additionally, 
there is no increase in household income with female or male eligibility (Figure 2.10), indicating 
that the observed changes in nutrition must be due to shifts in female bargaining power, not 
increased household income. These parallels to the results in the NIDS data suggest that the use 
of the Duflo paper to strongly argue for the targeting of programs towards women should be 
reconsidered. The pension, in both 1993 and 2008, appears to leave men’s status in the 
household unchanged. 
 
2.8 Robustness checks 
 Although the main decision-making results in this paper are robust to the addition of 
control variables and changes in sample, given the large literature that exists documenting a 
variety of impacts of the pension, it is important to explore the possibility that the increases in 
decision making shown here are an effect of one of these other changes rather than a direct 
impact of shifts in who controls household income. 
2.8.1 Changes in employment 
 One important impact of the pension is its effect on the labor supply of those who are 
eligible. A potential explanation, then, for the increases in female decision-making power is that 
these effects are being driven, at least in part, by women who are leaving the work force when 
they begin to receive the pension. Now retired, they spend more time at home and therefore 
assume more household duties, such as making decisions about purchases. If true, then the 
increase in decision-making power is not due to the income that elderly women are now earning, 
but to their new role in the household. Two analyses already done in this paper rebut this 
explanation. First, the increases in decision-making power are seen not only for day-to-day 
purchases but also for large, unusual purchases, a category for which the labor supply 
explanation seems less well suited. While the daily shopping may be seen as a chore, it is less 
likely that infrequent, large purchases are. Additionally, if the extra time at home that resulted 
from leaving the labor force was the driving force behind the increase in decision-making power, 
then there should an upward trend in decision-making in the years prior to eligibility as women 
steadily stop working. However, in Figure 2.2a, the age trend in decision making prior to pension 
eligibility is negative, suggesting that this is not the case. 




decision making can also be tested directly. I re-estimate regression equation 1, now including an 
interaction term between pension eligibility and employment.23 If the decision-making impacts 
are being driven by those who have left the labor force, then the coefficient on the interaction 
term should be negative. The results are presented in Table 2.7. Columns 1 and 2 present the 
results for women and columns 3 and 4 present the results for men. Columns 1 and 3 include the 
full set of controls as well as an indicator variable for employment status. Columns 2 and 4 add 
the interaction between eligibility and employment. The results for women are not suggestive of 
heterogeneous effects by employment status. The coefficient on the interaction term, while 
negative, is small compared to the main effect of eligibility and insignificant. Additionally, the 
coefficient on employment status in Column 1 is a significant 6 percentage points, suggesting 
that being employed tends to have a positive, not negative, impact on decision making. Again no 
significant effects related to eligibility are present for men, although employment does have a 
similar positive effect on decision making in the male sample. 
2.8.2 Changes in household composition 
 The most important threat to the validity of the results in this paper is the possibility that 
receipt of the pension causes households to reorganize and that the results are an artifact of this 
change in household structure rather than a direct impact of the pension itself. Because previous 
work has shown that some changes in household composition do seem to occur (Edmonds et al., 
2005; Hamoudi and Thomas, 2005) the goal in this paper is to argue that any changes that may 
be occurring are not likely to affect the validity of the results. For example, the existing literature 
finds increases in the numbers of young children and young woman and decreases in prime 
working age women with female pension eligibility. Even if this pattern were to be found in the 
NIDS data it is unlikely to be the cause of the results that I find. As shown in Table 2.3, only a 
very low percentage of non-elderly women are the decision makers in households with an elderly 
women, therefore it is difficult to describe a scenario in which their movements in and out of 
households could impact the decision-making power of elderly women to such a great extent. 
 Figure 2.11 explores whether there is a change in household size at pension eligibility. I 
plot the mean of household size against age and show the regression line and 95 percent 
confidence intervals estimated on either side of the discontinuity. Figure 2.11a examines 
23 This is an individual level analysis, as in Table 2.2. Sample size differs slightly because some observations have 
missing employment data. 
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household size for elderly women. Although the slope of the regression line changes at the 
discontinuity, there is no discernible jump. However, the analysis for men, in Figure 2.11b, is 
highly suggestive of an increase in household size, a result that is supported by regression 
analysis (results not shown). In order to understand where this increase is coming from, I 
examine changes in the number of children aged 14 and below in the household in Figure 2.12. 
Figure 2.12 shows that for elderly women there is essentially no change in the number of 
children at the age of eligibility, but there is a large discontinuity at age 65 in the male sample. 
The jump in the regression line is roughly equal in size to the increase in household size seen in 
Figure 2.11b. There is no change in the mean number of adults in the household or in the number 
of elderly men or women in the household for men or women (results not shown). 
 In the NIDS data there is not strong evidence of changes in household composition that 
could be driving the decision making results found for elderly women. However, pension 
eligibility is associated with an increase in the number of children living with elderly men. One 
possible explanation for this is that men stop working when they receive the pension and move in 
with extended family where there are more children. To address this issue, in Table 2.8, I re-
estimate the main results presented in Table 2.2 and add flexible controls for number of children 
in the household, in the form of dummy variables for the presence of one, two, three and four or 
more children. No children is the omitted category. Columns 1 (women) and 3 (men) repeat the 
results presented in column 1 of Table 2.2. Columns 2 and 4 add the controls for number of 
children.  
 Controlling for number of children has very little effect on the eligibility coefficient in 
the female sample, and with the exception of the four or more category, the presence of children 
has no significant relationship with decision-making power. This is not true for men; adding the 
controls reduces the magnitude of the eligibility coefficient from -0.08 to essentially zero. 
Additionally, the presence of children in the household has a strong, negative relationship with 
male decision making. In short, considering changes in household composition does not affect 
the estimates for female decision making. Household composition matters more for men, but 
controlling for these changes only strengthens the finding of a zero result for men: the negative 
(insignificant) coefficient is reduced to zero, and there is a no suggestion of a positive effect. 
These results are consistent with the results in Table 2.2 that show that the estimated effect of 







 The results in this study show that women experience an increase in personal income 
share when they become eligible for the pension. Bargaining models of the household predict 
that this increase should result in an increase in bargaining power, and I find that pension eligible 
women are more likely to be the primary decision maker in their households across a variety of 
categories. This shift in decision-making power is accompanied by improved nutritional status 
for young girls and an increase in the ownership of consumer durables. This is one of the first 
studies to show how specific mechanisms within the household (namely decision making) are 
reacting to gender specific changes in income instead of relying solely on the reduced form 
impact on household outcomes to make arguments about bargaining power.  
 The improvements in household outcomes with female, but not male, eligibility, echo 
previous results (Duflo, 2003) that have been used both to support bargaining models of the 
household and to argue that social programs should channel resources towards women as they 
will direct the money towards more productive uses. The findings in this paper that the lack of 
impacts for men may be due to the lack of increases in personal income share and bargaining 
power suggests caution in advocating for such targeting based on a reduced form analysis alone. 
Any evaluation of a cash transfer program such as the South African pension must acknowledge 
that households will react in varied and complex ways and changes in outcomes cannot be 




Figure 2.1: Pension receipt by age 
 
Figure 2.2: Primary decision making for day-to-day purchases by age 
 
Figure 2.3: Primary decision making for day-to-day purchases by age, two 
year age bins 
 
 
Notes: Sample is individuals aged 50 to 75, women in panel A and men in panel B. Scatterplots 
are unweighted means of y-axis variable by age in years. Unweighted OLS regression lines of y-
axis variable on age are estimated on either side of the discontinuity (age 60 for women and age 65 
for men). 95% confidence intervals are shown around the regression lines. Y-axis variable in 
Figure 2.1 is a dummy variable for pension receipt. Y-axis variable in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 is a 
dummy variable for whether or not everyone in household agrees that individual is the primary 
































































































































Figure 2.4: Decision making by percent of personal income share 
 
Figure 2.5: Personal income share by age 
Figure 2.6: Total household income by age 
 
Notes: Sample is individuals aged 50 to 75, women in panel A and men in panel B. The top half 
percent of male and female household income earners are trimmed. Figure 2.4: Scatterplot is the 
mean of whether or not everyone in the household agrees the individual is the primary decision 
maker for day-to-day purchases by 5 percentage point bins of personal income share. Figures 2.5 
& 2.6: Scatterplots are unweighted means of y-axis variable by age. Unweighted OLS regression 
lines of y-axis variable on age are estimated on either side of the discontinuity (age 60 for women 
and age 65 for men). 95% confidence intervals are shown around the regression lines. Y-axis 
variable in Figure 2.5 is the percent of total household income reported to be earned or received by 
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Figure 2.7: Individual labor income as percent of household non-pension 
income by age 
 
Figure 2.8: Pension receipt by age in 1993: HHs with young children 
 
Figure 2.9: Personal income share by age in 1993: HHs with young children 
 
Notes: Scatterplots are unweighted means of y-axis variable by age in years. Unweighted OLS 
regression lines of y-axis variable on age are estimated on either side of the discontinuity (age 60 
for women and age 65 for men). 95% confidence intervals are shown around the regression lines. 
Figure 2.7: Sample is individuals aged 50 to 75, women in panel A and men in panel B. Y-axis 
variable is individual labor income as a percent of household non-pension income. Figures 2.8 and 
2.9: Source is 1993 PSLSD dataset. Sample is individuals aged 50 to 75 living with a child 6 to 60 
months. Y-axis variable in Figure 2.8 is pension receipt. Y-axis variable in Figure 2.9 is the 
























































































































Figure 2.10: Total HH income by age in 1993: HHs with young children 
 
Figure 2.11: Household size by age 
 
Figure 2.12: Number of children aged 0-14 by age 
 
Notes: Scatterplots are unweighted means of y-axis variable by age in years. Unweighted OLS 
regression lines of y-axis variable on age are estimated on either side of the discontinuity (age 60 
for women and age 65 for men). 95% confidence intervals are shown around the regression lines. 
Figure 2.10: Source is 1993 PSLSD dataset. Sample is individuals aged 50 to 75 living with a 
child 6 to 60 months. Y-axis variable in Figure 2.10 is total household income. Figures 2.11 and 
2.12: Sample is individuals aged 50 to 75, women in panel A and men in panel B. Y-axis variable 





















































































































































Not eligible Eligible Not eligible Eligible
Demographics
Age (mean) 54.3 (2.8) 66.8 (4.5) 55.9 (4.2) 69.2 (3.0)
Household size (mean) 5.0 (3.0) 5.1 (3.0) 4.6 (3.0) 5.3 (3.2)
Years of schooling (mean) 4.3 (4.0) 2.8 (3.5) 4.76 (4.1) 2.73 (3.5)
Rural (%) 63.5 71.7 55.7 75.3
Married (%) 47.1 32.5 73.9 78.8
Presence of child under fifteen (%) 71.8 74.6 58.9 68.0
Presence of child under five (%) 42.2 41.8 31.6 42.6
Presence of man (woman) 50+ (%) 35.8 28.0 42.1 70.2
Presence of woman 18 - 49 (%) 51.4 54.4 56.1 56.4
Presence of man 18 - 49 (%) 44.1 43.9 34.2 39.9
Income and employment
Employed (%) 42.3 16.3 54.0 22.1
Per-capita hh income (median) 425 480 530 570
Personal income (median) 650 940 870 870
Personal income as percent of total hh 
income (median)
32.0 48.1 36.8 39.8
Pension receipt
Received pension (%) 9.2 91.4 8.3 83.9
Amount received (median, conditional 
on receipt)
870 870 920 870
Is primary decision maker for
Day-to-day purchases (%) 61.2 67.8 56.3 62.7
Large, unusual purchases (%) 57.8 65.0 64.5 66.9
Who can live in household (%) 55.8 64.9 68.6 72.0
Where household lives (%) 55.4 64.6 69.6 71.7
Observations 915 835 813 279
Table 2.1: Summary statistics for adults aged 50 to 75
Women Men
Notes: Author's calculations from 2008 NIDS.  Standard deviations for means are in parentheses. Number of 
observations is based on black individuals aged 50-75 with non-missing values for decision making on day-to-day 
purchases which is the main regression sample. All money amounts are in South African rand, the exchange rate 
varied from 7-8 rand to the US dollar over the survey period. Employment is defined as working in any capacity 
including casual labor, self employment, and own farm labor. Personal income is any income that can be attributed 
directly to the individual, all income is collected individually except for agircultural income. Decision making 
variables are dummy variables for whether or not everyone in the household agrees that the individual is the primary 
decision maker in that category.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel 1: Women
Pension eligible 0.155*** 0.142** 0.139** 0.127**
[0.0573] [0.0565] [0.0619] [0.0610]
Presence of man 50+ -0.543*** -0.551*** -0.603*** -0.603***
[0.0371] [0.0362] [0.0343] [0.0350]
Presence of pension eligible man -0.0447 -0.0225 -0.0246 -0.0156
[0.0524] [0.0521] [0.0482] [0.0490]
Observations 1,750 1,750 1,726 1,726
R-squared 0.310 0.334 0.355 0.364
Sample mean 0.64 0.61
Panel 2: Men
Pension eligible -0.0788 -0.0477 -0.138 -0.0984
[0.104] [0.0905] [0.106] [0.0913]
Presence of woman 50 to 75 -0.274*** -0.253*** -0.185*** -0.166***
[0.0461] [0.0446] [0.0468] [0.0454]
Presence of pension eligible woman -0.0593 -0.0212 -0.0614 -0.0246
[0.0582] [0.0565] [0.0608] [0.0577]
Observations 1,092 1,092 1,078 1,078
R-squared 0.080 0.182 0.046 0.146
Sample mean 0.58 0.65
Control variables NO YES NO YES
Cubic in age of person YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.2: Effect of pension eligibility on household decision making
Dependent variable: Primary 
decision maker for day-to-day 
purchases
Dependent variable: Primary 
decision maker for large, unusual 
purchases
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the household level. Regressions are weighted with survey post-
stratification weights. Sample is restricted to black men and women aged 50-75. Control variables are number of household 
members who are 0-5, 6-14, 15-24, and 25-49, educational attainment category, and rural/urban status.
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No man 50+ in 
hh Man 50+ in hh
No woman 50+ 
in hh
Woman 50+ in 
hh
Decision maker is woman 50+ (%) 85.4 27.3 28.2
Decision maker is man 50+ (%) 48.7 70.2 48.5
Decision maker is woman 18 - 49 (%) 2.8 1.5 14.4 1.7
Decision maker is man 18 - 49 (%) 2.7 0 1.5 0
Household disagrees on decision maker (%) 9.2 22.2 13.9 21.5
Observations 1163 546 541 522
Woman 50 - 75 Man 50 - 75
Households with a:
Table 2.3: Identity of household decision maker: Primary decision maker for day-to-day purchases
Notes: Author's calculations from 2008 NIDS. 
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(2) (3)
No man 50+ in 
hh Man 50+ in hh
Pension eligible woman -0.153*** 0.0576
[0.0445] [0.127]




Sample mean 0.09 0.23
No woman 50+ 
in hh
Woman 50+ in 
hh
Pension eligible man -0.0416 -0.0687
[0.0848] [0.104]




Sample mean 0.14 0.21
Control variables YES YES
Cubic in age of oldest woman (man) YES YES
Table 2.4:  Effect of pension eligibility on decision making of others in the household
Dependent variable: Person of 
opposite sex aged 50+ is primary 
decision maker for day-to-day 
purchases
Dependent variable: Household 
disagreement on identity of primary 




Man 50+ in hh
(1)










Woman 50+ in hh
0.161
Panel 2: Households with a man 50 - 75
[0.118]
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the survey cluster level. Regressions are weighted with survey post-
stratification weights. Sample is restricted to households with a black woman (man) aged 50-75. Control variables are number 
of household members who are 0-5, 6-14, 15-24, and 25-49. 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eligible person 0.573** -0.121
[0.261] [0.256]
Eligible woman 0.598* 0.550* 0.0293 -0.0341
[0.349] [0.324] [0.336] [0.337]
Eligible man 0.221 0.0508 -0.144 -0.173
[0.417] [0.412] [0.393] [0.414]
Presence of woman 50-75 -0.128 -0.0635 0.132 0.273
[0.305] [0.288] [0.390] [0.417]
Presence of man 50-75 -0.251 -0.598 0.355 0.293
[0.428] [0.457] [0.605] [0.605]
Observations 389 389 389 413 413 413
R-squared 0.108 0.107 0.146 0.060 0.063 0.102
Cubic in age of oldest man, 
woman YES YES YES YES YES YES
Control variables NO NO YES NO NO YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Boys
Table 2.5: Effect of pension eligibility on weight for height z-scores
Girls
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the household level. Regressions are weighted with 
survey post-stratification weights. Sample is restricted to black boys and girls aged 6 to 60 months who live 
with a person aged 50-75 and have non-missing, valid anthropometric data. All regressions control for age of 
child. Control variables are number of household members who are 0-5, 6-14, 15-24, and 25-49, mother's 
educational attainment category, and presence of mother and father in the household. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eligible woman (man) 1.120*** 1.057** 0.00753 0.345
[0.431] [0.433] [0.745] [0.655]
Presence of man (woman) 50+ 0.675** 0.629** 1.326*** 1.472***
[0.328] [0.286] [0.365] [0.318]
Eligible man (woman) -0.186 0.0966 0.172 -0.0312
[0.454] [0.384] [0.447] [0.384]
Observations 1,709 1,709 1,063 1,063
R-squared 0.025 0.179 0.051 0.234
Sample mean 4.95 4.96
Cubic in age of oldest woman (man) 50-
75 YES YES YES YES
Control variables NO YES NO YES
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the survey cluster level. Regressions are weighted with survey post-
stratification weights. Sample is restricted to households with a black woman (man) aged 50 -75. Control variables are number 
of household members who are 0-5, 6-14, 15-24, and 25-49. Household durable goods include radio; Hi-Fi stereo, CD player, 
MP3 player; television; satellite dish; VCR or DVD player; computer; camera; cell phone; electric stove; gas stove; paraffin 
stove; microwave; fridge/freezer; washing machine; sewing/knitting machine; lounge suite.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.6: Effect of pension eligibility on number of household consumer durables
Households with a woman 50-75 Households with a man 50-75
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pension eligible 0.150*** 0.166*** -0.0520 -0.0571
[0.0544] [0.0559] [0.0904] [0.0920]
Presence of man (woman) 50+ -0.549*** -0.548*** -0.233*** -0.233***
[0.0365] [0.0366] [0.0478] [0.0479]
Eligible man (woman) -0.0135 -0.0141 0.00619 0.00764
[0.0532] [0.0530] [0.0595] [0.0604]
Employed 0.0627** 0.0825** 0.0669* 0.0627
[0.0278] [0.0348] [0.0406] [0.0447]
Employed*Pension eligible -0.0595 0.0208
[0.0572] [0.109]
Observations 1,709 1,709 1,017 1,017
R-squared 0.339 0.340 0.184 0.184
Sample mean 0.65 0.60
Control variables YES YES YES YES
Cubic in age of person YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.7: Effect of pension eligibility on household decision making: Interactions with 
employment
Dependent variable: Primary decision maker for day-to-day purchases
Women Men
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the household level. Regressions are weighted with survey post-
stratification weights. Sample is restricted to black men and women aged 50 - 75 with non-missing employment data. Control 
variables are number of household members who are 0-5, 6-14, 15-24, and 25-49, educational attainment category, and 
rural/urban status.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pension eligible 0.155*** 0.164*** -0.0788 -0.0169
[0.0573] [0.0578] [0.104] [0.101]
Presence of man (woman) 50+ -0.543*** -0.544*** -0.274*** -0.189***
[0.0371] [0.0373] [0.0461] [0.0481]
Eligible man (woman) -0.0447 -0.0361 -0.0593 -0.0668
[0.0524] [0.0527] [0.0582] [0.0576]
Number of children = 1 -0.00281 -0.220***
[0.0334] [0.0552]
Number of children = 2 -0.0495 -0.226***
[0.0358] [0.0573]
Number of children = 3 -0.0431 -0.222***
[0.0408] [0.0738]
Number of children = 4+ -0.100** -0.284***
[0.0456] [0.0637]
Observations 1,750 1,750 1,092 1,092
R-squared 0.310 0.316 0.080 0.127
Sample mean 0.64 0.58
Control variables NO NO NO NO
Cubic in age of person YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.8: Effect of pension eligibility on household decision making: Controls for number of 
children
Dependent variable: Primary decision maker for day to day purchases
Women Men
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the household level. Regressions are weighted with survey post-
stratification weights. Sample is restricted to black men and women aged 50 - 75. Columns 2 and 4 include dummy variables 
for the number of children 14 and under in the household.  The omitted category is 0.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pension eligible 0.142** 0.0884 -0.0477 -0.0499
[0.0565] [0.0543] [0.0905] [0.0891]
Presence of man (woman) 50+ -0.551*** -0.488*** -0.253*** -0.215***
[0.0362] [0.0372] [0.0446] [0.0469]
Eligible man (woman) -0.0225 -0.00521 -0.0212 -0.00519
[0.0521] [0.0502] [0.0540] [0.0534]
Personal income share 0.00337*** 0.00193***
[0.000472] [0.000612]
Observations 1,750 1,749 1,092 1,092
R-squared 0.334 0.365 0.182 0.196
Sample mean 0.64 0.58
Control variables YES YES YES YES
Cubic in age of person YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.A.1: Effect of pension eligibility on household decision making: Personal income share
Dependent variable: Primary decision maker for day to day purchases
Women Men
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the household level. Regressions are weighted with survey post-
stratification weights. Sample is restricted to men and women aged 50 to 75 with non missing employment data. Control 
variables are number of household members who are 0 -5, 6 -14, 15 - 24, and 25 - 49, educational attainment category, and 
rural/urban status. Personal income share is the percent of household income attributed to the individual.
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(1) (2) (4) (5)
Pension eligible 0.137 0.120 0.169 0.0171
[0.0858] [0.0867] [0.170] [0.152]
Presence of man (woman) 50+ -0.554*** -0.548*** -0.0683 -0.152**
[0.0557] [0.0565] [0.0822] [0.0711]
Eligible man (woman) 0.0195 0.0200 -0.00884 0.00360
[0.0726] [0.0744] [0.0839] [0.0770]
Observations 735 735 376 376
R-squared 0.287 0.307 0.032 0.169
Sample mean 0.60 0.48
Control variables NO YES NO YES
Cubic in age of person YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.A.2: Effect of pension eligibility on household decision making: Households with young 
children
Dependent variable: Primary decision-maker for day-to-day purchases
Women Men
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the household level. Regressions are weighted with survey post-
stratification weights. Sample is restricted to black men and women aged 50-75 who live with a child 60 months old or 
younger. Control variables are number of household members who are 0-5, 6-14, 15-24, and 25-49, educational attainment 




Subsidizing Remittances for Education: A Field Experiment Among Migrants 




Economists have widely acknowledged that a variety of market failures lead private 
markets to provide suboptimal levels of education. Privately-chosen levels of educational 
investments may be lower than the social optimum due to imperfections in credit markets, 
failures in intergenerational contracting, imperfect information, or the existence of positive 
externalities from human capital investments (Becker 1981, Loury 1981, Acemoglu and Angrist 
2000, Mookherjee and Ray 2003, Banerjee 2004, among others). A common policy response is 
to stimulate educational demand with subsidies. Conditional cash transfer programs, in which 
households receive cash payments conditional on behaviors such as school attendance and 
primary health care utilization, are perhaps the most widespread policy approach to subsidizing 
educational investments in the developing world.1 Subsidies for private education are another 
approach, of which the Colombian voucher program is an example (Angrist et al. 2002). In this 
paper we also study an educational subsidy program in a developing country, but one with novel 
features compared to programs that have been subjects of previous research. 
The key new feature of the program we study is that it seeks, via an innovative payment 
mechanism, to supplement donor-financed educational subsidies with the resources of migrants 
1 CCT programs now exist in a many countries, and have been shown to lead to increased school enrollment and 
reduced dropout. Studies include Schultz (2004), Behrman et al (2005), Barrera et al (2011), Baird et al (2011), and 
Glewwe and Kassouf (2012). See Fiszbein and Schady (2009) for a review. 
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working overseas. On a global scale, migrant remittances are one of the largest types of 
international financial flows to developing countries, amounting in 2012 to over US$400 billion 
(World Bank 2012).2 There is substantial interest among policymakers in the economic impacts 
of migrant remittances, and in policy options for leveraging international migrant populations 
from developing countries for the economic development of their origin countries.3   
The educational subsidy program we analyze provides Central American immigrants in 
the U.S. with matching funds to be used for education in their home country. The program’s 
target population is migrants from El Salvador in the Washington, DC metro area, and 
households in El Salvador that are connected to these migrants. In collaboration with partner 
organizations (a U.S.-based money transfer operator and an educational NGO in El Salvador), 
we designed and offered migrants a new product, named “EduRemesa.” The EduRemesa product 
allowed migrants to channel money, in US dollars, towards the education of a particular student 
in El Salvador for the 2012 school year.4 Migrants chose the specific student and the exact level 
of support provided. Students in El Salvador who were beneficiaries of an EduRemesa received a 
debit card, in their name, providing access to the funds. Beneficiary students were told that the 
funds were for expenditures related to their own education, but this was not enforced in any way. 
We conducted a randomized controlled trial to measure the impacts of the EduRemesa 
mechanism at various levels of subsidy. We randomly assigned Salvadoran migrants (who were 
recruited in metro Washington, DC) to a control group or one of a number of treatment 
conditions. The treatments varied in the degree to which our research project subsidized, via a 
matching contribution, EduRemesa funds for the beneficiary student. In the “3:1 match” 
treatment, each dollar contributed by the migrant was matched with $3 in project funds. In the 
“1:1 match” treatment, each dollar contributed by the migrant was matched with $1 in project 
2 By contrast, developing country receipts of official foreign development assistance in 2012 amounted to just 
US$126 billion (OECD 2013). It is also worth noting that while migrant remittance flows are large in aggregate, in 
practice they amount to only a minority of the total developed-country earnings of migrant workers from developing 
countries (Clemens et al. 2009, Clemens 2011, Yang 2011). 
3 Policy-oriented publications include Pew Hispanic Center (2002), Terry and Wilson (2005), and World Bank 
(2006, 2007). Yang (2011) reviews recent research on the economics of migrant remittances. Cox-Edwards and 
Ureta (2003) and Yang (2008) examine the impact of migration and remittances on educational investments in 
migrant-origin households. 
4 “Remesa” is the Spanish word for “remittance.” El Salvador uses the US dollar as its national currency. 
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funds.5 In a final treatment group (“no match”), migrants were simply offered the EduRemesa 
product without matching funds: migrants were expected to fully fund each dollar in support of 
the beneficiary student.6,7 
Several months after the EduRemesa offers to migrants, we conducted follow-up surveys 
to establish impacts of our treatments. Migrants could have sent EduRemesas to many possible 
students in El Salvador, so it was important that at baseline we elicited from migrants, in both the 
control and treatment groups, the identity of a “target” student in El Salvador whom they would 
be highly likely to fund if offered the EduRemesa product. We did this by telling migrants, at the 
start of the baseline survey, that a prize in the form of educational funding for one student in El 
Salvador would be awarded by lottery. Migrant survey respondents were invited to nominate one 
“target” student in El Salvador to be entered into this lottery.8 It appears that this elicitation 
method was successful: 85% of migrants who sent an EduRemesa sent one to the target student 
they identified in this manner. Our measurement of impacts in El Salvador relies on surveys of 
these target students, and of a knowledgeable adult in the target student’s household.9 
Take up of the EduRemesa was monotonically related to the match level. 18.5% of 
migrants in the 3:1 match treatment executed at least one EduRemesa transaction, compared to 
6.9% in the 1:1 match treatment and zero in the no-match treatment. 15.1% and 6.0% of migrants 
in the 3:1 and 1:1 match treatments respectively chose to send an EduRemesa to their target 
student. In the 3:1 match treatment, migrants taking up the EduRemesa used it for 1.4 students, 
5 For example, in the 3:1 match treatment, an EduRemesa providing $300 in total to a student would cost a migrant 
only $75, with the remaining $225 funded out of project resources. In the 1:1 match treatment $300 in total support 
would cost a migrant $150, with the remaining $150 contributed by our project. 
6 The no match treatment tests migrant demand for the EduRemesa mechanism itself, without the match. Migrants 
might value the mechanism if they sought to better control how remittance recipients in El Salvador use the funds 
they send, and if they perceived the EduRemesa’s product features as providing a greater degree of assurance that 
the funds would be used for the target student’s education, compared to a regular cash remittance to the household. 
The no match treatment is also a benchmark for comparing the impact of the match treatments, allowing an estimate 
of the impact of the matching funds themselves, separately from the impact of the payment mechanism or of the 
marketing pitch that accompanied the offer of the EduRemesa. 
7 Matching programs to stimulate the use of remittances for investment in home countries have been implemented 
by home country governments, but to date have not been evaluated using randomized methods. For example, the 
Mexican government’s “Tres por Uno” (“Three for One”) program encourages Mexican migrants abroad to invest in 
their communities of origin. Each dollar invested by migrants abroad is matched by $3 from the Mexican 
government. Migrants have contributed an average of $15 million annually since the program began (Hazán, 2012). 
8 This was done prior to treatment so that choice of target students was not influenced by treatment status. 
9 Migrants also sent EduRemesas to other students in other households. Our approach is unable to identify impacts 
outside of the target student’s household, and thus we underestimate total impacts on El Salvador households. 
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and provided total funding (inclusive of the match) of $719 on average, of which $465 was for 
the target student. 
Our most noteworthy finding is that the 3:1 match treatment leads to large increases in 
educational expenditures on the target student. We find substantial “crowd in” of household 
educational investments in response to the subsidy. Not only are the EduRemesa funds 
supplementing (rather than substituting for) existing expenditures on education, these funds 
appear to be stimulating additional educational investments on the target student. Across all 
target students, we find a “crowd-in ratio” (ratio of increased target student educational 
expenditure to EduRemesa funds received) of 3.7 (each dollar of EduRemesa funds leads to $3.7 
in additional spending). Crowd in is driven entirely by females: the crowd-in ratio for female 
target students is 5.0 vs. only 1.7 for males.10  
The 3:1 match also has substantial effects on other related outcomes. It leads target 
students to be more likely to attend private school, which is likely related to the observed higher 
educational expenditure. This impact is also concentrated among female target students. In 
addition, the 3:1 match leads to lower labor supply of target students (an effect that, by contrast, 
exhibits no strong heterogeneity with respect to target student gender). 
To our knowledge, this is the first research to find crowd in of education expenditures (or 
any household investment) in response to a subsidy. Crowd in is of course a theoretical 
possibility, simply representing the case where education is a normal good while “all other 
goods” are collectively inferior goods. Crowd in becomes more likely (and can be large in 
magnitude) in the case where increasing one’s consumption of education requires a discrete 
increase in expenditure after a certain point. In practice, this could be the case when a subsidy 
induces a shift from public to private school, and where private schools require discretely higher 
expenditures. Our results are consistent with this theoretical case, in that the match treatment 
leads to large increases in private school attendance, and that typical expenditures on private 
schools in El Salvador are substantially higher than on public schooling. 
Budget constraints prevented us from fielding full income, consumption and expenditure 
modules in the follow-up survey, so we are unable to say definitively where the funds for 
additional crowded-in educational expenditures came from. That said, data we did collect reveals 
10 The crowd-in ratio is significantly different from 1 at conventional levels (meaning there is crowd in) for the 
pooled sample of all target students and for female target students, but not for male target students. 
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where these crowded-in funds did not originate. They did not come from additional remittances 
sent by the migrant, since we find no large or statistically significant change in target student 
household remittance receipts. We also find that increased expenditures on target students are not 
funded via reductions in expenditures on other students in the household. Several other possible 
sources of funds exist (on which we cannot shed light directly), including reductions in other 
household expenditure categories, borrowing, other transfer receipts, and increases in earnings 
on the part of others in the household.11 
This paper is related to research on crowd out of public transfers, in which findings of 
incomplete crowd out are referred to as “flypaper effects” (see Payne’s 2009 review.) Existing 
research finds no crowd out of resources within households in response to transfers provided for 
particular purposes, such as Jacoby (2002), Islam and Hoddinott (2009) and Afridi (2010) in the 
context of child nutrition programs. Shi (2012) documents a flypaper effect in the context of a 
change in school fees in rural China.12 In contrast to these studies, ours is the first to find 
evidence of a crowd in of household resources in response to a transfer. 
While existing analyses of conditional cash transfer programs have not examined impacts 
on household education expenditures,13 our results are reminiscent of certain findings in that 
literature. Baird et al. (2011) and Edmonds and Schady (2012) find (in Malawi and Ecuador, 
respectively) that cash transfers have very large effects on school attendance, implying 
substantial elasticities of school attendance with respect to income. Angelucci et al. (2009) find 
that the Mexican Progresa program increased secondary school enrollment only when eligible 
secondary school students had eligible primary school students in their family network. In these 
circumstances, it appears that the Progresa transfer to a household with a secondary school 
student crowded in transfers from other eligible households (those with primary school students) 
in the social network to enable secondary students to attend school.14  
Our research is also related to experimental research on matching funds for charitable 
contributions. Karlan and List (2007) find that matching offers (at the same 3:1 and 1:1 ratios we 
11 The match treatments led to reductions in target student labor supply, so any increase in earnings would have to 
have been on the part of other household members. 
12 Duflo and Udry (2004) find evidence of a related type of flypaper effect: the effect of shocks to certain crops in 
Cote d’Ivoire are differential with respect to the gender of the individual typically farming that crop. 
13 Some studies of the impacts of CCTs have gone beyond schooling measures to examine impacts on household 
consumption (Hoddinott and Skoufias, 2004; Angelucci and Attanasio, 2009; Angelucci and de Giorgi, 2009). 
14 The findings of Gertler et al. (2012) are broadly related as well, in that they find that a portion of Progresa 
transfers are put towards household investments (in this case in the form of productive assets). 
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study) increase the giving response rate and the amount donated, regardless of the size of the 
matching offer. Eckel and Grossman (2008) find that matching increases charitable donations 
more than rebates of equivalent size. Karlan et al. (2011), by contrast, find only weak evidence 
for the effectiveness of matches, and find that under some presentations matches may even have 
negative effects. Meier (2007) finds that after the matching period ended, voluntary contributions 
decreased, concluding that matching may have negative effects in the long run. Our study differs 
from these studies of matching in charitable giving because migrants and EduRemesa 
beneficiaries are typically family members, so we study intra-family transfers rather than 
charitable donations to anonymous recipients. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical discussion of the 
possibility of crowd-in in response to a transfer. Section 3 describes the project, and Section 4 
provides an overview of the data and sample summary statistics. Section 5 presents the main 




In response to receiving additional funds from an external source to be used for 
education, how should household educational expenditures respond? We discuss here a simple 
model to guide interpretation of the empirical results to follow. The model, which we present in 
diagrammatic form, illustrates the cases where a transfer received by the household could lead to 
crowd out or crowd in. Furthermore, anticipating our empirical results, we discuss a case where 
crowd in could be especially large: when increasing one’s consumption of education requires a 
discrete increase in expenditure after a certain point (which could represent the shift from public 
to private school).15  
Consider a unitary household, in a static context, choosing between purchases of 
education (for a particular student), and of all other goods. We abstract from the extensive 
margin (the decision to attend school at all), and consider that the purchase of education involves 
15 In a related paper, Peltzman (1973) shows theoretically and empirically how subsidies for higher education in the 
form of state universities can lead to overall reductions in expenditures on higher education because the subsidy is in 
in-kind and not valid at private institutions. 
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choosing a “quality level” of schooling E.16 All other goods, denoted Y, are denominated in 
dollars. We are interested in the impact of receiving a transfer, in dollar amount s, on the optimal 
choice of E.  
Figure 3.1 presents the case of crowd out of the transfer, the case where both education 
and all other goods are normal goods. Prior to the receipt of the transfer, the optimal 
consumption bundle is at point x at the tangency point of household indifference curve U with 
the budget line B. The transfer s leads the budget line to shift upwards to B’, where the new 
optimal consumption bundle is at point x’ at the point of tangency with indifference curve U’. 
Consumption of all other goods and of education quality both rise. The dollar value of the 
increase in consumption of all other goods can be read off the vertical axis, ∆Y. The increase in 
expenditure on education is therefore s - ∆Y. The increase in educational expenditure is less than 
the amount of the transfer, so some of the transferred funds were “crowded out” by expenditures 
on all other goods.  
Figure 3.2 illustrates the case of crowd in. All elements of the figure are identical to those 
in Figure 3.1, except for the position of indifference curve U’ which implies that the post-transfer 
consumption bundle x’ involves a reduction in expenditure on all other goods (∆Y  < 0). In this 
case, expenditure on education rises by more than the amount of the transfer (s - ∆Y > s). In this 
case, education is a normal good, while all other goods are – in aggregate – inferior goods. 
Our empirical analysis will estimate the impact of a transfer on educational expenditures, 
and in particular will estimate the impact of each dollar transferred on educational expenditures. 
If each additional dollar leads to less than a dollar increase in educational expenditures, we will 
conclude that crowd out has occurred. If, on the other hand, each additional dollar leads to more 
than a one dollar increase in educational expenditures, then we will have found crowd in. 
In anticipation of our empirical results, we turn to a discussion of an additional case 
where crowd in could be particularly large in magnitude. This is the case where it is impossible 
to purchase intermediate levels of educational quality, so that moving from lower to higher levels 
of educational quality requires a household to make a discrete jump from a lower to a higher 
level, and to pay a fixed cost when doing so. This involves a modification to the standard budget 
constraint, as in Figure 3.3. The budget constraint is partitioned into two parts, with a void in 
16 The decision to abstract from the extensive margin anticipates our empirical results: the EduRemesa treatments 
have no impact on the extensive margin of school attendance. 
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between. At lower levels of education quality, it is only possible to purchase up to a units, and 
any increase after this point requires a discrete jump to b units or more and payment of a fixed 
cost F. In practice, this void could represent the gap in quality between public and private 
schools, where the assumption is that the quality of a private school is not just marginally higher 
than that of a public school, but significantly higher. 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the potential impact of a transfer when intermediate educational 
quality levels are unavailable. Prior to the increase, the chosen consumption bundle is x, with 
relatively low educational quality (below a). The transfer s shifts the partitioned budget 
constraint upwards in a parallel fashion, and it is possible for the consumer to desire to pay the 
fixed cost F to make a discrete jump to educational quality level b. The change in all other goods 
expenditure, ∆Y (which is negative), is large with respect to the increase in funds, and the 
increase in expenditure on education, s - ∆Y, is correspondingly large as well.  
 
3.3 Project description 
3.3.1 Overview of education in El Salvador 
The education system in El Salvador is divided into four levels: primary (grades 1-6), 
lower secondary or middle school (grades 7-9), secondary (grades 10-12), and tertiary. The 
system is standardized across the country, but there are some variations, specifically in that 
students can often choose whether to complete a two- or three-year high school program. At the 
tertiary level there are a wide range of public and private options, including both traditional 
universities and technical programs. 
Primary school enrollment rates are high in El Salvador, at 95 percent in 2009. However, 
enrollment quickly falls off at the middle and secondary levels. In 2009, enrollment rates in 
middle and secondary school were only 56 and 32 percent respectively (FUSADES 2011). A 
large government conditional cash transfer program has focused on primary school students 
despite the much lower enrollment rates for older students (de Brauw and Gilligan 2011). 
Although public schools below the tertiary level do not charge tuition or fees in El Salvador, the 
costs of attending secondary school are nonetheless higher than for primary school. Older 
students have higher opportunity cost because of the higher value of their time, and secondary 
schools are often further away and require expenditures on uniforms and school supplies. These 
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characteristics of the El Salvador educational system make it an appropriate setting within which 
to study a project that is targeted towards secondary and tertiary students. 
Most students at the primary and secondary school level in El Salvador study in public 
schools. Table 3.A.1 shows figures from the 2010 Encuesta de Hogares de Propositos Multiples 
(EHPM), an annual, nationally representative, household survey in El Salvador. 89% of primary 
students and 79% of secondary students attend public schools. Although only 21% of students 
attend private school at the secondary level, the fact that that percentage doubles from the 
primary school level suggests that attending private school at the secondary level is valued. At 
the tertiary level, private institutions are much more important, with 60% of enrolled students 
attending a private institution.  
At the secondary level, where Salvadoran students take a standardized national test, mean 
scores of private school students consistently exceed those of public school students by a large 
margin (FUSADES 2011). While these differences may be due to a variety of factors, such as the 
nature of selection into school type, these differences may be behind perceptions that private 
schools are of higher quality. 
There are significant cost differences between attending public and private institutions. 
Table 3.A.2 shows average education expenditures in the follow-up survey data collected for this 
study (to be described below), for the control group only. At the secondary school level, average 
annual expenditures are roughly two-thirds higher in private than in public schools ($2214 
compared to $1442). This difference is largely due to tuition costs as no school fees are charged 
for public secondary education in El Salvador, but expenditures in other categories are higher as 
well. This cost differential carries over to the tertiary level where private school costs are again 
about two-thirds higher than those for public schools ($2834 compared to $1868) despite the fact 
that both types of institutions charge fees at the tertiary level. 
3.3.2 Project overview 
 Migrants from El Salvador were recruited to participate in this project at the two 
locations of the Salvadoran consulate in the Washington, DC area (in Georgetown and 
Woodbridge, VA). Baseline field work began in early November 2011 and concluded in early 
February 2012, a period chosen to overlap with the vacation period between the end of the 2011 
school year and the start of the 2012 school year.17 While waiting for consular services, migrants 
17 Public schools in El Salvador began the school year on January 23, 2012. 
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were approached by project staff and asked if they wished to participate in the study. Because the 
product being evaluated was specifically targeted towards students at the secondary or tertiary 
level, migrants were required to have a relative in El Salvador who would be eligible for 
secondary or tertiary studies in the 2012 school year.18 Migrants who agreed to participate in the 
study were administered a baseline survey.  
A key objective of this research is to measure impacts on students and households in El 
Salvador. This being the case, a challenge that arises is determining which students and 
households in El Salvador to survey, since migrants who are offered EduRemesas could use 
them for students in multiple potential households. In addition, it is important to determine the 
identity of surveyed students and households in El Salvador in a consistent manner across 
treatment conditions, so as to avoid the possibility that treatment status would affect which El 
Salvador student and household the migrant study respondent chose to identify.  
Our approach was to identify, for all migrants, the student in El Salvador whom they 
would prioritize to receive additional educational financing. Our presumption was that this 
student would be the one they would finance with an EduRemesa (if offered the EduRemesa 
facility, and choosing to take up). Specifically, we asked migrants to enter a student of their 
choosing in El Salvador (who would be eligible for secondary or tertiary schooling in the coming 
year) into a lottery to receive a $500 scholarship for the 2012 school year.19 This was done at the 
beginning of the baseline survey, before any individual learned of their treatment status, and so 
helps rule out differential selection of target students and households on the basis of treatment 
status. Throughout the paper we will refer to this student as the “target student” and to the 
student’s household as the “target household.” The rest of the baseline survey collected basic 
demographic information on the migrant, information on remittances, and information about the 
target student and household. 
Immediately following the baseline survey, our project staff implemented the randomized 
treatments. Treatments were conducted immediately after the baseline survey so as to reduce 
attrition. All migrants, including those in the control group, were offered general information 
about the importance of education in El Salvador, and suggestions on how to maximize the 
impact of their remittances on the educational outcomes of their family members. Migrants in the 
18 Relatives were defined as “close family members” or children, siblings, nieces and nephews, grandchildren, and 
cousins. 
19 Target students were not required to be currently enrolled in school.  
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treatment groups were offered the EduRemesa with a subsidy level corresponding to their 
treatment group.20 
Following the baseline interaction, follow-up surveys were conducted from July to 
October 2012 (the last third of the 2012 school year), in random order. A phone survey of 
migrant respondents collected information about remittances sent to the target household. 
Information about the El Salvador household was also collected via phone surveys, where we 
separately interviewed the target student and a knowledgeable adult in the target student’s 
household. Target students provided information related to their education and labor supply, 
while knowledgeable adults provided information related to the education of other students in the 
household. We use the information in these follow-up surveys, combined with administrative 
information about the take up of the EduRemesas, to analyze treatment impacts. 
3.3.3 Details of EduRemesa treatments 
 We partnered with the Fundación Empresarial para el Desarrollo Educativo (FEPADE),21 
an educational NGO in El Salvador, to develop the EduRemesa. The EduRemesa was a product 
that would allow migrants to directly send money to high school and college students to use for 
their education. Migrants participating in the project were randomly assigned to be either part of 
a control group or one of three treatment groups that received offers for the EduRemesa at 
varying subsidy levels. In order to avoid spillovers between participants, a first-stage 
randomization was conducted at the day-by-location level that assigned migrants to either the 
control group or to a group that would receive an offer of the EduRemesa. In other words, on 
each day and at each recruitment location all migrants were either in the control group or not. 
One third of days were allocated to the control group and two thirds to the EduRemesa group. 
This randomization was stratified by week and location. 
 In a second randomization, all migrants who had been selected to receive an EduRemesa 
offer were divided into three groups: those who received no match offer, those who received a 
1:1 match offer, and those who received a 3:1 match offer. This randomization was done at the 
individual level and was stratified within sequentially-numbered groups of six surveys. On days 
20 Following the conclusion of the baseline interaction with the migrant, the target household in El Salvador was 
administered a phone survey. These mainly serve to establish a first contact with the El Salvador household, with the 
intention of reducing attrition in the later follow-up survey. Because some time had passed between the migrant 
treatment in the United States and the survey in El Salvador (the mean time between surveys was fifteen days), 
responses and behaviors by El Salvador respondents could have already been influenced by the treatments, so we do 
not consider these phone El Salvador surveys to be “baseline” data.  
21 In English, “Business Foundation for Educational Development.” 
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when the EduRemesa treatment was being offered, the match treatments offered to the migrants 
varied randomly at the individual level. All treatment materials were contained in a sealed 
envelope attached to each survey that was opened by the surveyor when the survey concluded 
and the treatment began. Surveyors did not know before opening the envelope which match 
treatment had been assigned. The randomization process is depicted in Figure 3.5. The following 
is a brief description of the information provided to the different groups.22    
 Control group: Encouragement to send remittances for education 
 Migrants in the control group were provided with a handout that discussed the 
importance of supporting education in El Salvador and suggested that sending remittances 
directly to students (as opposed to their parents) in monthly installments was an effective way to 
do this. Project staff reviewed and discussed the handout with the migrant and gave it to the 
migrant to take home. The purpose of providing the control group with this information was to 
help ensure that any effects found of the EduRemesa could be interpreted as due to the product 
itself, and not due to the encouragement that it provided for directing remittances towards 
education or to specific suggestions on how to send remittances for education (e.g., sending in 
monthly installments). 
 Treatment group 1: EduRemesa with no match (without subsidy) 
 Migrants in this treatment group were provided with the same handout given to the 
migrants in the control group. Following the discussion of the importance of directing education 
funds directly to the student in monthly installments, migrants were then introduced to the 
EduRemesa, a product that would make it simpler for them to do this. Migrants were given a 
pamphlet that they reviewed with the surveyor that contained all relevant information and 
contact information for US based project staff and FEPADE in El Salvador.  
 EduRemesas were available in the fixed amounts of $300 or $500 for secondary school 
students and $600 or $800 for tertiary students. As part of the project, migrants were exempted 
from paying the administrative fees usually charged by FEPADE, and they received a coupon 
with the informational pamphlet that informed them of this.23 Migrants who were interested in 
sending an EduRemesa filled out a short application indicating the identity of the student 
beneficiary and then sent the desired amount directly to FEPADE through a money transfer 
22 Copies of the materials provided to study participants can be accessed at the following website: 
www.umich.edu/~deanyang/eduremesa/ambler aycinena yang 2013 EduRemesas marketing materials.pdf. 
23 FEPADE charges administrative fees of 15% of the total EduRemesa amount. 
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company, Viamericas Corporation, our other collaborating organization in this study. Student 
beneficiaries would receive an ATM card from FEPADE and one tenth of the amount sent by the 
migrant would be deposited into their accounts every month during the ten months of the school 
year. This money was intended to be used by the student for expenses related to their education, 
but this was not enforced.24  The purpose of offering the EduRemesa without any subsidy was to 
analyze the demand for and impact of a product that allowed migrants to directly channel 
remittance funds toward education, and additionally to provide a benchmark group that allows us 
to isolate the impacts of the match subsidies themselves, separately from the EduRemesa 
payment mechanism and marketing pitch. 
 Treatment group 2: EduRemesa with a 1:1 match subsidy 
 Migrants in this treatment group received the same information as migrants in treatment 
group 1, but the coupon they received informed them that in addition to not having to pay the 
administrative fees, they were being offered a one to one match on every dollar they sent as part 
of an EduRemesa. For example, in order to send a $300 EduRemesa, they would have to provide 
only $150 and the project would provide the remaining $150. 
 Treatment group 3: EduRemesa with a 3:1 match subsidy 
 This treatment was identical in all respects to treatment group 2, with the only difference 
being that the match rate was three to one. For example, in order to send a $300 EduRemesa, 
they would have to pay only $75 and the project would provide the remaining $225. A 
description of the amount to be sent by the migrant for each treatment group and EduRemesa 
amount is in Table 3.1. 
 In all three treatment groups, the interaction ended by asking the migrants whether or not 
they were at all interested in the EduRemesa and whether they would like to receive a follow up 
call from the project in a few days. Migrants who indicated that they were interested were 
contacted by phone several days later to further discuss their interest and answer any questions.  
Project staff continued to follow up with all interested participants until they indicated that they 
were no longer interested. Migrants additionally had contact information for project staff in the 
United States and FEPADE in El Salvador. 
24 The system used for the distribution of funds is the same system already used by FEPADE for the distribution of 
funds in their existing scholarship program.  
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 Migrants who decided to take-up the EduRemesa did so by visiting any Viamericas 
authorized remittance agent and sending the required remittance amount. Once FEPADE had 
received the remittance, they contacted the beneficiary student to request a copy of the student’s 
identification card needed to issue their ATM card. Upon receipt of this documentation, the 
student came to FEPADE’s central offices in San Salvador to complete the paperwork. Students 
and their guardians were reimbursed by our project for travel expenses. Before receiving their 
bank card, students signed a letter acknowledging the amount of their EduRemesa and the 
accompanying rules. The rules required that the students turn in proof of enrollment, that 
students must attend school, comply with academic requirements, and inform FEPADE if they 
stopped attending school for any reason.25  
FEPADE’s standard arrangement when administering educational scholarships for other 
donors involves requiring students to provide official copies of report cards, which are then 
forwarded to the scholarship sponsor. In our partnership with FEPADE on the EduRemesa 
project, we implemented an additional cross-randomization to test the impact of offering this 
monitoring mechanism. Migrants in treatment groups 1, 2, or 3 were cross-randomized into 
being offered one of two versions of the EduRemesa: one in which the migrant was additionally 
offered the benefit of receiving a report of the student’s grades after each grading period 
(“EduRemesa with grades”), and one in which migrants were not given this option (“EduRemesa 
without grades”).  This cross-randomization allows us to test whether impacts of the EduRemesa 
are due solely to the funds provided, or whether improved monitoring of student grades may be 
an additional mechanism.26  
 
3.4 Sample, balance tests, and attrition 
 As described in the previous section, study participants are migrants from El Salvador 
recruited in the Washington, DC area, and the target students identified by the migrants during 
the baseline survey. Three main samples will be used for analysis: the full sample of migrant-
student pairs with a completed migrant baseline survey (the “full” sample), the sample of 
migrant-student pairs with completed El Salvador follow-up surveys (the “El Salvador follow-
up” sample), and the sample of migrant-student pairs with a completed migrant follow-up survey 
25 In four cases, FEPADE suspended monthly transfers to EduRemesa recipients who had stopped attending school. 
26 The grades/no grades cross-randomization was also randomized at the day-location level. See section 6 for further 
discussion of the impact of this cross-randomized treatment. 
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(the “migrant follow-up” sample). There are 991 migrant-student pairs in the full sample, 728 in 
the El Salvador follow-up sample (73 percent completion), and 735 in the migrant follow-up 
sample (74 percent completion). Because the main outcome variables of interest are collected in 
the El Salvador follow-up survey, the main tables in the paper will display results in the El 
Salvador follow-up sample.27 Outcomes related to educational expenditures and remittances are 
derived through a series of questions and imputed when missing to allow for a consistent sample. 
The substance of the results does not change when excluding imputed observations. Further 
information about the variable construction for all variables and imputation procedures can be 
found in Appendix C. 
 Table 3.2 provides baseline summary statistics for the El Salvador follow-up sample for 
variables related both to the migrant and to the target student. The migrants are 50 percent 
female, 37 years old on average, and have been in the United States for an average of 11 years. 
Average annual remittances to the target household are $2,684, suggesting that even though an 
existing remittance relationship was not a requirement, most migrants do remit to the target 
households.28 The target students are 53 percent female and 18.5 years old on average. They are 
related to the migrant in a diverse set of ways: 26 percent are the migrant’s child, 25 percent the 
migrant’s sibling, 33 percent the migrant’s niece or nephew, and 10 percent are the migrant’s 
cousin. 92 percent of target students are in school at baseline. Because the main analyses will 
examine heterogeneity of treatment effects by gender of the target student, we present summary 
statistics by gender in Table 3.A.3A. Tables 3.A.3B and 3.A.3C provide summary statistics for 
the full sample and the migrant follow-up sample respectively, both for the overall samples and 
by target student gender. No meaningful differences are apparent across the three samples at 
baseline. 
Because this is a randomized experiment, it is important to confirm that the 
randomization was successful in ensuring balance in baseline variables across treatment 
conditions. Table 3.3 examines balance across the treatment groups in the El Salvador follow-up 
sample using the same variables reported in Table 3.2. Table 3.A.4A examines balance by 
gender of the target student and Tables 3.A.4B and 3.A.4C examine balance in the full sample 
27 All regression results in the paper are similar when performed in a sample that was restricted to those migrant-
student pairs where both follow-ups were complete, although precision suffers due to the reduced sample size. 
28 At baseline, 86 percent of migrants report sending nonzero remittances to the target household during the past 
year. 
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and the migrant follow-up samples respectively. The first four columns of the tables report the 
mean of each variable in the control group and each treatment group. The tables also report the 
p-values on the F-tests for equality of those means. The samples are well-balanced at baseline. 
The number of p-values below .1 or 0.05 is small and not different from what would be expected 
given sampling variation. 
 Given that it was not possible to complete follow-up surveys with all members of the full 
sample it is also important to analyze whether or not this attrition is in any way related to 
treatment. Table 3.A.5 presents regression estimates on whether survey completion varies in 
each of the three treatment groups compared to the control group, overall and by gender of the 
target student. The table also reports the p-values from tests of the equality of survey completion 
between the different treatment groups. The dependent variable in column 1 is completion of the 
El Salvador follow-up, the dependent variable in column 2 is completion of the migrant follow-
up, and column 3 examines completion of both surveys. Attrition is not related to treatment 
status in the full sample, the female target student subsample, and (for the most part) in the male 
target student subsample.29  
 
3.5 Empirical results  
3.5.1 Estimation 
 Random treatment assignment allows us to estimate the causal impact of the different 
EduRemesa treatments on a variety of outcomes.  The main results in this paper are estimated 
using the following equation: 
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽13: 1 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽21: 1 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑛𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖 + 𝛿𝑋𝑗𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡    (1) 
where i indexes each migrant-student pair, j indexes the location of the initial interaction, and t 
indexes the week of the initial interaction.  The outcomes consist of take-up measures from the 
EduRemesa administrative data and variables from the migrant and El Salvador follow-up 
surveys relating to educational expenditures, educational outcomes, labor force participation, and 
remittances. 𝛽1, 𝛽2, and 𝛽3 are the average difference between an outcome variable in the 3:1 
match treatment, the 1:1 match treatment, and the no match treatment respectively and its value 
in the control group. They are the intent to treat (ITT) effects of the three EduRemesa treatments 
29 The one exception is that there is lower migrant follow-up survey completion for the 1:1 match treatment in the 
subsample with male target students. This is not a treatment cell, subsample, or survey relevant for any key results, 
so we do not concern ourselves with this one case where there may be treatment-related attrition. 
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on the outcomes of interest.  𝑋𝑗𝑡 is the set of stratification cell fixed effects representing the week 
and location of the observation’s baseline survey. There are 28 week-location stratification cells 
in all analysis samples. Robust standard errors are clustered by unique combinations of day and 
location of the baseline interaction (the level of the EduRemesa randomization). 
 Additionally, most analyses in this paper will be considered both in the overall sample 
and separately by gender of the target student. Panel 1 of these tables will display results for the 
overall sample, panel 2 for female target students only, and panel 3 for male target students only. 
The tables will also display the p-values on statistical tests of equality of the treatment effects 
across the different treatment groups.  
3.5.2 Take-up 
Before we consider how receipt of the EduRemesa may have affected behavior, we first 
examine the take up of the EduRemesa and how that take up differs by treatment group. All take-
up related variables come from the EduRemesa administrative data, provided by both Viamericas 
Corporation and FEPADE. Table 3.4 reports summary statistics related to the take up of the 
EduRemesa. Panel 1 describes the basic characteristics of the EduRemesas sent. 52 EduRemesas 
were sent overall by 41 migrants. 85 percent of migrants who sent an EduRemesa (35 out of 41) 
sent one to the target student they named during the baseline survey. 17 non-target students 
received EduRemesas, most sent by migrants who sent more than one EduRemesa overall. 40 
EduRemesas were sent in the 3:1 match group and 12 were sent in the 1:1 match group. Not a 
single migrant in the no match treatment group chose to send an EduRemesa. 
Panel 2 shows the number of EduRemesas sent by amount of the EduRemesa. Within 
each education level, migrants appear to take advantage of the match offer by choosing to send 
the larger available amount. 28 of the 34 EduRemesas sent for secondary schooling were for 
$500 (compared to 6 at the $300 level), and 13 of the 18 sent for tertiary schooling were for $800 
(compared to 5 at the $600 level). Panel 3 displays average characteristics of EduRemesas, 
conditional on the migrant sending at least one EduRemesa. Migrants supported 1.2 students on 
average in the 1:1 match group and 1.3 students in the 3:1 match group. In the 1:1 and 3:1 groups 
respectively migrants sent (inclusive of the match) an average of $690 and $719 in total, $540 
and $465 of which went towards target student beneficiaries. Finally, panel 4 compares the 
distribution of the education level of target students overall to the education level of those who 
received an EduRemesa. Those who received EduRemesas are broadly similar to those that did 
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not, with the exception that fewer of the EduRemesa recipients were still in primary school at the 
time of the baseline interview (17 percent in the overall sample compared to 8.6 percent among 
EduRemesa recipients).30 
Table 3.5 estimates the impact of the treatments on take-up using equation (1). The 
results shown in Table 3.5 are obtained using the El Salvador follow-up sample and the results of 
the same analyses in the full sample and the migrant follow-up sample are shown in Tables 
3.A.6A and 3.A.6B.  Panel 1 describes results in the overall sample and panels 2 and 3 show 
results among migrants whose chosen target students were female and male, respectively.  
Take-up in both the control group and the no match treatment group is zero.  Both the 3:1 
and 1:1 match treatments encourage take-up relative to the no-match treatment group and the 
control group, but the larger subsidy offered by the 3:1 match is much more effective. Column 1 
examines whether a particular migrant sent any EduRemesa, and column 2 the total number of 
EduRemesas sent by the migrant. Migrants in the 3:1 match group were 18.5 percentage points 
more likely to send an EduRemesa at all and those in the 1:1 match group were 6.9 percentage 
points more likely. The 3:1 group sent 0.25 EduRemesas on average and the 1:1 group sent 0.08.  
Migrant contributions to EduRemesas in the 1:1 match group average $23 and $35 in the 1:1 and 
3:1 match groups respectively (column 3). This resulted in an average of $50 in total EduRemesa 
funds (migrant contribution plus subsidy) being sent in the 1:1 group and $140 being sent in the 
3:1 group (column 4).  
Columns 5, 6, and 7 examine only EduRemesas sent to the target student. The 1:1 match 
offer increased the likelihood that an EduRemesa was sent to the target student by 6.0 percentage 
points relative to the control group; the corresponding figure in the 3:1 match group was 15.1 
percentage points (column 5). Migrants contributed $18 and $22 in the 1:1 and 3:1 match groups 
(column 6), for average total receipts by the target student of $37 and $86, respectively (column 
7). 
Some differences in take up by gender are present. Although overall take up (columns 1-
4) does not seem to be strongly related to target student gender, use of EduRemesas for target 
students specifically does vary by gender. In the 3:1 match group female target students are 18 
30 Although the EduRemesa is for secondary and tertiary level students, some target students may have been in 
primary at baseline because they would have been eligible had they been in their last year of primary school, 
preparing to begin their first year of secondary school in 2012. However, it is also possible that there were some 
target students who did not truly meet the requirement. 
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percentage points more likely to receive an EduRemesa than target students in the control group, 
while male target students are only 11.5 percentage points more likely (column 5). Female target 
students in the 3:1 match group receive an average of $108 in total EduRemesa funds while male 
target students in the same group receive only $56 (column 7). The same trend is present in the 
1:1 match group where female target students receive an average of $60 in total EduRemesa 
funds, while the estimated amount received by male target students is low and not statistically 
significantly different from zero. Migrants do seem to be more likely to send EduRemesas to 
their target student when that student is female.31    
3.5.3 Impact on educational expenditures 
We now turn to the principal question of the paper: how did the EduRemesa affect the 
education spending of those that received it? Although the EduRemesa was specifically marketed 
and designed as a tool to provide education funds directly to students, because money is fungible 
it is not obvious that EduRemesa funds would result in an increase in education expenditures. 
Follow-up data collected from the target students and responsible adults in their households 
allow us to answer this question. Because 85 percent of migrants who sent an EduRemesa chose 
to send one to their target student, it appears that our method of determining the target sample 
was largely successful. We now examine impacts of the EduRemesa on target students.  
Table 3.6 reports impacts on target student education expenditures, both overall and for 
female and male target students separately. Column 1 examines total annualized expenditures on 
the target student’s education and columns 2 through 9 examine expenditures by category.32 The 
main result in Table 3.6 is that the target students in the 3:1 match group spend an average of 
$301 more on educational expenses, an increase of 22 percent over expenditures in the control 
group. As would be expected, due to lower take-up there is a smaller increase of $75 in the 1:1 
match group, but it is not statistically significant. The overall increase in the 3:1 match group is 
driven by large increases in tuition ($106), transportation ($77), and food ($143). The only 
statistically significant increase in the 1:1 match group is for tuition ($83). Despite the fact that 
31 In column 7 of Table 3.5 (total EduRemesa funds received by target student) the p-value on the statistical test for 
equality of treatment effects across female and male target students is 0.134 for the 3:1 match treatment and 0.038 
for the 1:1 match treatment. 
32 These amounts are reported by the target student. When the target student’s report is missing, the responsible 
adult’s report is used. In order to keep the sample consistent across columns, in the few cases where both are 
missing the expenditures are imputed. Further details on variable construction can be found in Appendix C and all 
results are robust to the exclusion of the observations with imputed values. 
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there was no take-up in the no match group, there is an increase in tuition expenditures of $67. 
However, this does not translate to an increase in overall education expenditures.  
These results are heterogeneous with respect to gender of the target student. The impacts 
of the 3:1 match treatment on female target students are large and statistically significant. The 
3:1 match treatment leads to a $509 average increase in total education expenditures, a 36 
percent increase from the mean expenditures in the control group.33 As in the overall sample, this 
increase is coming from large increases in tuition, transportation and food expenditures. There 
are no positive, statistically significant impacts of either match treatment on education 
expenditures among male target students, and the main coefficients are much lower in 
magnitude. Male target students were less likely than female target students to receive an 
EduRemesa, but differences in take up alone cannot account for the differences in impacts on 
educational expenditures.  
These results are shown graphically in Figure 3.6, which plots the cumulative distribution 
function of total target student expenditures separately for the control group and the three 
treatment groups. Panel 1 shows all target students, panel 2 female target students, and panel 3 
male target students. For both the overall sample and the sample of female target students, the 
distribution of the 3:1 match group is clearly below that of the control group, the no match 
group, and the 1:1 match group. Target students in the 3:1 match group are spending more across 
the entire distribution. 
These results on target student education expenditures suggest that, at least for female 
target students, the EduRemesa is being successfully targeted towards their education. However, 
in order to fully understand how the EduRemesa is affecting resources allocated towards 
education it is also instructive to examine total household education expenditures. If total 
household expenditures go up by less than target student expenditures, then the increases 
documented in Table 3.6 may be partly due to shifting of resources away from other students in 
the household towards the target student. We perform this analysis by summing the reports of 
expenditures on the target student with the reports of expenditures for others aged 22 or under in 
33 The p-value on the statistical test for equality of the effect of the 3:1 match treatment across male and female 
target students is 0.086. 
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the household.34 The impact of the match treatment on total household educational expenditures 
is presented in Table 3.7. The set-up of the table is parallel to Table 3.6, but all the outcomes are 
for total household expenditures on education. The results mirror those for target student 
education expenditures. Total expenditures increase both overall and for female target students 
and these increases are driven by increases in tuition, transportation, and food. However, the 
estimates on total household expenditures are generally less precise than those for target student 
expenditures and not all the impacts are statistically significant. Despite this, the coefficients are 
similar in magnitude and somewhat greater than the coefficients for the impacts on target student 
expenditure alone. This indicates that the increases in target student expenditures are not 
accompanied by reductions in expenditures for other students in the household. 
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 reveal that the 3:1 match treatment increases target student education 
expenditures. Following the model presented in Section 2, we now turn to asking whether the 
entire EduRemesa “sticks” to education, or whether some of it is shifted to other purposes. In the 
3:1 match group, the increase in total target student expenditures is $301 overall and $509 among 
females, which should be compared to average target student receipt of EduRemesa funds of $85 
overall and $108 among females resulting from that treatment (Table 3.5, column 7). It appears 
that not only does education spending increase by the total amount of the EduRemesa, but that 
the EduRemesa may actually encourage further investment in education by the target household. 
In other words, receipt of the EduRemesa may actually be “crowding in” educational 
expenditure. 
To examine this explicitly, Table 3.8 reports the results of instrumental variables 
regression estimating the impact of each dollar of EduRemesa funds on target student 
educational expenditures. Because the large increases in educational expenditures occur only in 
the 3:1 match group, we utilize only the control group and the 3:1 match group in this analysis. 
We instrument for total target student receipt of EduRemesa funds with the 3:1 match group 
treatment indicator and estimate the model by two stage least squares. As in equation 1, the 
instrumental variables regressions include stratification cell fixed effects and standard errors are 
clustered at the day- location level. Panel 1 reports the first stage regression and panel 2 the 
second stage. Panels 3 and 4 contain results to be discussed later in this section. Column 1 
34 The expenditures on these other students were reported by the adult interviewed in the target household and 
imputed when missing to maintain a consistent sample. Variable construction is described in Appendix C and all 
results are robust to the exclusion of imputed values. 
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presents the estimate for the overall El Salvador follow-up sample, and separate estimates for 
female and male target students are in columns 2 and 3 respectively. F-statistics for the first stage 
regressions indicate that the instrument is strong according to the Stock and Yogo (2005) 
thresholds in both the overall sample and the sample of female target students. 
The estimated coefficient in panel 2 reveals the impact of each dollar of EduRemesa 
funds on target student educational expenditures. As such, it can be interpreted as a test of crowd 
out vs. crowd in: a coefficient statistically significantly smaller than 1 would reveal crowd out, 
while a coefficient statistically significantly larger than 1 would reveal crowd in. In the overall El 
Salvador follow-up sample, the coefficient is 3.72. Each dollar of the EduRemesa leads to an 
increase of $3.72 in target student education expenditures. Among female target students the 
coefficient is even larger: each EduRemesa dollar leads to an increase of $4.99 in target student 
education expenditures. These estimates are both statistically significantly different from unity, 
at the 10% and 5% levels in the overall and female target student subsamples, respectively. For 
male target students, the coefficient is also positive, but is smaller in magnitude and is not 
significantly different from either zero or unity. Because all these coefficients exceed 1, we refer 
to these coefficients elsewhere in the paper as “crowd-in ratios.”  
3.5.4 Impact on other target student outcomes 
Given the finding of a large crowd-in ratio for female target students, the empirical 
results are suggestive of the situation (discussed in Section 2) where the presence of fixed costs 
for high levels of education quality can result in large crowd-in ratios (as depicted in Figure 3.4). 
We now turn to the impacts of this spending on other education-related outcomes. First, in Table 
3.9 we examine impacts on school enrollment and type of school. Column 1 examines whether 
or not the target student is enrolled in school at follow-up and columns 2 through 4 whether the 
target student is in any private school, parochial school, or non-parochial private school 
respectively (the latter two are subcategories of private schools). As in the previous tables, panel 
1 examines all target students in the El Salvador follow-up sample, panel 2 is restricted to female 
target students, and panel 3 is restricted to male target students. 
The treatments do not have statistically significant effects on school enrollment overall. 
The coefficient on the 3:1 match in column 1 among female target students is positive and 
economically meaningful, but falls short of statistical significance. There is, however, a large 
impact on the probability that the target student is attending private school, and as in the results 
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on expenditures, this result is concentrated among the female target students. Female target 
students in the 3:1 match group are 22 percentage points more likely to be in private school, and 
those in the 1:1 match group are 13 percentage points more likely. These are large increases 
relative to the control group private school attendance rate of 28 percent. These increases in 
private school attendance concord with the increases in expenditure on tuition and other 
educational expenditures discussed above. The amount needed to enroll in a private institution 
may be higher than what is provided by the EduRemesa (in fact the EduRemesa amounts were 
designed for public, not private, school), but the extra funds provided by the EduRemesa were 
enough to encourage households to provide the remaining funds needed.  In other words, this 
increase in private school attendance corresponds to the situation described in Section 2 where a 
fixed cost associated with an increase in educational quality can result in a large crowd in of 
funds in response to a transfer. 
We also examine the impact of the treatments on target students’ labor supply. Because 
the EduRemesa has no effect on overall enrollment, it is not expected that student labor supply 
would be lower because of decreased drop out, but the receipt of the EduRemesa funds may have 
reduced the need of the students to work while in school to pay for the costs related to their 
education. Additionally, increased attendance at private schools may have required target 
students to dedicate more time and effort to their studies, reducing their ability to work. On the 
other hand, it is possible that target students would have had to increase their labor supply, given 
the large crowd in of expenditures. We examine target student labor force participation in Table 
3.10 for the overall sample (panel 1) and female and male target students separately (panels 2 
and 3). We examine the impacts of the match treatments on both the extensive margin (whether a 
student worked) and the intensive margin (hours worked per week). We focus here on columns 1 
and 2 which examine all work, but also present results for paid and unpaid work separately 
(columns 3 through 6). 
Both the 3:1 and the 1:1 match treatments had a significant effect on target student labor 
supply. Target students in the 3:1 match group are 14 percentage points less likely to do any 
work at all and work an average of 4.4 hours less per week than students in the control group. 
Students in the 1:1 match group are 7.5 percentage points less likely to do any work and work 
3.2 hours less per week. These are large relative effects: the 3:1 match group is a 64 percent 
reduction compared to the control group. Figure 3.7 shows the cumulative distribution functions 
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of total hours worked by treatment for the overall sample (panel 1), female target students (panel 
2), and male target students (panel 3). The distributions of both the 3:1 and 1:1 match groups are 
above those of the no match and control groups. This is evidence of effects on both the extensive 
and intensive margins. Target students in the 3:1 and 1:1 match groups are much less likely to 
work at all, but they are also less likely to work a large number of hours, as evidenced by the 
much longer tails of the no match and control group distributions. 
Interestingly, and in contrast to the previous results in the paper, there are similar impacts 
of the 3:1 match treatment on the labor supply of both male and female target students.35 These 
large reductions in labor supply for both male and female target students can be thought of as 
representing another way in which target students are “spending” their EduRemesa funds, further 
strengthening the evidence that the EduRemesa leads to crowd in of resources. We examine this 
directly in Table 3.8. First, in panel 3, we estimate the impact of total EduRemesa funds received 
by the target student on the wages earned by the target student, where the EduRemesa funds are 
instrumented by the 3:1 match group treatment indicator. Because wages are not reported in our 
survey, we perform a crude approximation by multiplying the gender- and age-specific mean 
hourly wage reported in the nationally-representative 2010 Encuesta de Hogares de Propositos 
Multiples by the number of annual paid hours worked by the target student. This approximation 
suggests that for every dollar received as an EduRemesa, female target students reduce their 
earnings by $0.86 and male target students reduce their earnings by $3.08, although the male 
estimate is not statistically significant.  
Finally, we can combine our data on education expenditures with these earnings 
estimates to get an understanding of the impact of the EduRemesa on total resources devoted to 
target student education.36 This is shown in panel 4 of Table 3.8 where the dependent variable is 
total target student education expenditures minus estimated earnings (in other words, the 
household’s contribution to the target student’s educational expenditures, net of the target 
student’s earnings). As in panel 3, we instrument for total EduRemesa funds with the 3:1 
treatment indicator. With the addition of the foregone earnings, we find large crowd-in ratios for 
both females (5.8) and males (4.8), although the male estimate is not statistically significant. 
35 For the 1:1 match treatment there are impacts only for female target students, however because takeup of the 
EduRemesa among male target students in the 1:1 group was so low, we would not expect to see any results of that 
treatment among males. 
36 Of course there may be other resources that we do not measure that are also being affected. 
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Because of the crude manner in which wages were estimated, strong conclusions should not be 
drawn from the exact magnitudes of these estimates. We view the results of panel 4 as giving a 
rough sense of how the estimated crowd-in ratio would change when considering the reduction in 
target student earnings as an additional contribution to the target student’s education.37 
3.5.5 Impact on remittances   
Given that the EduRemesas were initiated and partially funded by migrant family 
members, an open question is whether the positive crowd-in ratios reflect (at least in part) an 
increase in funds remitted to the target household by the migrant. In other words, did migrants 
“top-up” the EduRemesa resources with additional remittances?  
We therefore analyze impacts on remittances sent by the migrant. Table 3.11 presents 
these results for the overall sample and separately by target student gender. The dependent 
variable of interest is the remittances sent by the migrant between January 1, 2012 and the 
follow-up survey date to the target household (column 1), other households in El Salvador 
(column 2), and to all households (column 3). 38  Because of several large outliers in the 
remittance data, we also show results that trim the top one percent of values (columns 4-6) and 
results that utilize the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the remittance variable (columns 
7-9).39, 40 
There is no evidence in Table 3.11 that the 3:1 match treatment results in higher 
remittances either to the target household or overall. In anything, there may be a negative effect, 
since the estimated coefficients are negative. An oddity is that in columns 1-3 there appear to be 
negative effects of the 1:1 and no match treatments on remittances. However, these effects are 
not robust to trimming of large outliers or to the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Overall, 
the treatments do not seem to have had an important effect on remittances. Our findings of 
37 It should be noted that these estimates are conservative in that they place no value on unpaid work. 
38 The information was reported by the migrant during the migrant follow-up survey, and therefore the analysis 
sample differs slightly from the analyses thus far in the paper that use information from the El Salvador follow-up 
survey. The remittance figures are derived through a series of questions and imputed when missing to allow for a 
consistent sample. The substance of the results does not change when excluding imputed observations. Further 
information about the variable construction and imputation procedure can be found in Appendix C. 
39 The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation is log(yi+(yi2+1)1/2). It can be interpreted in the same way as a 
logarithmic dependent variable, but does not suffer the same problem of being undefined at zero (Burbidge et al. 
1988). 
40 All the previously-reported results in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 relating to education expenditures are robust to trimming 
of the top 1% and the hyperbolic sine transformation. 
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positive crowd-in ratios therefore do not appear to be funded via additional inflows of funds 
from migrants. 
 
3.6 Discussion and additional analyses 
 In this section we provide additional discussion and analyses to clarify the interpretation 
of results. We also report on results of an additional cross-randomization that we have so far 
mentioned only in passing. 
Ruling out marketing effects 
 One might be concerned that some other aspect of the 3:1 match treatment is contributing 
to the observed increase in education expenditures, aside from the EduRemesa funds provided. 
In particular, participants received encouragement to channel remittances to education as part of 
the marketing of the EduRemesa, so it is possible that some of the increase in expenditures could 
be the result of a marketing effect.  
Our experiment was designed precisely to eliminate such concerns. While migrants in the 
control group did not receive the offer of an EduRemesa, they did receive a flyer that suggested 
ways migrants could enhance remittance impacts on education that highlighted the features of 
the EduRemesa (specifically, the flyer suggested sending funds directly to the sponsored student 
and disbursing funds in monthly installments).  
In addition, we can compare the results in the 3:1 match group to the no match group 
where the EduRemesa was also offered but without subsidy. The marketing effect should be the 
same in both groups, while take up was zero in the no match group, so the difference in 
outcomes between these groups should only be due to the EduRemesa funds received. Across all 
the outcomes where the 3:1 match treatment had a statistically significant effect (target student 
education expenditures, household education expenditures, private school attendance, and the 
labor supply outcomes), the 3:1 match effect is also statistically significantly different from the 
effect of the no match treatment. We therefore view the results as ruling out the possibility that 
the 3:1 match effect is partly due to the encouragement to invest in education that was part of the 
marketing of the EduRemesa.41 
41 We also note that the marketing treatments were administered to the migrants, not the family members. If the 
marketing of the EduRemesa increased migrant interest in promoting education in target student households, we 
would expect to see increases in remittances sent to these households. But as discussed above, we find no increase in 
remittances sent by migrants to the target households. 
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Relative magnitudes of the 3:1 and 1:1 match treatment effects 
 We focus most of our attention on the substantial impacts of the 3:1 match, but it is also 
important to consider these effects next to the effects of the 1:1 match. Take up was highest in 
the 3:1 match group, but it was not zero in the 1:1 group. Among female target students, for 
example, take up was 10% in the 1:1 group compared to 19% in the 3:1 match group (Table 3.5, 
column 5). Given this level of take up and the large effects of the 3:1 treatment, one might have 
expected to see positive, but smaller, effects of the 1:1 treatment on expenditures and other 
outcomes. We do find this for some key outcomes: for female target students, the 1:1 match 
raises private school attendance and reduces labor supply (point estimates are smaller in 
magnitude than those of the 3:1 match, but not statistically significantly so). However, we do not 
find statistically significant increases in female target student expenditures due to the 1:1 match 
(although the coefficient on total expenditures for the 1:1 match treatment in column 1 of Table 
3.6 is positive.) Looking across outcome variables, the broad pattern of these findings is that the 
1:1 match also has positive effects but that are smaller in magnitude and less often statistically 
significant compared to the effects of the 3:1 match. 
EduRemesa with and without monitoring of beneficiary student grades 
 As mentioned in Section 3.C above, migrants offered the EduRemesa were cross-
randomized into being offered one of two versions of the product: half of migrants were 
randomly assigned to be offered a version of the EduRemesa where they would receive official 
reports of their beneficiary students’ grades at the end of every grading period (“EduRemesa 
with grades”), and the remaining migrants were offered the EduRemesa without this grade 
reporting (“EduRemesa without grades”).  
We included this cross-randomization to test whether the impact of the EduRemesa offer 
could be enhanced by providing the migrant improved monitoring of student performance. We 
hypothesized that migrants offered the EduRemesa with grades might take up the product at 
higher rates. In addition, conditional on taking up, the EduRemesa with grades could have 
provided greater incentive for households to spend more on education.  
Table 3.A.7 analyzes take up separately for the EduRemesa with grades and the 
EduRemesa without grades. Take up in the 3:1 match group does not vary by whether or not the 
migrant was offered grade reports, and this is true across all measures of take up. The similarity 
in treatment effects for the EduRemesa with and without grades is also evident in the analysis of 
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target student educational expenditures (Table 3.A.8). The only evidence of differences across 
the EduRemesa with and without grades is in take up in the 1:1 match group, which is higher for 
the EduRemesa without grades. It is not obvious why the EduRemesa without grades would have 
led to higher take up, but we speculate that migrants may have not wanted to bear the effort cost 
of monitoring students in El Salvador that would be expected with the EduRemesa with grades 
treatment. We do not place great emphasis on this result, however, since the corresponding 
pattern (higher take up for the EduRemesa without grades) does not hold for the 3:1 match 
treatment. Overall, we conclude from this analysis that migrants do not appear to place value on 
monitoring the performance of students funded via the EduRemesa. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 We report the results of a randomized experiment testing take up and impacts of a novel 
educational subsidy program. The program provided a payment mechanism, called EduRemesa, 
through which Salvadoran migrants in the United States could channel funding for education to 
secondary- and tertiary-level students (of their choice) in El Salvador. We randomly assigned the 
offer of the EduRemesa mechanism to migrants, at (also randomly assigned) varying levels of 
subsidy via a matching contribution: no match, 1:1 match, and 3:1 match. Take up of 
EduRemesas was zero without subsidy, roughly 7% in the 1:1 match treatment, and 
approximately 19% in the 3:1 match treatment. The sums received by El Salvador beneficiaries 
were substantial: in the 3:1 match treatment, conditional on take up, about $800 was transferred 
on average to beneficiary students in El Salvador (inclusive of the matching funds). 
 The 3:1 match treatment led to large increases in educational expenditures on beneficiary 
students, over and above amounts transferred via the EduRemesa mechanism. These effects are 
concentrated among female beneficiary students. Each EduRemesa dollar received by females 
led to $5 in additional spending on education for the beneficiary student; in other words, each 
EduRemesa dollar “crowded in” an additional $4 in female student educational expenditure by 
the recipient household. The 3:1 match treatment also led female beneficiary students to have 
substantially higher private school attendance (which is likely closely related to the large 
increase in expenditures) and lower labor supply. For male beneficiary students, corresponding 
effects of the 3:1 match are smaller and not statistically significant, with the exception of a 
reduction in labor supply that is similar in magnitude to that found for females. 
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 These results can help guide policy related to increasing the development impact of 
migrant remittances. They indicate that donor- or government-funded programs aiming to 
subsidize education in developing countries can extend the resources available to them via 
contributions from two additional sources: 1) international migrants, who respond positively to 
matching grant programs for home-country education, and 2) beneficiary households themselves, 
who respond to subsidies by contributing additional resources toward student education.  
Our finding of zero take up in the no-match treatment may reveal that migrants have no 
(unsubsidized) demand for control over remittance recipient expenditures on education. 
This interpretation contrasts with Ashraf et al.’s (2012) evidence of migrant demand for control 
over savings in remittance-recipient households, but is consistent with Torero and Viceisza’s 
(2011) findings that migrants do not seek control over grocery expenditures of remittance-
recipient households. Another explanation for zero take up in the “no match” treatment is that 
migrants have a demand for control over educational expenditures in El Salvador, but they ex 
ante believed that the EduRemesa did not assure that funds would be used for education (even 
though we find that this was not the case ex post). 
As in all empirical work, it is important to replicate this study in other populations and 
contexts to gauge the generalizability of these results. In particular, it would be worth examining 
whether similar crowd in would be found outside the context of transnational households 
(households with an international migrant member). Also, since in our experiment the transition 
from public to private schooling appears central to mediating the effects found, future work 
should examine whether similar crowd in would occur in contexts where private schooling 
options are not as widely available. 
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Table 3.1: EduRemesa amounts and migrant contributions by 
treatment group
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min 10th pct. Median 90th pct. Max N
Migrant is female 0.50 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 728
Migrant age 36.88 9.43 15 26 36 49 74 709
Migrant is married 0.60 0.49 0 0 1 1 1 724
Migrant hh size in US 4.48 2.09 1 2 4 7 13 728
Migrant years of education 9.12 4.66 0 1 9 14 21 717
Migrant years in US 11.22 6.37 0 5 10 21 38 726
Migrant annual remittance to target hh 2,684 3,463 0 0 1,750 7,050 31,620 713
Migrant annual remittances to other hhs 1,182 2,002 0 0 0 3,600 15,600 721
Target student is female 0.53 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 728
Target student age 18.50 3.20 11 15 18 23 38 713
Target student is migrant's…
…child 0.26 0.44 0 0 0 1 1 727
…sibling 0.25 0.43 0 0 0 1 1 727
…niece/nephew 0.33 0.47 0 0 0 1 1 727
…cousin 0.10 0.31 0 0 0 1 1 727
Target student is in school 0.92 0.27 0 1 1 1 1 728
Target student years of education 11.81 2.18 8 9 12 15 24 678
Table 3.2: Baseline summary statistics
Notes: Sample is all migrant-student pairs with completed El Salvador follow-up surveys. Variables all come from migrant baseline survey. Sample size varies 
slighly with missing values for each variable. 
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Control No match 1:1 match 3:1 match C = NM = 1:1 = 3:1 C = NM C = 1:1 C = 3:1 N
Migrant is female 0.47 0.49 0.53 0.53 0.239 0.551 0.116 0.104 728
Migrant age 36.76 36.84 36.83 37.16 0.995 0.923 0.883 0.799 709
Migrant is married 0.60 0.55 0.68 0.59 0.168 0.180 0.187 0.914 724
Migrant hh size in US 4.55 4.50 4.41 4.39 0.705 0.988 0.304 0.611 728
Migrant years of education 9.14 8.78 8.74 9.80 0.207 0.450 0.534 0.217 717
Migrant years in US 10.90 11.24 11.09 11.88 0.492 0.447 0.649 0.141 726
Migrant annual remittance to target hh 2,964 2,582 2,408 2,556 0.586 0.396 0.167 0.395 713
Migrant annual remittances to other hhs 1,248 1,054 1,031 1,342 0.515 0.380 0.327 0.577 721
Target student is female 0.57 0.55 0.50 0.48 0.281 0.928 0.190 0.139 728
Target student age 18.34 18.44 18.68 18.69 0.524 0.394 0.254 0.160 713
Target student is migrant's…
…child 0.27 0.22 0.27 0.26 0.515 0.158 0.812 0.608 727
…sibling 0.23 0.31 0.22 0.25 0.147 0.036 0.699 0.453 727
…niece/nephew 0.30 0.33 0.39 0.33 0.233 0.517 0.043 0.574 727
…cousin 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.427 0.841 0.236 0.465 727
Target student is in school 0.92 0.90 0.93 0.94 0.562 0.369 0.740 0.549 728
Target student years of education 11.79 11.51 12.04 11.91 0.337 0.416 0.261 0.486 678
Notes: Sample is all migrant-student pairs with completed El Salvador follow-up surveys. Variables all come from migrant baseline survey. Sample size varies slightly 
with missing values for each variable. P-values come from regressions of each baseline variable on the treatment variables, including stratification cell fixed effects for 
week and location of baseline survey, with standard errors clustered at the level of the day and location of the baseline survey.
Table 3.3: Baseline balance
Means P-values
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No match 1:1 match 3:1 match Total
0 10 31 41
0 9 26 35
0 12 40 52
0 3 14 17
No match 1:1 match 3:1 match Total
$300 0 1 5 6
$500 0 6 22 28
$600 0 2 3 5
$800 0 3 10 13
Total 0 12 40 52









Total number of ERs
ERs sent to other students
Panel 4: EduRemesas by education level
Table 3.4: Summary of EduRemesa take up
Number of target students receiving ERs 
Number of migrants sending ERs
Panel 1: Characteristics of EduRemesas sent by treatment 
group







Panel 3: Average characteristics of EduRemesas 
conditional on takeup
Number of EduRemesas sent
Total amount sent by migrant
Total amount sent by migrant plus subsidy 
Amount sent by migrant to target student
Amount sent by migrant to target student plus subsidy
Notes: Data comes from EduRemesas administrative data. Sample is all migrant-student pairs interviewed at baseline.
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Panel 1: All target students
3:1 match 0.185*** 0.248*** 35.09*** 139.8*** 0.151*** 21.61*** 85.51***
[0.0332] [0.0492] [6.984] [27.47] [0.0291] [4.236] [16.25]
1:1 match 0.0686*** 0.0841*** 23.14*** 49.63*** 0.0600*** 18.49*** 37.15***
[0.0201] [0.0256] [7.107] [15.29] [0.0190] [5.934] [12.18]
No match -0.000367 0.00532 1.184 4.544 -0.000529 0.559 1.311
[0.00985] [0.0129] [2.445] [7.153] [0.00931] [1.879] [4.991]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.002 0.004 0.246 0.005 0.011 0.667 0.021
3:1 = No match 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1:1 = No match 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 728 728 728 728 728 728 728
R-squared 0.133 0.114 0.08 0.102 0.114 0.075 0.097
Control group mean 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel 2: Female target students
3:1 match 0.178*** 0.233*** 35.82*** 141.2*** 0.178*** 27.60*** 108.4***
[0.0464] [0.0629] [9.666] [38.26] [0.0464] [6.985] [27.21]
1:1 match 0.101*** 0.111*** 31.13*** 67.51*** 0.101*** 29.23*** 59.89***
[0.0346] [0.0372] [10.79] [23.67] [0.0346] [10.56] [21.93]
No match 0.00990 0.0176 4.590 13.23 0.00990 3.150 7.475
[0.0136] [0.0185] [3.966] [12.25] [0.0136] [3.239] [8.565]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.186 0.082 0.730 0.073 0.186 0.896 0.165
3:1 = No match 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
1:1 = No match 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.006
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 387 387 387 387 387 387 387
R-squared 0.145 0.146 0.118 0.135 0.145 0.113 0.137
Control group mean 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel 3: Male target students
3:1 match 0.180*** 0.246*** 30.91*** 127.0*** 0.115*** 13.57*** 55.96***
[0.0435] [0.0724] [9.659] [37.66] [0.0366] [4.848] [18.83]
1:1 match 0.0281 0.0508 13.59 29.36 0.00842 5.466 7.756
[0.0230] [0.0364] [8.474] [20.01] [0.0184] [4.737] [10.88]
No match -0.0123 -0.0106 -2.886 -6.829 -0.0129 -2.389 -7.167
[0.0162] [0.0225] [4.292] [13.15] [0.0143] [2.518] [7.916]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.003 0.023 0.208 0.031 0.023 0.273 0.047
3:1 = No match 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.005
1:1 = No match 0.107 0.131 0.101 0.103 0.305 0.150 0.214
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.008 0.011
Observations 341 341 341 341 341 341 341
R-squared 0.178 0.135 0.109 0.131 0.161 0.118 0.146
Control group mean 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3.5: Takeup of EduRemesa by treatment
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the level of the day and location of the baseline survey in brackets. Sample is all migrant-student pairs with 
completed El Salvador follow-up surveys. All regressions include stratification cell fixed effects for the week and location of the baseline survey. 
Dependent variables are from EduRemesa administrative data.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total Tuition School supplies Uniforms Books Transport Food
Computer 
use Other
Panel 1: All target students
3:1 match 301.5** 105.8*** -3.343 6.962 7.323 76.67** 143.5** 0.0542 -35.49
[125.5] [32.52] [7.791] [6.069] [7.797] [37.81] [57.33] [26.29] [28.62]
1:1 match 74.97 83.38** -11.28 -8.662* 5.047 35.85 48.37 -29.75 -47.98
[117.0] [32.89] [7.079] [4.784] [7.913] [41.41] [51.78] [25.04] [34.29]
No match 19.32 66.58* -1.105 -7.527 -11.26* 1.060 35.94 -20.00 -44.37
[111.5] [34.93] [7.508] [4.815] [5.802] [31.04] [47.20] [25.29] [28.77]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.102 0.603 0.338 0.007 0.830 0.391 0.123 0.302 0.605
3:1 = No match 0.060 0.405 0.818 0.010 0.029 0.075 0.102 0.502 0.613
1:1 = No match 0.675 0.691 0.270 0.811 0.053 0.406 0.840 0.765 0.869
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.136 0.705 0.459 0.014 0.029 0.200 0.191 0.560 0.838
Observations 728 728 728 728 728 728 728 728 728
R-squared 0.033 0.052 0.032 0.052 0.033 0.042 0.045 0.037 0.051
Control group mean 1358 186.8 60.16 35.94 54.68 270.4 442.9 217.5 89.63
Panel 2: Female target students
3:1 match 509.4*** 202.2*** 6.169 12.58 7.583 131.5** 216.0** -6.485 -60.11
[183.8] [56.38] [11.04] [9.253] [11.41] [50.28] [90.58] [40.70] [39.75]
1:1 match 45.60 98.91* -0.808 -14.02** 4.872 61.80 41.95 -57.34 -89.76
[185.7] [51.68] [12.96] [5.491] [12.42] [63.79] [84.40] [39.72] [57.80]
No match -55.40 66.59 -2.196 -7.224 -12.20 -0.458 41.30 -52.00 -89.23*
[169.1] [50.75] [9.509] [5.854] [8.562] [40.37] [68.63] [43.64] [50.01]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.028 0.132 0.656 0.004 0.852 0.324 0.088 0.280 0.408
3:1 = No match 0.006 0.044 0.478 0.020 0.091 0.027 0.061 0.378 0.332
1:1 = No match 0.596 0.612 0.925 0.234 0.165 0.346 0.995 0.917 0.985
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.017 0.118 0.770 0.016 0.148 0.086 0.122 0.508 0.598
Observations 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387
R-squared 0.103 0.109 0.047 0.094 0.069 0.101 0.09 0.083 0.109
Control group mean 1412 173.6 56.35 34.59 57.22 279.4 454.7 245.6 110.9
Panel 3: Male target students
3:1 match 43.57 -4.661 -16.83 -1.432 5.697 19.85 53.46 -1.683 -10.83
[186.7] [51.66] [11.26] [7.368] [11.89] [52.56] [70.17] [35.84] [32.94]
1:1 match 64.92 51.20 -29.41*** -7.723 6.234 12.80 40.63 -2.068 -6.742
[195.1] [55.47] [9.984] [7.979] [12.08] [54.94] [69.66] [34.18] [60.15]
No match -27.38 53.82 -6.742 -9.841 -11.52 -14.75 -12.80 -12.64 -12.91
[189.5] [58.89] [12.21] [6.830] [9.414] [49.21] [71.23] [32.92] [36.09]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.921 0.375 0.224 0.504 0.969 0.914 0.872 0.992 0.939
3:1 = No match 0.724 0.329 0.486 0.275 0.134 0.519 0.449 0.791 0.936
1:1 = No match 0.647 0.964 0.086 0.799 0.173 0.668 0.489 0.792 0.902
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.886 0.569 0.165 0.548 0.223 0.798 0.708 0.955 0.990
Observations 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341
R-squared 0.058 0.067 0.089 0.065 0.061 0.069 0.052 0.065 0.103
Control group mean 1287 204 65.15 37.69 51.36 258.7 427.4 180.8 61.88
Table 3.6: Target student education expenditures
Dependent variable: Annualized target student expenditure on
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the level of the day and location of the baseline survey in brackets. Sample is all migrant-student pairs with completed El 
Salvador follow-up surveys. All regressions include stratification cell fixed effects for the week and location of the baseline survey. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total Tuition School supplies Uniforms Books Transport Food
Computer 
use Other
Panel 1: All target students
3:1 match 332.8* 147.9*** -5.067 11.89 3.238 111.3* 95.97 6.577 -39.08
[168.7] [45.64] [9.432] [8.077] [10.13] [56.44] [76.22] [39.86] [28.46]
1:1 match 84.86 95.87** -19.29** -4.093 -4.331 90.10 -16.69 -10.74 -45.96
[169.9] [42.80] [8.978] [7.705] [8.934] [71.90] [71.63] [35.86] [35.01]
No match -54.15 77.96* -8.630 -6.616 -19.54** 25.77 -52.50 -23.94 -46.65
[153.1] [41.43] [8.620] [7.730] [8.708] [56.20] [65.47] [34.20] [29.06]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.236 0.399 0.199 0.045 0.528 0.794 0.208 0.712 0.784
3:1 = No match 0.087 0.267 0.753 0.038 0.053 0.261 0.112 0.508 0.676
1:1 = No match 0.473 0.740 0.342 0.783 0.110 0.463 0.652 0.771 0.977
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.226 0.529 0.408 0.051 0.098 0.522 0.265 0.802 0.912
Observations 728 728 728 728 728 728 728 728 728
R-squared 0.041 0.053 0.033 0.038 0.037 0.059 0.034 0.035 0.05
Control group mean 2132 251.3 90.78 57.91 86.99 423.6 812.7 310.4 98.31
Panel 2: Female target students
3:1 match 534.0** 290.0*** 12.14 19.13 2.312 141.5* 138.8 -10.51 -59.34
[262.0] [85.83] [15.49] [12.74] [16.25] [82.41] [115.4] [55.73] [40.02]
1:1 match -165.0 95.03 -13.95 -17.82* -15.74 41.25 -75.90 -84.77* -93.09
[250.3] [67.34] [17.56] [10.57] [15.64] [89.52] [111.3] [45.26] [57.80]
No match -314.2 92.75 -8.863 -14.30 -26.32* -30.98 -163.6* -76.56 -86.29*
[239.5] [68.63] [13.86] [11.28] [13.51] [65.11] [95.63] [55.42] [50.26]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.017 0.063 0.187 0.004 0.294 0.312 0.116 0.189 0.350
3:1 = No match 0.007 0.063 0.193 0.017 0.099 0.069 0.017 0.331 0.377
1:1 = No match 0.556 0.977 0.789 0.773 0.476 0.433 0.453 0.893 0.817
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.018 0.135 0.306 0.010 0.255 0.191 0.057 0.400 0.599
Observations 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387
R-squared 0.105 0.11 0.053 0.084 0.07 0.079 0.102 0.086 0.107
Control group mean 2233 228 86.71 58.9 92.23 453 845.3 352.6 116.3
Panel 3: Male target students
3:1 match 8.040 -16.38 -28.82** -0.164 -1.276 69.57 0.472 5.160 -20.51
[224.8] [64.61] [14.15] [10.74] [15.64] [68.61] [92.67] [50.31] [33.61]
1:1 match 284.4 75.85 -32.58** 4.158 6.924 140.1 30.92 61.77 -2.746
[276.5] [72.15] [12.87] [11.26] [14.29] [114.8] [99.30] [58.94] [62.10]
No match 2.470 30.61 -18.38 -3.262 -16.19 51.01 -14.86 -9.109 -17.35
[234.8] [68.07] [15.04] [10.63] [13.54] [92.57] [100.5] [47.16] [36.73]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.37 0.296 0.802 0.756 0.634 0.576 0.782 0.426 0.745
3:1 = No match 0.985 0.544 0.527 0.796 0.361 0.851 0.902 0.822 0.906
1:1 = No match 0.37 0.608 0.372 0.611 0.126 0.534 0.676 0.342 0.781
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.598 0.569 0.663 0.878 0.293 0.814 0.907 0.614 0.948
Observations 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341
R-squared 0.078 0.064 0.068 0.061 0.052 0.105 0.043 0.086 0.101
Control group mean 2000 281.8 96.09 56.62 80.14 385.3 770 255.2 74.85
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.7: Total household education expenditures
Dependent variable: Annualized target student expenditure on
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the level of the day and location of the baseline survey in brackets. Sample is all migrant-student pairs with completed El 
Salvador follow-up surveys. All regressions include stratification cell fixed effects for the week and location of the baseline survey. 
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3:1 match 85.34*** 108.5*** 51.70***
[16.08] [27.90] [18.37]
F-statistic on first stage 28.17 15.12 7.92
Observations 425 228 197
Total target student EduRemesa funds 3.720** 4.989** 1.730
[1.647] [2.035] [3.424]
P-value for equality of coefficient to 1 0.099 0.050 0.831
Observations 425 228 197
Total target student EduRemesa funds -1.661*** -0.861** -3.080
[0.582] [0.429] [2.004]
Observations 425 228 197
Total target student EduRemesa funds 5.381*** 5.850*** 4.811
[1.946] [2.257] [4.389]
P-value for equality of coefficient to 1 0.024 0.032 0.385
Observations 425 228 197
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the level of the day and location of the baseline survey in brackets. Sample is 
all migrant-student pairs with completed El Salvador follow-up surveys in the control group and 3:1 match treatment 
group. Treatment indicator for the 3:1 match treatment is used to instrument for EduRemesa funds in panels 2, 3, and 4. 
All regressions include stratification cell fixed effects for the week and location of the baseline survey. 
Table 3.8: Instrumental variables regressions
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel 3: IV: Dependent variable is estimated target student annualized earnings
Panel 2: IV: Dependent variable is total target student annualized education expenditures
Panel 1: First stage: Dependent variable is total target student EduRemesa funds
Panel 4: IV: Dependent variable is target student expenditures minus estimated earnings
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is in any 
private school
Target student 
is in parochial 
school
Target student 
is in other 
private school
Panel 1: All target students
3:1 match 0.0309 0.145*** 0.0504 0.0942**
[0.0398] [0.0419] [0.0396] [0.0370]
1:1 match -0.0210 0.0599 -0.00488 0.0647*
[0.0381] [0.0426] [0.0370] [0.0357]
No match 0.0182 0.0922* 0.0361 0.0561
[0.0440] [0.0480] [0.0379] [0.0396]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.244 0.107 0.260 0.554
3:1 = No match 0.819 0.400 0.778 0.478
1:1 = No match 0.426 0.550 0.373 0.857
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.453 0.271 0.477 0.758
Observations 728 728 728 728
R-squared 0.048 0.041 0.036 0.041
Control group mean 0.741 0.300 0.185 0.115
Panel 2: Female target students
3:1 match 0.0836 0.223*** 0.0485 0.174***
[0.0599] [0.0665] [0.0570] [0.0611]
1:1 match -0.0166 0.128** 0.0370 0.0911*
[0.0691] [0.0636] [0.0556] [0.0514]
No match -0.00889 0.0698 -0.0112 0.0810
[0.0628] [0.0662] [0.0507] [0.0563]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.189 0.277 0.877 0.280
3:1 = No match 0.220 0.0821 0.375 0.237
1:1 = No match 0.920 0.457 0.433 0.883
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.335 0.219 0.588 0.448
Observations 387 387 387 387
R-squared 0.082 0.076 0.060 0.092
Control group mean 0.739 0.281 0.176 0.105
Panel 3: Male target students
3:1 match -0.0595 0.0485 0.0516 -0.00308
[0.0681] [0.0656] [0.0633] [0.0513]
1:1 match -0.0536 -0.0204 -0.0498 0.0293
[0.0587] [0.0688] [0.0553] [0.0592]
No match 0.0115 0.0955 0.0886 0.00692
[0.0709] [0.0727] [0.0656] [0.0550]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.934 0.358 0.156 0.627
3:1 = No match 0.385 0.542 0.642 0.871
1:1 = No match 0.397 0.167 0.0426 0.739
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.628 0.375 0.0955 0.886
Observations 341 341 341 341
R-squared 0.109 0.061 0.055 0.076
Control group mean 0.744 0.325 0.197 0.128
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the level of the day and location of the baseline 
survey in brackets. Sample is all migrant-student pairs with completed El Salvador follow-up 
surveys. All regressions include stratification cell fixed effects for the week and location of the 
baseline survey.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.9: Target student education outcomes
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any work
Average hours 










Panel 1: All target students
3:1 match -0.139*** -4.365*** -0.0718* -2.928*** -0.0830*** -1.436***
[0.0402] [1.048] [0.0369] [0.936] [0.0308] [0.468]
1:1 match -0.0751* -3.204*** -0.0543 -1.780* -0.0435 -1.425***
[0.0412] [1.095] [0.0346] [0.968] [0.0325] [0.431]
No match 0.00897 -0.386 -0.0147 -0.138 0.00231 -0.248
[0.0445] [1.323] [0.0371] [1.223] [0.0352] [0.559]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.187 0.251 0.663 0.230 0.267 0.974
3:1 = No match 0.006 0.003 0.163 0.022 0.021 0.010
1:1 = No match 0.091 0.017 0.290 0.148 0.241 0.015
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.023 0.009 0.340 0.071 0.067 0.025
Observations 728 728 728 728 728 728
R-squared 0.041 0.056 0.032 0.048 0.041 0.059
Control group mean 0.326 6.778 0.196 4.426 0.17 2.352
Panel 2: Female target students
3:1 match -0.157*** -3.260*** -0.110*** -2.277** -0.0706* -0.983*
[0.0481] [1.155] [0.0406] [0.899] [0.0370] [0.521]
1:1 match -0.0817 -3.275*** -0.0902** -2.458*** -0.0305 -0.817
[0.0528] [1.045] [0.0397] [0.871] [0.0381] [0.550]
No match 0.00582 1.371 -0.0705 0.652 0.0535 0.718
[0.0554] [1.683] [0.0430] [1.553] [0.0411] [0.678]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.183 0.985 0.638 0.744 0.382 0.757
3:1 = No match 0.007 0.004 0.360 0.050 0.012 0.017
1:1 = No match 0.164 0.003 0.638 0.043 0.110 0.054
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.027 0.009 0.656 0.125 0.040 0.055
Observations 387 387 387 387 387 387
R-squared 0.103 0.099 0.053 0.07 0.092 0.087
Control group mean 0.275 5.19 0.17 3.353 0.15 1.837
Panel 3: Male target students
3:1 match -0.116* -5.144*** -0.0216 -3.103* -0.111** -2.042***
[0.0701] [1.866] [0.0680] [1.838] [0.0467] [0.774]
1:1 match -0.0441 -2.555 -0.00319 -0.840 -0.0434 -1.714**
[0.0666] [2.028] [0.0625] [1.955] [0.0515] [0.660]
No match 0.0310 -1.852 0.0571 -0.682 -0.0454 -1.169
[0.0681] [2.332] [0.0661] [2.245] [0.0592] [0.968]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.373 0.176 0.811 0.249 0.206 0.512
3:1 = No match 0.111 0.112 0.303 0.207 0.272 0.322
1:1 = No match 0.263 0.766 0.362 0.945 0.975 0.516
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.264 0.184 0.512 0.326 0.351 0.582
Observations 341 341 341 341 341 341
R-squared 0.079 0.096 0.083 0.095 0.077 0.091
Control group mean 0.393 8.855 0.231 5.829 0.197 3.026
Table 3.10: Target student labor force outcomes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the level of the day and location of the baseline survey in brackets. Sample is all migrant-
student pairs with completed El Salvador follow-up surveys. All regressions include stratification cell fixed effects for the week and 
location of the baseline survey.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variables refer to work currently being done by the target student
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Panel 1: All target students
3:1 match -167.9 -74.69 -242.6 -2.336 -71.33 -49.84 -0.124 -0.252 -0.296
[192.2] [70.59] [208.7] [160.1] [48.14] [162.4] [0.333] [0.292] [0.280]
1:1 match -365.1** -63.63 -428.8** -153.1 29.36 -128.5 -0.441 0.132 -0.424
[180.7] [66.62] [189.9] [152.4] [60.67] [160.5] [0.410] [0.330] [0.333]
No match -482.9*** -141.9** -624.8*** -213.1 -60.65 -316.6** -0.271 -0.171 -0.456
[165.6] [54.85] [175.6] [136.5] [49.59] [138.9] [0.323] [0.302] [0.275]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.284 0.900 0.364 0.362 0.130 0.654 0.475 0.289 0.724
3:1 = No match 0.052 0.394 0.036 0.152 0.853 0.095 0.674 0.826 0.618
1:1 = No match 0.370 0.252 0.166 0.623 0.186 0.182 0.664 0.407 0.924
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.135 0.446 0.069 0.354 0.284 0.173 0.773 0.535 0.879
Observations 735 735 735 727 727 727 735 735 735
R-squared 0.053 0.037 0.048 0.061 0.04 0.057 0.031 0.03 0.032
Control group mean 1449 363 1812 1206 278.1 1537 6.126 1.973 6.839
Panel 2: Female target students
3:1 match -59.45 -20.15 -79.60 -12.05 -134.0** -60.68 0.0210 -0.632 -0.226
[301.2] [107.6] [321.8] [224.3] [64.18] [243.4] [0.423] [0.392] [0.369]
1:1 match -347.3 -1.052 -348.4 -120.3 32.48 -114.5 -0.508 0.128 -0.600
[242.3] [88.84] [257.0] [206.7] [85.13] [226.4] [0.538] [0.431] [0.490]
No match -446.5** -59.51 -506.0** -213.8 -30.57 -262.9 -0.325 0.106 -0.536
[210.4] [74.55] [223.8] [172.8] [70.27] [191.2] [0.416] [0.393] [0.384]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.317 0.889 0.395 0.664 0.086 0.827 0.346 0.157 0.449
3:1 = No match 0.151 0.751 0.179 0.318 0.223 0.413 0.437 0.159 0.475
1:1 = No match 0.580 0.550 0.458 0.587 0.518 0.469 0.736 0.964 0.900
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.346 0.824 0.385 0.554 0.196 0.654 0.588 0.278 0.681
Observations 401 401 401 397 398 397 401 401 401
R-squared 0.05 0.066 0.052 0.054 0.095 0.072 0.066 0.091 0.068
Control group mean 1415 320.6 1736 1225 298.8 1550 6.089 2.048 6.868
Panel 3: Male target students
3:1 match -298.4 -130.3 -428.8 3.236 9.058 -24.91 -0.346 0.0502 -0.331
[239.5] [103.3] [259.6] [193.7] [75.67] [195.0] [0.453] [0.474] [0.381]
1:1 match -390.1 -77.67 -467.8* -173.0 86.16 -50.97 -0.329 0.324 -0.126
[254.6] [102.4] [264.8] [191.0] [84.79] [216.8] [0.541] [0.483] [0.449]
No match -528.9** -211.9*** -740.8*** -151.1 -94.41 -309.2* -0.246 -0.596 -0.368
[238.9] [79.59] [239.2] [180.2] [62.21] [174.6] [0.470] [0.458] [0.410]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.687 0.638 0.872 0.377 0.454 0.913 0.977 0.612 0.701
3:1 = No match 0.310 0.315 0.140 0.484 0.146 0.159 0.853 0.248 0.939
1:1 = No match 0.566 0.134 0.247 0.915 0.039 0.268 0.888 0.071 0.634
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.595 0.234 0.280 0.649 0.062 0.310 0.980 0.186 0.884
Observations 334 334 334 330 329 330 334 334 334
R-squared 0.102 0.097 0.095 0.121 0.099 0.108 0.048 0.065 0.052
Control group mean 1493 419.7 1913 1180 249.7 1519 6.175 1.873 6.802
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Full migrant follow-up sample Trimmed top 1% of each column
Table 3.11: Remittances sent by migrant
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the level of the day and location of the baseline survey in brackets. Sample is all migrant-student pairs with completed migrant follow-
up surveys. All regressions include stratification cell fixed effects for the week and location of the baseline survey. 
Dependent variable is migrant report of remittances sent since January 1, 2012
Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation
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Primary Secondary Tertiary
Public 89.06% 78.90% 38.92%
Private 10.94% 21.10% 61.08%
Parochial 4.34% 5.31% 5.76%
Other private 6.60% 15.78% 55.32%
Table 3.A.1: Type of school by school level, current students, El 
Salvador
Notes: Source is El Salvador Encuesta de Hogares de Propositos Multiples 2010.
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Public Private Public Private
Total 1442 2214 1868 2834
Tuition 6 499 177 702
Supplies 80 107 59 97
Uniforms 76 71 7 11
Texts 63 81 94 97
Shoes 280 288 541 573
Transport 571 548 645 778
Food 342 284 266 292
Other 25 337 79 283
Secondary Tertiary
Table 3.A.2: Average annual education expenditures (USD), 
current students
Notes: Source is reports on target student expenditure in the control group.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min 10th pct. Median 90th pct. Max N
Panel 1: Migrant-student pairs with female target student
Migrant is female 0.49 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 387
Migrant age 36.92 9.25 15 26 36 50 74 375
Migrant is married 0.61 0.49 0 0 1 1 1 385
Migrant hh size in US 4.58 2.13 1 2 4 7 13 387
Migrant years of education 9.33 4.72 0 0 10 14 20 384
Migrant years in US 11.51 6.61 0 5 11 22 38 386
Migrant annual remittance to target hh 2,766 3,542 0 0 1,800 7,200 26,900 380
Migrant annual remittances to other hhs 1,166 1,876 0 0 100 3,800 11,500 385
Target student is female 1.00 0.00 1 1 1 1 1 387
Target student age 18.59 3.34 11 15 18 23 35 380
Target student is migrant's…
…child 0.26 0.44 0 0 0 1 1 387
…sibling 0.27 0.44 0 0 0 1 1 387
…niece/nephew 0.34 0.48 0 0 0 1 1 387
…cousin 0.09 0.28 0 0 0 0 1 387
Target student is in school 0.92 0.27 0 1 1 1 1 387
Target student years of education 11.89 2.10 9 9 12 15 19 357
Panel 2: Migrant-student pairs with male target student
Migrant is female 0.50 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 341
Migrant age 36.83 9.64 18 25 36 49 71 334
Migrant is married 0.59 0.49 0 0 1 1 1 339
Migrant hh size in US 4.36 2.05 1 2 4 7 13 341
Migrant years of education 8.88 4.58 0 2 9 14 21 333
Migrant years in US 10.89 6.07 0 5 10 21 37 340
Migrant annual remittance to target hh 2,590 3,373 0 0 1,500 6,750 31,620 333
Migrant annual remittances to other hhs 1,200 2,140 0 0 0 3,600 15,600 336
Target student is female 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 341
Target student age 18.40 3.03 14 15 18 22 38 333
Target student is migrant's…
…child 0.26 0.44 0 0 0 1 1 340
…sibling 0.23 0.42 0 0 0 1 1 340
…niece/nephew 0.32 0.47 0 0 0 1 1 340
…cousin 0.13 0.33 0 0 0 1 1 340
Target student is in school 0.93 0.26 0 1 1 1 1 341
Target student years of education 11.72 2.27 8 9 12 15 24 321
Table 3.A.3A: Baseline summary statistics: El Salvador follow-up sample
Notes: Sample is all migrant-student pairs with completed El Salvador follow-up surveys. Variables all come from migrant baseline survey. Sample size varies 
slighly with missing values for each variable. 
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min 10th pct. Median 90th pct. Max N
Panel 1: All migrant-student pairs
Migrant is female 0.49 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 991
Migrant age 36.79 9.52 15 25 36 49 74 963
Migrant is married 0.60 0.49 0 0 1 1 1 986
Migrant hh size in US 4.39 2.03 1 2 4 7 13 990
Migrant years of education 9.22 4.63 0 1 9 14 21 976
Migrant years in US 11.22 6.34 0 5 10 21 38 987
Migrant annual remittance to target hh 2,658 3,344 0 0 1700 6950 31620 973
Migrant annual remittances to other hhs 1,116 1,907 0 0 0 3600 15600 983
Target student is female 0.53 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 991
Target student age 18.57 3.40 11 15 18 23 40 967
Target student is migrant's…
…child 0.26 0.44 0 0 0 1 1 989
…sibling 0.23 0.42 0 0 0 1 1 989
…niece/nephew 0.33 0.47 0 0 0 1 1 989
…cousin 0.11 0.32 0 0 0 1 1 989
Target student is in school 0.92 0.27 0 1 1 1 1 990
Target student years of education 11.79 2.15 8 9 12 14 24 913
Panel 2: Migrant-student pairs with female target student
Migrant is female 0.48 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 522
Migrant age 37.07 9.52 15 26 36 50 74 508
Migrant is married 0.62 0.49 0 0 1 1 1 519
Migrant hh size in US 4.45 2.05 1 2 4 7 13 521
Migrant years of education 9.35 4.66 0 0 10 14 20 517
Migrant years in US 11.49 6.54 0 4 11 22 38 520
Migrant annual remittance to target hh 2,694 3,394 0 0 1690 7200 26900 513
Migrant annual remittances to other hhs 1,122 1,800 0 0 0 3600 11500 519
Target student is female 1.00 0.00 1 1 1 1 1 522
Target student age 18.69 3.61 11 15 18 23 36 511
Target student is migrant's…
…child 0.26 0.44 0 0 0 1 1 521
…sibling 0.24 0.43 0 0 0 1 1 521
…niece/nephew 0.35 0.48 0 0 0 1 1 521
…cousin 0.10 0.29 0 0 0 0 1 521
Target student is in school 0.91 0.29 0 1 1 1 1 521
Target student years of education 11.90 2.09 9 9 12 15 19 476
Panel 3: Migrant-student pairs with male target student
Migrant is female 0.51 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 469
Migrant age 36.48 9.52 18 25 36 48 71 455
Migrant is married 0.59 0.49 0 0 1 1 1 467
Migrant hh size in US 4.32 2.02 1 2 4 7 13 469
Migrant years of education 9.07 4.61 0 2 9 15 21 459
Migrant years in US 10.93 6.10 0 5 10 21 37 467
Migrant annual remittance to target hh 2,619 3,290 0 0 1700 6725 31620 460
Migrant annual remittances to other hhs 1,110 2,023 0 0 0 3500 15600 464
Target student is female 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 469
Target student age 18.42 3.14 13 15 18 22 40 456
Target student is migrant's…
…child 0.26 0.44 0 0 0 1 1 468
…sibling 0.23 0.42 0 0 1 1 468
…niece/nephew 0.32 0.47 0 0 0 1 1 468
…cousin 0.13 0.34 0 0 0 1 1 468
Target student is in school 0.93 0.26 0 1 1 1 1 469
Target student years of education 11.68 2.21 8 9 11 14 24 437
Table 3.A.3B: Baseline summary statistics: Full sample
Notes: Sample is all migrant-student pairs interviewed at baseline. Variables all come from migrant baseline survey. Sample size varies slighly with missing 
values for each variable. 
144
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min 10th pct. Median 90th pct. Max N
Panel 1: All migrant-student pairs
Migrant is female 0.50 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 735
Migrant age 37.28 9.56 17 26 36 50 74 717
Migrant is married 0.62 0.49 0 0 1 1 1 733
Migrant hh size in US 4.52 2.09 1 2 4 7 13 735
Migrant years of education 9.07 4.69 0 0 9 14 21 724
Migrant years in US 11.08 6.34 0 5 10 21 38 733
Migrant annual remittance to target hh 2,765 3,413 0 0 1,800 7,200 31,620 724
Migrant annual remittances to other hhs 1,189 2,048 0 0 0 3,675 15,600 730
Target student is female 0.55 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 735
Target student age 18.51 3.40 11 15 18 23 40 724
Target student is migrant's…
…child 0.28 0.45 0 0 0 1 1 735
…sibling 0.23 0.42 0 0 0 1 1 735
…niece/nephew 0.33 0.47 0 0 0 1 1 735
…cousin 0.09 0.29 0 0 0 0 1 735
Target student is in school 0.92 0.28 0 1 1 1 1 735
Target student years of education 11.74 2.18 8 9 12 14 24 683
Panel 2: Migrant-student pairs with female target student
Migrant is female 0.49 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 401
Migrant age 37.41 9.53 17 26 36.5 50.5 74 390
Migrant is married 0.64 0.48 0 0 1 1 1 400
Migrant hh size in US 4.57 2.08 1 2 4 7 13 401
Migrant years of education 9.21 4.72 0 0 10 14 20 398
Migrant years in US 11.42 6.53 0 4 11 22 38 400
Migrant annual remittance to target hh 2,871 3,485 0 0 1,800 7,380 26,900 394
Migrant annual remittances to other hhs 1,193 1,913 0 0 165 3,800 11,500 399
Target student is female 1.00 0.00 1 1 1 1 1 401
Target student age 18.60 3.57 11 15 18 23 35 396
Target student is migrant's…
…child 0.30 0.46 0 0 0 1 1 401
…sibling 0.23 0.42 0 0 0 1 1 401
…niece/nephew 0.33 0.47 0 0 0 1 1 401
…cousin 0.08 0.28 0 0 0 0 1 401
Target student is in school 0.91 0.29 0 1 1 1 1 401
Target student years of education 11.86 2.14 9 9 12 15 19 366
Panel 3: Migrant-student pairs with male target student
Migrant is female 0.51 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 334
Migrant age 37.12 9.61 18 25 36 50 71 327
Migrant is married 0.59 0.49 0 0 1 1 1 333
Migrant hh size in US 4.46 2.10 1 2 4 7 13 334
Migrant years of education 8.89 4.66 0 1 9 14 21 326
Migrant years in US 10.66 6.08 0 5 9 20 37 333
Migrant annual remittance to target hh 2,638 3,326 0 0 1,800 6,725 31,620 330
Migrant annual remittances to other hhs 1,184 2,203 0 0 0 3,650 15,600 331
Target student is female 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 334
Target student age 18.40 3.20 14 15 17 22 40 328
Target student is migrant's…
…child 0.27 0.44 0 0 0 1 1 334
…sibling 0.22 0.42 0 0 1 1 334
…niece/nephew 0.34 0.47 0 0 0 1 1 334
…cousin 0.10 0.31 0 0 0 1 1 334
Target student is in school 0.93 0.25 0 1 1 1 1 334
Target student years of education 11.60 2.22 8 9 11 14 24 317
Table 3.A.3C: Baseline summary statistics: Migrant follow-up sample
Notes: Sample is all migrant-student pairs with completed migrant follow-up surveys. Variables all come from migrant baseline survey. Sample size varies 
slighly with missing values for each variable. 
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Control No match 1:1 match 3:1 match C = NM = 1:1 = 3:1 C = NM C = 1:1 C = 3:1 N
Panel 1: Migrant-student pairs with female target student
Migrant is female 0.48 0.46 0.52 0.52 0.683 0.622 0.371 0.320 387
Migrant age 36.88 37.21 37.42 36.18 0.619 0.534 0.542 0.638 375
Migrant is married 0.61 0.55 0.68 0.61 0.479 0.205 0.588 0.836 385
Migrant hh size in US 4.63 4.54 4.71 4.41 0.693 0.821 0.691 0.236 387
Migrant years of education 9.29 8.99 8.91 10.21 0.287 0.542 0.450 0.197 384
Migrant years in US 11.24 11.74 11.19 12.15 0.794 0.383 0.960 0.677 386
Migrant annual remittance to target hh 3,046 2,243 2,580 2,955 0.458 0.126 0.506 0.865 380
Migrant annual remittances to other hhs 1,110 1,114 1,193 1,315 0.757 0.781 0.503 0.368 385
Target student age 18.42 18.21 18.58 19.35 0.091 0.755 0.535 0.036 380
Target student is migrant's…
…child 0.25 0.18 0.35 0.25 0.070 0.108 0.213 0.913 387
…sibling 0.25 0.30 0.21 0.31 0.464 0.254 0.847 0.257 387
…niece/nephew 0.35 0.40 0.33 0.28 0.368 0.257 0.862 0.278 387
…cousin 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.982 0.934 0.724 0.995 387
Target student is in school 0.93 0.90 0.91 0.93 0.906 0.569 0.523 0.770 387
Target student years of education 11.79 11.63 11.88 12.37 0.112 0.514 0.827 0.065 357
Panel 2: Migrant-student pairs with male target student
Migrant is female 0.44 0.52 0.55 0.54 0.391 0.457 0.138 0.219 341
Migrant age 36.60 36.40 36.22 38.06 0.705 0.895 0.554 0.452 334
Migrant is married 0.58 0.54 0.68 0.58 0.495 0.519 0.240 0.725 339
Migrant hh size in US 4.45 4.45 4.11 4.38 0.609 0.759 0.313 0.959 341
Migrant years of education 8.93 8.53 8.57 9.40 0.938 0.740 0.974 0.715 333
Migrant years in US 10.44 10.63 11.00 11.64 0.319 0.847 0.380 0.092 340
Migrant annual remittance to target hh 2,856 3,003 2,235 2,187 0.223 0.813 0.150 0.200 333
Migrant annual remittances to other hhs 1,434 980 867 1,368 0.310 0.197 0.121 0.830 336
Target student age 18.22 18.71 18.79 18.05 0.106 0.047 0.098 0.806 333
Target student is migrant's…
…child 0.28 0.28 0.19 0.26 0.193 0.774 0.032 0.534 340
…sibling 0.21 0.32 0.23 0.20 0.443 0.123 0.706 0.851 340
…niece/nephew 0.25 0.23 0.45 0.38 0.006 0.746 0.002 0.078 340
…cousin 0.16 0.16 0.08 0.09 0.175 0.556 0.233 0.209 340
Target student is in school 0.91 0.90 0.96 0.95 0.174 0.284 0.303 0.413 341
Target student years of education 11.80 11.34 12.19 11.48 0.167 0.326 0.139 0.471 321
Table 3.A.4A: Baseline balance: El Salvador follow-up sample
Means P-values
Notes: Sample is all migrant-student pairs with completed El Salvador follow-up surveys. Variables all come from migrant baseline survey. Sample size varies slightly 
with missing values for each variable. P-values come from regressions of each baseline variable on the treatment variables, including stratification cell fixed effects for 
week and location of baseline survey, with standard errors clustered at the level of the day and location of the baseline survey.
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Control No match 1:1 match 3:1 match C = NM = 1:1 = 3:1 C = NM C = 1:1 C = 3:1 N
Panel 1: All migrant-student pairs
Migrant is female 0.47 0.48 0.51 0.54 0.233 0.651 0.273 0.052 991
Migrant age 36.63 36.42 36.67 37.53 0.665 0.789 0.678 0.298 963
Migrant is married 0.58 0.59 0.65 0.61 0.535 0.849 0.208 0.552 986
Migrant hh size in US 4.48 4.47 4.37 4.18 0.466 0.810 0.469 0.246 990
Migrant years of education 9.32 9.11 9.21 9.16 0.970 0.714 0.886 0.648 976
Migrant years in US 10.87 11.13 10.97 12.15 0.147 0.575 0.804 0.028 987
Migrant annual remittance to target hh 2,838 2,419 2,520 2,717 0.372 0.150 0.263 0.763 973
Migrant annual remittances to other hhs 1,223 1,021 996 1,147 0.635 0.320 0.269 0.748 983
Target student is female 0.56 0.56 0.50 0.46 0.038 0.830 0.142 0.033 991
Target student age 18.48 18.65 18.65 18.55 0.693 0.313 0.352 0.409 967
Target student is migrant's…
…child 0.25 0.23 0.27 0.29 0.481 0.295 0.842 0.611 989
…sibling 0.23 0.28 0.21 0.23 0.227 0.072 0.608 0.630 989
…niece/nephew 0.32 0.33 0.37 0.32 0.520 0.548 0.150 0.760 989
…cousin 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.446 0.543 0.579 0.334 989
Target student is in school 0.91 0.90 0.93 0.94 0.434 0.280 0.680 0.472 990
Target student years of education 11.80 11.47 11.98 11.92 0.101 0.181 0.210 0.244 913
Panel 2: Migrant-student pairs with female target student
Migrant is female 0.46 0.45 0.51 0.53 0.568 0.731 0.308 0.226 522
Migrant age 37.32 36.89 36.98 36.85 0.993 0.907 0.785 0.990 508
Migrant is married 0.61 0.58 0.66 0.63 0.715 0.367 0.644 0.864 519
Migrant hh size in US 4.53 4.46 4.63 4.11 0.246 0.783 0.935 0.058 521
Migrant years of education 9.39 9.18 9.31 9.53 0.930 0.646 0.684 0.866 517
Migrant years in US 11.33 11.53 10.69 12.60 0.183 0.709 0.347 0.227 520
Migrant annual remittance to target hh 2,765 2,164 2,775 3,093 0.172 0.106 0.938 0.418 513
Migrant annual remittances to other hhs 1,114 1,135 1,114 1,132 0.973 0.806 0.746 0.724 519
Target student age 18.63 18.63 18.70 18.90 0.779 0.990 0.640 0.355 511
Target student is migrant's…
…child 0.25 0.20 0.34 0.28 0.107 0.239 0.127 0.657 521
…sibling 0.22 0.26 0.20 0.27 0.387 0.214 0.776 0.242 521
…niece/nephew 0.37 0.40 0.31 0.29 0.313 0.483 0.339 0.262 521
…cousin 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.825 0.505 0.748 0.787 521
Target student is in school 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.93 0.781 0.958 0.468 0.715 521
Target student years of education 11.89 11.54 11.97 12.27 0.018 0.138 0.772 0.065 476
Panel 3: Migrant-student pairs with male target student
Migrant is female 0.48 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.853 0.541 0.716 0.399 469
Migrant age 35.76 35.82 36.35 38.14 0.288 0.687 0.866 0.105 455
Migrant is married 0.55 0.60 0.63 0.60 0.524 0.493 0.165 0.291 467
Migrant hh size in US 4.41 4.48 4.11 4.25 0.516 0.587 0.289 0.912 469
Migrant years of education 9.24 9.01 9.12 8.84 0.907 0.961 0.898 0.522 459
Migrant years in US 10.28 10.62 11.25 11.77 0.125 0.642 0.203 0.028 467
Migrant annual remittance to target hh 2,932 2,750 2,270 2,399 0.311 0.746 0.094 0.194 460
Migrant annual remittances to other hhs 1,366 874 878 1,159 0.292 0.099 0.117 0.402 464
Target student age 18.29 18.68 18.60 18.23 0.327 0.081 0.251 0.471 456
Target student is migrant's…
…child 0.25 0.27 0.20 0.30 0.408 0.749 0.135 0.795 468
…sibling 0.23 0.29 0.23 0.20 0.461 0.166 0.934 0.817 468
…niece/nephew 0.25 0.25 0.43 0.35 0.943 0.002 0.090 468
…cousin 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.176 0.659 0.158 0.127 468
Target student is in school 0.92 0.88 0.97 0.95 0.027 0.048 0.171 0.795 469
Target student years of education 11.68 11.39 12.00 11.61 0.470 0.649 0.178 0.826 437
Notes: Sample is all migrant-student pairs interviewed at baseline. Variables all come from migrant baseline survey. Sample size varies slightly with missing values for 
each variable. P-values come from regressions of each baseline variable on the treatment variables, including stratification cell fixed effects for week and location of 
baseline survey, with standard errors clustered at the level of the day and location of the baseline survey.
Table 3.A.4B: Baseline balance: Full sample
Means P-values
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Control No match 1:1 match 3:1 match C = NM = 1:1 = 3:1 C = NM C = 1:1 C = 3:1 N
Panel 1: All migrant-student pairs
Migrant is female 0.49 0.47 0.51 0.52 0.662 0.781 0.475 0.306 735
Migrant age 37.14 37.16 36.98 37.87 0.966 0.793 0.831 0.788 717
Migrant is married 0.61 0.60 0.64 0.62 0.937 0.633 0.765 0.981 733
Migrant hh size in US 4.58 4.67 4.45 4.34 0.358 0.332 0.533 0.404 735
Migrant years of education 9.06 9.17 9.04 9.01 0.989 0.813 0.996 0.889 724
Migrant years in US 10.75 11.33 11.12 11.34 0.807 0.383 0.640 0.483 733
Migrant annual remittance to target hh 3,005 2,445 2,670 2,743 0.438 0.108 0.343 0.587 724
Migrant annual remittances to other hhs 1,321 1,007 1,035 1,275 0.489 0.205 0.212 0.910 730
Target student is female 0.57 0.58 0.54 0.48 0.107 0.934 0.336 0.031 735
Target student age 18.44 18.57 18.52 18.57 0.869 0.448 0.585 0.557 724
Target student is migrant's…
…child 0.27 0.25 0.30 0.33 0.411 0.324 0.573 0.404 735
…sibling 0.23 0.26 0.20 0.21 0.512 0.385 0.344 0.617 735
…niece/nephew 0.32 0.34 0.37 0.31 0.572 0.514 0.210 0.950 735
…cousin 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.501 0.164 0.762 0.799 735
Target student is in school 0.91 0.88 0.94 0.94 0.247 0.371 0.196 0.218 735
Target student years of education 11.77 11.39 11.92 11.85 0.224 0.194 0.377 0.582 683
Panel 2: Migrant-student pairs with female target student
Migrant is female 0.51 0.42 0.49 0.53 0.834 0.591 0.906 0.512 401
Migrant age 37.19 38.10 37.60 36.88 0.769 0.679 0.749 0.592 390
Migrant is married 0.63 0.61 0.64 0.67 0.924 0.536 0.985 0.805 400
Migrant hh size in US 4.61 4.70 4.55 4.37 0.511 0.419 0.792 0.351 401
Migrant years of education 9.18 9.08 9.14 9.49 0.885 0.799 0.967 0.560 398
Migrant years in US 10.88 12.13 11.27 11.81 0.676 0.239 0.818 0.702 400
Migrant annual remittance to target hh 3,161 2,137 3,030 2,974 0.095 0.038 0.954 0.972 394
Migrant annual remittances to other hhs 1,182 1,196 1,164 1,239 0.987 0.948 0.949 0.732 399
Target student age 18.46 18.41 18.64 19.06 0.607 0.790 0.648 0.268 396
Target student is migrant's…
…child 0.28 0.22 0.39 0.32 0.073 0.136 0.139 0.732 401
…sibling 0.23 0.23 0.18 0.28 0.476 0.734 0.473 0.249 401
…niece/nephew 0.33 0.42 0.29 0.26 0.141 0.147 0.465 0.285 401
…cousin 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.883 0.479 0.689 0.959 401
Target student is in school 0.91 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.972 0.639 0.866 0.954 401
Target student years of education 11.87 11.49 11.90 12.22 0.095 0.100 0.970 0.243 366
Panel 3: Migrant-student pairs with male target student
Migrant is female 0.48 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.873 0.471 0.622 0.614 334
Migrant age 37.07 35.89 36.24 38.76 0.328 0.196 0.493 0.428 327
Migrant is married 0.59 0.58 0.64 0.57 0.755 0.663 0.466 0.992 333
Migrant hh size in US 4.53 4.64 4.34 4.30 0.753 0.556 0.517 0.701 334
Migrant years of education 8.89 9.31 8.91 8.55 0.662 0.330 0.806 0.559 326
Migrant years in US 10.57 10.22 10.94 10.92 0.783 0.512 0.520 0.712 333
Migrant annual remittance to target hh 2,799 2,869 2,247 2,537 0.409 0.960 0.167 0.463 330
Migrant annual remittances to other hhs 1,509 750 880 1,308 0.193 0.059 0.157 0.685 331
Target student age 18.41 18.78 18.38 18.11 0.468 0.125 0.718 0.808 328
Target student is migrant's…
…child 0.25 0.29 0.20 0.34 0.350 0.777 0.288 0.360 334
…sibling 0.24 0.30 0.23 0.14 0.230 0.438 0.648 0.120 334
…niece/nephew 0.30 0.23 0.48 0.36 0.248 0.008 0.296 334
…cousin 0.11 0.15 0.05 0.10 0.172 0.063 0.347 0.727 334
Target student is in school 0.91 0.88 0.98 0.97 0.018 0.274 0.012 0.095 334
Target student years of education 11.64 11.25 11.95 11.51 0.539 0.594 0.291 0.978 317
Notes: Sample is all migrant-student pairs for completed migrant follow-up surveys. Variables all come from migrant baseline survey. Sample size varies slightly with 
missing values for each variable.  P-values come from regressions of each baseline variable on the treatment variables, including stratification cell fixed effects for 
week and location of baseline survey, with standard errors clustered at the level of the day and location of the baseline survey.










Panel 1: All target students
3:1 match -0.0345 0.0178 -0.000549
[0.0355] [0.0365] [0.0426]
1:1 match -0.0240 -0.0459 -0.0577
[0.0363] [0.0368] [0.0422]
No match -0.0266 -0.00370 -0.0464
[0.0374] [0.0390] [0.0468]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.803 0.089 0.184
3:1 = No match 0.871 0.634 0.376
1:1 = No match 0.952 0.302 0.816
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.969 0.209 0.397
Observations 991 991 991
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.022
Control group mean 0.758 0.758 0.614
Panel 2: Female target students
3:1 match -0.0160 0.0221 0.00986
[0.0512] [0.0490] [0.0583]
1:1 match -0.0412 -0.0145 -0.0425
[0.0535] [0.0523] [0.0630]
No match -0.0649 -0.0297 -0.0882
[0.0491] [0.0490] [0.0555]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.673 0.533 0.454
3:1 = No match 0.436 0.341 0.125
1:1 = No match 0.692 0.807 0.522
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.737 0.611 0.306
Observations 522 522 522
R-squared 0.052 0.073 0.049
Control group mean 0.772 0.772 0.624
Panel 3: Male target students
3:1 match -0.0651 0.0155 -0.0143
[0.0513] [0.0445] [0.0582]
1:1 match -0.0133 -0.0881* -0.0877
[0.0462] [0.0516] [0.0535]
No match 0.00733 -0.00127 -0.0245
[0.0566] [0.0595] [0.0688]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.370 0.063 0.187
3:1 = No match 0.308 0.797 0.894
1:1 = No match 0.732 0.217 0.312
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.554 0.164 0.301
Observations 469 469 469
R-squared 0.06 0.066 0.043
Control group mean 0.741 0.741 0.601
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.A.5: Attrition
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the level of the day and location of the baseline 
survey in brackets. Sample is all migrant-student pairs interviewed at baseline. All regressions 
include stratification cell fixed effects for the week and location of the baseline survey.
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Panel 1: All target students
3:1 match 0.145*** 0.188*** 26.24*** 105.0*** 0.120*** 16.92*** 67.25***
[0.0245] [0.0354] [4.997] [19.47] [0.0216] [3.131] [11.96]
1:1 match 0.0520*** 0.0633*** 17.03*** 36.20*** 0.0443*** 13.55*** 26.93***
[0.0153] [0.0194] [5.446] [11.62] [0.0144] [4.508] [9.207]
No match -0.000802 0.00213 0.242 1.838 -0.00235 -0.130 -0.380
[0.00735] [0.00988] [1.853] [5.245] [0.00704] [1.414] [3.701]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.001 0.002 0.232 0.004 0.005 0.541 0.010
3:1 = No match 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1:1 = No match 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.004
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 991 991 991 991 991 991 991
R-squared 0.103 0.089 0.063 0.08 0.091 0.059 0.078
Control group mean 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel 2: Female target students
3:1 match 0.164*** 0.203*** 30.61*** 120.0*** 0.164*** 24.99*** 97.47***
[0.0364] [0.0471] [7.112] [28.19] [0.0364] [5.461] [21.39]
1:1 match 0.0754*** 0.0792*** 22.29*** 46.46** 0.0754*** 21.62*** 43.77**
[0.0267] [0.0284] [8.296] [18.01] [0.0267] [8.121] [16.87]
No match 0.00193 0.00498 1.683 5.001 0.00193 1.009 2.305
[0.0110] [0.0145] [2.902] [8.999] [0.0110] [2.413] [6.613]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.058 0.025 0.428 0.024 0.058 0.727 0.055
3:1 = No match 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1:1 = No match 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.014 0.006 0.010 0.011
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 522 522 522 522 522 522 522
R-squared 0.128 0.127 0.097 0.116 0.128 0.095 0.121
Control group mean 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel 3: Male target students
3:1 match 0.121*** 0.168*** 20.77*** 86.07*** 0.0771*** 8.906*** 37.13***
[0.0300] [0.0528] [7.012] [27.23] [0.0249] [3.224] [12.39]
1:1 match 0.0261 0.0470* 11.21* 25.96* 0.0106 4.604 7.761
[0.0161] [0.0266] [6.493] [14.80] [0.0126] [3.619] [7.801]
No match -0.00714 -0.00565 -2.380 -3.963 -0.0112 -2.322 -6.331
[0.0122] [0.0195] [3.617] [10.57] [0.0116] [2.050] [6.109]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.005 0.041 0.334 0.054 0.032 0.408 0.065
3:1 = No match 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004
1:1 = No match 0.082 0.113 0.113 0.100 0.192 0.144 0.158
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.009 0.010 0.011
Observations 469 469 469 469 469 469 469
R-squared 0.122 0.098 0.079 0.093 0.111 0.084 0.1
Control group mean 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3.A.6A: Takeup of EduRemesa by treatment: Full sample
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the level of the day and location of the baseline survey in brackets. Sample is all migrant-student pairs 
interviewed at baseline. All regressions include stratification cell fixed effects for the week and location of the baseline survey. Dependent variables are 
from EduRemesa administrative data.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
150









sent by migrant 
plus subsidy
EduRemesa 
sent to target 
student
Total amount 








Panel 1: All target students
3:1 match 0.163*** 0.221*** 30.41*** 122.1*** 0.137*** 19.08*** 76.12***
[0.0302] [0.0453] [6.643] [25.95] [0.0267] [3.912] [14.85]
1:1 match 0.0718*** 0.0923*** 25.09*** 54.58*** 0.0611*** 19.25*** 37.97***
[0.0215] [0.0278] [7.838] [16.90] [0.0202] [6.371] [13.12]
No match -0.00184 0.00417 1.157 4.503 -0.00414 0.104 -0.359
[0.00997] [0.0137] [2.572] [7.475] [0.00990] [1.931] [5.275]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.010 0.012 0.596 0.021 0.025 0.981 0.055
3:1 = No match 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1:1 = No match 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 735 735 735 735 735 735 735
R-squared 0.123 0.107 0.079 0.095 0.111 0.077 0.096
Control group mean 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel 2: Female target students
3:1 match 0.168*** 0.225*** 34.15*** 135.1*** 0.168*** 25.31*** 99.77***
[0.0437] [0.0674] [11.15] [44.10] [0.0437] [6.642] [25.69]
1:1 match 0.0947*** 0.102*** 29.35*** 62.64*** 0.0947*** 27.78*** 56.38***
[0.0332] [0.0369] [10.44] [23.84] [0.0332] [10.01] [20.92]
No match 0.00317 0.0122 3.336 12.14 0.00317 1.423 4.485
[0.0142] [0.0220] [4.418] [15.14] [0.0142] [3.101] [8.821]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.188 0.087 0.726 0.093 0.188 0.832 0.177
3:1 = No match 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
1:1 = No match 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.015 0.006 0.007 0.010
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 401 401 401 401 401 401 401
R-squared 0.139 0.146 0.118 0.140 0.139 0.109 0.134
Control group mean 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel 3: Male target students
3:1 match 0.149*** 0.209*** 25.26*** 104.8*** 0.102*** 11.88*** 49.34***
[0.0394] [0.0680] [9.115] [34.86] [0.0332] [4.432] [16.71]
1:1 match 0.0342 0.0685 17.21 37.38 0.0116 6.734 9.088
[0.0273] [0.0442] [10.94] [24.61] [0.0221] [6.202] [13.68]
No match -0.0189 -0.0197 -4.525 -10.60 -0.0258 -4.349 -13.55
[0.0205] [0.0310] [5.819] [16.60] [0.0200] [3.459] [10.67]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients
3:1 = 1:1 0.020 0.081 0.584 0.116 0.048 0.534 0.100
3:1 = No match 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006
1:1 = No match 0.125 0.119 0.118 0.112 0.204 0.147 0.175
3:1 = 1:1 = No match 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.014 0.014 0.018
Observations 334 334 334 334 334 334 334
R-squared 0.158 0.127 0.111 0.121 0.158 0.128 0.149
Control group mean 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3.A.6B: Takeup of EduRemesa by treatment: Migrant follow-up sample
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the level of the day and location of the baseline survey in brackets. Sample is all migrant-student pairs with 
completed migrant follow-up surveys. All regressions include stratification cell fixed effects for the week and location of the baseline survey. Dependent 
variables are from EduRemesa administrative data.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Panel 1: All target students
3:1 match & no grades 0.180*** 0.227*** 31.43*** 123.9*** 0.138*** 20.83*** 81.59***
[0.0444] [0.0670] [8.802] [34.59] [0.0395] [5.768] [22.38]
1:1 match & no grades 0.126*** 0.157*** 44.33*** 95.28*** 0.111*** 35.10*** 71.39***
[0.0315] [0.0414] [12.06] [24.82] [0.0309] [10.00] [20.10]
No match & no grades 0.00794 0.0139 2.842 9.908 0.00655 1.903 5.431
[0.0123] [0.0171] [3.045] [9.146] [0.0116] [2.197] [6.058]
3:1 match & grades 0.190*** 0.269*** 38.55*** 155.1*** 0.164*** 22.27*** 89.16***
[0.0480] [0.0670] [9.677] [39.13] [0.0415] [5.631] [22.64]
1:1 match & grades 0.0100 0.0101 1.620 3.453 0.00887 1.576 2.366
[0.0140] [0.0163] [2.797] [7.709] [0.0132] [2.489] [5.786]
No match & grades -0.0109 -0.00508 -1.044 -1.771 -0.00902 -1.356 -3.986
[0.0115] [0.0146] [2.659] [8.051] [0.0106] [2.053] [5.686]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients in no grades and grades treatment:
3:1 match group 0.876 0.658 0.570 0.537 0.650 0.853 0.810
1:1 match group 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001
No match group 0.163 0.313 0.193 0.231 0.207 0.114 0.133
Observations 728 728 728 728 728 728 728
R-squared 0.147 0.125 0.107 0.115 0.128 0.106 0.114
Control group mean 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel 2: Female target students
3:1 match & no grades 0.195*** 0.204*** 33.94*** 132.6*** 0.195*** 32.38*** 126.4***
[0.0605] [0.0621] [10.25] [40.58] [0.0605] [9.991] [39.55]
1:1 match & no grades 0.176*** 0.186*** 54.74*** 117.8*** 0.176*** 52.98*** 110.8***
[0.0514] [0.0519] [17.21] [34.61] [0.0514] [17.23] [34.27]
No match & no grades 0.0236 0.0362* 7.986* 24.38* 0.0236 5.865 15.89
[0.0165] [0.0201] [4.340] [13.25] [0.0165] [3.804] [10.42]
3:1 match & grades 0.160** 0.266** 38.04** 151.1** 0.160** 22.57** 89.21**
[0.0693] [0.105] [14.93] [60.94] [0.0693] [8.709] [36.07]
1:1 match & grades 0.0228 0.0302 6.016 13.83 0.0228 4.327 7.079
[0.0320] [0.0358] [6.253] [17.17] [0.0320] [5.708] [14.19]
No match & grades -0.00589 -0.00273 0.475 0.884 -0.00589 -0.352 -2.427
[0.0189] [0.0247] [4.696] [15.13] [0.0189] [3.875] [11.27]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients in no grades and grades treatment:
3:1 match group 0.700 0.598 0.808 0.790 0.700 0.442 0.483
1:1 match group 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.003 0.009 0.006 0.003
No match group 0.176 0.141 0.112 0.118 0.176 0.144 0.153
Observations 387 387 387 387 387 387 387
R-squared 0.169 0.162 0.151 0.150 0.169 0.159 0.165
Control group mean 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel 3: Male target students
3:1 match & no grades 0.155** 0.245** 28.27* 111.7* 0.0733 8.218 31.84
[0.0621] [0.122] [15.18] [59.70] [0.0452] [5.054] [19.25]
1:1 match & no grades 0.0653 0.115* 31.03* 66.76* 0.0318 14.12 24.06
[0.0407] [0.0670] [17.08] [37.27] [0.0340] [9.705] [20.93]
No match & no grades -0.00163 -0.00496 -1.285 -1.062 -0.00811 -1.326 -3.291
[0.0160] [0.0255] [4.636] [13.55] [0.0165] [2.767] [8.611]
3:1 match & grades 0.202*** 0.248*** 33.34*** 140.6*** 0.152*** 18.33** 77.28**
[0.0602] [0.0784] [11.37] [44.97] [0.0554] [7.589] [30.11]
1:1 match & grades -0.00362 -0.00733 -2.090 -3.431 -0.00960 -1.991 -5.148
[0.0148] [0.0238] [4.265] [12.99] [0.0131] [2.507] [7.165]
No match & grades -0.0246 -0.0193 -5.062 -13.57 -0.0150 -3.367 -9.938
[0.0256] [0.0328] [6.227] [20.87] [0.0215] [3.809] [12.85]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients in no grades and grades treatment:
3:1 match group 0.589 0.981 0.784 0.694 0.278 0.260 0.204
1:1 match group 0.093 0.081 0.072 0.075 0.241 0.124 0.187
No match group 0.400 0.711 0.584 0.593 0.791 0.643 0.664
Observations 341 341 341 341 341 341 341
R-squared 0.186 0.141 0.124 0.139 0.173 0.135 0.162
Control group mean 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3.A.7: Takeup of EduRemesa by grades treatment
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the level of the day and location of the baseline survey in brackets. Sample is all migrant-student pairs with 
completed El Salvador follow-up surveys. All regressions include stratification cell fixed effects for the week and location of the baseline survey. 
Dependent variables are from EduRemesa administrative data.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total Tuition School supplies Uniforms Books Transport Food
Computer 
use Other
Panel 1: All target students
3:1 match & no grades 347.2** 129.4*** -7.346 14.14* 3.387 103.7* 122.9* 23.76 -42.78
[171.1] [44.70] [9.334] [7.494] [9.713] [53.17] [71.78] [38.25] [35.56]
1:1 match & no grades 2.681 97.33** -10.08 -5.372 0.968 23.44 0.241 -32.89 -70.96**
[131.6] [45.66] [9.030] [5.021] [8.664] [34.50] [50.70] [30.07] [33.48]
No match & no grades 7.252 44.10 5.482 -6.593 -15.02** 26.30 31.60 -23.15 -55.47*
[144.5] [45.52] [10.37] [6.037] [7.232] [39.73] [61.11] [34.91] [33.37]
3:1 match & grades 256.7 81.95* 0.714 -0.154 11.19 50.39 164.3** -23.43 -28.25
[155.5] [42.05] [10.62] [8.128] [11.17] [46.87] [77.21] [31.67] [28.12]
1:1 match & grades 147.6 68.14* -12.26 -12.14* 9.203 48.56 97.82 -27.09 -24.64
[162.5] [40.78] [9.292] [6.711] [11.81] [68.43] [81.49] [33.22] [45.31]
No match & grades 32.07 89.51* -8.145 -9.059 -6.785 -27.84 43.28 -17.80 -31.09
[135.4] [49.21] [9.239] [5.762] [7.916] [38.37] [57.01] [29.97] [30.16]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients in no grades and grades treatment:
3:1 match group 0.666 0.413 0.519 0.153 0.579 0.418 0.665 0.308 0.613
1:1 match group 0.427 0.606 0.852 0.332 0.539 0.717 0.273 0.881 0.260
No match group 0.884 0.485 0.283 0.719 0.392 0.255 0.869 0.897 0.392
Observations 728 728 728 728 728 728 728 728 728
R-squared 0.034 0.054 0.033 0.056 0.034 0.044 0.047 0.039 0.052
Control group mean 1358 186.8 60.16 35.94 54.68 270.4 442.9 217.5 89.63
Panel 2: Female target students
3:1 match & no grades 553.1** 248.7*** 3.244 20.43 1.299 183.3** 173.3 16.08 -93.25**
[253.3] [71.75] [13.54] [13.13] [13.90] [71.18] [120.7] [57.37] [42.99]
1:1 match & no grades 158.4 162.8** 10.46 -8.952 9.519 94.88* 30.99 -50.02 -91.33
[206.2] [68.57] [19.62] [6.382] [16.12] [52.16] [83.88] [48.68] [63.52]
No match & no grades 43.94 81.13 -2.851 -2.386 -15.54 42.34 74.84 -27.91 -105.7*
[195.3] [66.92] [9.985] [8.381] [10.06] [50.85] [87.17] [60.09] [62.18]
3:1 match & grades 465.0** 152.3* 9.378 4.201 14.34 76.53 263.2** -30.34 -24.52
[229.5] [78.34] [15.08] [12.80] [16.52] [64.60] [116.6] [48.89] [47.22]
1:1 match & grades -68.88 34.09 -12.99 -18.80** -0.538 30.90 52.07 -63.09 -90.52
[262.3] [61.09] [14.92] [7.194] [15.58] [107.9] [142.7] [50.72] [62.19]
No match & grades -151.5 50.48 -2.066 -11.89* -9.320 -41.24 11.00 -74.46 -73.99
[222.0] [68.22] [14.85] [6.264] [11.29] [51.80] [82.86] [53.18] [48.70]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients in no grades and grades treatment:
3:1 match group 0.778 0.336 0.734 0.373 0.519 0.248 0.562 0.499 0.109
1:1 match group 0.427 0.110 0.324 0.216 0.607 0.555 0.895 0.826 0.986
No match group 0.429 0.734 0.963 0.292 0.632 0.189 0.519 0.517 0.515
Observations 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387
R-squared 0.106 0.116 0.050 0.101 0.071 0.107 0.092 0.085 0.111
Control group mean 1412 173.6 56.35 34.59 57.22 279.4 454.7 245.6 110.9
Panel 3: Male target students
3:1 match & no grades 10.74 -37.79 -23.55* 1.890 -2.291 23.45 28.41 16.90 3.732
[233.3] [63.29] [13.94] [9.389] [13.73] [61.29] [90.38] [50.43] [44.30]
1:1 match & no grades -226.0 11.46 -38.27*** -8.213 -9.525 -40.09 -62.84 -18.13 -60.42
[193.5] [67.39] [9.137] [8.468] [9.907] [52.22] [75.28] [37.04] [39.78]
No match & no grades -129.1 1.739 3.325 -13.03 -12.89 -10.84 -46.40 -35.52 -15.48
[223.6] [61.54] [17.20] [7.902] [10.58] [65.47] [83.48] [34.02] [36.57]
3:1 match & grades 72.03 25.04 -11.12 -4.316 12.65 16.27 75.33 -17.83 -23.99
[232.2] [63.90] [14.28] [9.405] [16.31] [71.40] [90.45] [43.05] [33.15]
1:1 match & grades 328.8 87.63 -20.33 -7.677 21.20 61.11 135.6 10.14 41.14
[259.0] [68.66] [13.51] [11.49] [18.79] [81.58] [91.11] [47.73] [98.75]
No match & grades 120.0 129.2 -19.52 -5.874 -8.460 -19.57 37.64 16.65 -10.16
[234.5] [90.15] [12.35] [9.749] [13.13] [50.48] [94.35] [48.26] [48.41]
P-values for tests of equality of coeffcients in no grades and grades treatment:
3:1 match group 0.825 0.396 0.465 0.594 0.430 0.931 0.680 0.562 0.500
1:1 match group 0.0343 0.347 0.143 0.966 0.102 0.230 0.0479 0.583 0.292
No match group 0.333 0.187 0.226 0.512 0.749 0.898 0.425 0.292 0.901
Observations 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341
R-squared 0.070 0.076 0.096 0.067 0.072 0.074 0.063 0.069 0.110
Control group mean 1287 204.0 65.15 37.69 51.36 258.7 427.4 180.8 61.88
Table 3.A.8: Target student education expenditures: Interactions with grades treatment
Dependent variable: Annualized target student expenditure on
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the level of the day and location of the baseline survey in brackets. Sample is all migrant-student pairs with completed El 
Salvador follow-up surveys. All regressions include stratification cell fixed effects for the week and location of the baseline survey. 




















Text used in migrant experiment 
 
To thank you and your family for you participation in this study now we are going to give you the 
opportunity to participate in two more lotteries.  Let me tell you about them. 
Question 1:   
First, you have the chance to win $600.  You can keep this money or you can choose to send some or all of it to 
name of person to be surveyed in El Salvador.  However, you must tell me now how much you want to keep and 
how much you want to send and if you win the choice you make now will be carried out.    
Treatment 0: Keep in mind that because of the rules of this project we cannot inform name of person to be surveyed 
about what you decide to do with the money. This means that your decision is a secret.  Name of person to be 
surveyed will not be told how much you have decided to send and how much you have decided to keep.   
Treatment 1: Keep in mind that because of the rules of this project we have to inform name of person to be surveyed 
about what you decide to do with the money. This means that your decision is not a secret.  Name of person to be 
surveyed will be told how much you have decided to send and how much you have decided to keep. 
Let’s make this decision now.  You have the following options:  (surveyor shows options to migrant) 
 KEEP:  $600 and  SEND:  $0 
 
 KEEP:  $500 and  SEND:  $100 
 
 KEEP:  $400 and  SEND:  $200 
 
 KEEP:  $300 and  SEND:  $300 
 
 KEEP:  $200 and  SEND:  $400 
 
 KEEP:  $100 and  SEND:  $500  
 




Question 2:  
Now I am going to tell you about a second lottery that is completely different and separate from the first one. 
Because you have participated in our survey, name of person to be surveyed will have the opportunity to win a 
remittance worth $300 and will need to choose how he/she would like to receive it if he/she wins.  He/she cannot 
pick anything but must choose among the following categories:  meals at local restaurants, education related 
expenses, daily expenses like groceries, and health related expenses.  He/she can spend it all on one thing or break it 
up among different things. 
Name of person to be surveyed will decide how he/she would like to receive the remittance. However, we would like 
to know how you would prefer that name of person to be surveyed allocate this remittance. 
Spending category: Amount: 
1. Meals at local restaurants (ex: Pollo Campero, 
Burger King) 
 
2. Education related expenses (ex: supplies, 
uniforms, books) 
 
3. Daily expenses like groceries  
4. Health related expenses (ex: medicine, doctor’s 
visits) 
 






Text used in recipient experiment 
 
Question 1: Because name of migrant participated in our study, you now have the chance to receive a remittance 
worth $300.  Some participants like you will be chosen to receive this remittance.  However, this remittance can 
only be spent on a limited number of things.  In order to participate you must tell me now how you would like to 
allocate the remittance among the following categories, and if you win, you will receive exactly what you have told 
me that you want.  The categories are: meals at local restaurants, education related expenses, daily expenses like 
groceries, and health related expenses.  You can spend it all on one thing or break it up among different things. 
Treatment 1: You can choose anything that you like.   
Keep in mind that because of the rules of this project we cannot inform name of migrant about what you decide to 
do. This means that your decision is a secret.  Name of migrant will not be told about what you decide to spend the 
money on. 
Treatment 2: When we spoke with name of migrant we asked him/her what he/she prefers for you to spend this 
money on and he/she indicated that he/she would like you to choose ______.   However, you can choose anything 
that you like.   
Keep in mind that because of the rules of this project we cannot inform name of migrant about what you decide to 
do. This means that your decision is a secret.  Name of migrant will not be told about what you decide to spend the 
money on. 
Treatment 3: You can choose anything that you like.   
Keep in mind that because of the rules of this project we have to inform name of migrant about what you decide to 
do. This means that your decision is not a secret.  Name of migrant will be told about exactly what you decided to 
spend the money on.  
Treatment 4: When we spoke with name of migrant we asked him/her what he/she prefers for you to spend this 
money on and he/she indicated that he/she would like you to choose ______.   However, you can choose anything 
that you like.   
Keep in mind that because of the rules of this project we have to inform name of migrant about what you decide to 
do. This means that your decision is not a secret.  Name of migrant will be told about exactly what you decided to 







Let’s make this decision now.  How would you like to allocate this remittance among the following categories? 
Spending category: Amount: 
1. Meals at local restaurants (ex: Pollo Campero, 
Burger King) 
 
2. Education related expenses (ex: supplies, 
uniforms, books)  
 
3. Daily expenses like groceries  
4. Health related expenses (ex: medicine, doctor’s 
visits) 
 








Data used in this paper came from two surveys. Baseline surveys were conducted with migrants 
between early November 2011 and early February 2012. Follow-up surveys were conducted by 
phone with migrants and the target household in El Salvador (both the target student and a 
responsible adult) from mid July 2012 to late October 2012. We also use administrative data 
from the EduRemesa project. Because El Salvador uses the US dollar as its official currency, all 
monetary figures are in US dollars. Following are descriptions of all variables used for baseline 
summary statistics and dependent variables in regressions. 
Variables from baseline survey 
Migrant is female is equal to one if migrant is female and zero if migrant is male. 
Migrant age is migrant’s age in years, calculated from reported date of birth. 
Migrant is married is equal to one if migrant reports being married or cohabiting and zero 
otherwise. It is derived from a asking for the migrant’s civil status. 
Migrant household size in the US is the total number of persons (including the migrant) living in 
the migrant’s home in the United States. 
Migrant annual remittances to target household is the total amount sent by the migrant to the 
target household in the 12 months preceding the survey. This equals the frequency of regular 
remittance transactions over the past 12 months multiplied by the average amount per regular 
remittance transaction. This is added to the total amounts reported to have been sent for special 
occasions in various categories. 
Migrant annual remittances to other households is the total amount sent by the migrant to 
households that are not the target household in the 12 months preceding the survey. This equals 
the frequency of regular remittance transactions over the past 12 months multiplied by the 
average amount per regular remittance transaction for each household. This is added to the total 





Target student is female is equal to one if the migrant reports the target student is female and 
zero if migrant reports the target student is male. 
Target student age is the migrant’s report of the target student’s age. 
Target student is migrant’s child is equal to one if the migrant reports the target student is his/her 
child and zero if a different relationship is reported. It is derived from a question that asks the 
migrant to describe his/her relationship with the target student. 
Target student is migrant’s sibling is equal to one if the migrant reports the target student is 
his/her sibling and zero if a different relationship is reported. It is derived from a question that 
asks the migrant to describe his/her relationship with the target student. 
Target student is migrant’s niece/nephew is equal to one if the migrant reports the target student 
is his/her niece/nephew and zero if a different relationship is reported. It is derived from a 
question that asks the migrant to describe his/her relationship with the target student. 
Target student is migrant’s cousin is equal to one if the migrant reports the target student is 
his/her cousin and zero if a different relationship is reported. It is derived from a question that 
asks the migrant to describe his/her relationship with the target student. 
Target student is in school is equal to one if the migrant reports that the target student currently 
attends school and zero if the migrant reports that the target student does not currently attend 
school. 
Target student years of education is the target student’s total number of years of education 
reported by the migrant. It is the total number of years completed for those students not currently 
in school and includes the current year for those still in school. It is derived from questions about 
current level of schooling and number of years within that level. 
Variables from EduRemesa administrative data 
EduRemesa sent is equal to one if the migrant sent at least one EduRemesa to any student and 
zero otherwise. 
Number of EduRemesas sent is the total number of EduRemesas sent by each migrant. 
Total amount sent by migrant is the total dollar amount contributed by each migrant to 
EduRemesas, summing across all EduRemesas sent by each migrant. 
Total amount sent by migrant plus subsidy is the total dollar amount contributed by each migrant 
to EduRemesas plus the project subsidy, summing across all EduRemesas sent by each migrant. 
EduRemesa sent to target student is equal to one if the migrant sent an EduRemesa to his/her 




Total amount sent by migrant to target student is the total dollar amount contributed by each 
migrant to EduRemesas for his/her target student. 
Total amount sent by migrant plus subsidy to target student is the total dollar amount contributed 
by each migrant to EduRemesas for his/her target student plus the project subsidy. 
Variables from the El Salvador follow-up survey 
Target student expenditures on education: 
Spending on all categories is asked with reference to the period since January 1, 2012 and then 
annualized in the manner described below for each category. For all categories both target 
students and the responsible adult were asked if there were expenditures in each category. If yes, 
they are asked how much was spent. The student report is given priority and the responsible 
adult report is used when the student report is missing. If both are missing, the value is imputed 
to allow for consistent sample size. Imputations were performed by regressing expenditure in 
each category on student age, gender, whether student is in school, the type of school, education 
level, and number of people 22 and under in the student’s household using the control group. The 
data comes from the student reports in El Salvador follow-up survey. This regression is then used 
to predict values for the missing values in each expenditure category. 
Target student expenditure on: 
 Tuition is the annual amount spent on tuition for the target student. It is sum of two 
categories: annual tuition paid in a lump sum at the beginning of the school and monthly 
tuition paid every month. Monthly tuition report is multiplied by ten (for ten month 
school year) to arrive at annual figure.  
Student report: 99.2% 
Adult report: 0.7% 
Imputed value: 0.1% 
 School supplies is the annual amount on school supplies for the target student. 
Student report: 97.7% 
Adult report: 2.2% 
Imputed value: 0.1% 
 Uniforms is the annual amount spent on school uniforms for the target student. 
Student report: 99.2% 
Adult report: 0.7% 
Imputed value: 0.1% 
 Books is the annual amount spent on school books for the target student. 
Student report: 98.6% 




Imputed value: 0.4% 
 Transport is the annual amount spent on transportation to and from school for the target 
student. It is reported as a weekly expenditure and multiplied by 43 for a 10 month school 
year. 
Student report: 99.7% 
Adult report: 0.3% 
Imputed value: 0.0% 
 Food is the annual amount spent by the target student for food purchased while at school. 
It is reported as a weekly expenditure and multiplied by 43 for a 10 month school year. 
Student report: 99.9% 
Adult report: 0.1% 
Imputed value: 0.0% 
 Computer use is the annual amount spent by the target student for computer use related to 
school work. It is reported as a weekly expenditure and multiplied by 43 for a 10 month 
school year. 
Student report: 99.4% 
Adult report: 0.5% 
Imputed value: 0.1% 
 Other are expenditures that do not fit into any category. These are reported in the 
frequency of the respondent’s choice and multiplied by the appropriate number to 
annualize for the 10 month school year. 
Student report: 99.9% 
Adult report: 0.1% 
Imputed value: 0.0% 
Total target student education expenditures is the sum of all the preceding target student 
education expenditure variables. 
 All categories are student report: 95.4% 
 At least one adult report: 4.0% 
 At least one imputed value: 0.8% 
Total household expenditures on education: 
Spending on all categories is asked with reference to the period since January 1, 2012 and then 
annualized in the manner described below for each category. For all categories amounts are the 
target student amount described above plus the amount spent on each additional child in the 
household in that expenditure category. The additional student reports come from the responsible 
adult. For each category and for each additional child the responsible adult was asked if there 




missing, the value is imputed to allow for consistent sample size. Imputations were performed by 
regressing expenditure in each category on additional student age, gender, whether student is in 
school, the type of school, education level, and number of people 22 and under in the student’s 
household using the control group. The data comes from the adult reports in El Salvador follow-
up survey. This regression is then used to predict values for the missing values in each 
expenditure category. 
Total household expenditure on: 
Tuition is the annual amount spent on tuition. It is sum of two categories: annual tuition 
paid in a lump sum at the beginning of the school and monthly tuition paid every month. 
Monthly tuition report is multiplied by ten (for ten month school year) to arrive at annual 
figure.  
At least one imputed value: 0.8% 
 School supplies is the annual amount on school supplies. 
At least one imputed value: 1.1% 
 Uniforms is the annual amount spent on school uniforms. 
At least one imputed value: 0.3% 
 Books is the annual amount spent on school books. 
At least one imputed value: 1.9% 
 Transport is the annual amount spent on transportation to and from school. It is reported 
as a weekly expenditure and multiplied by 43 for a 10 month school year. 
At least one imputed value: 0.1% 
 Food is the annual amount spent on food purchased while at school. It is reported as a 
weekly expenditure and multiplied by 43 for a 10 month school year. 
At least one imputed value: 0.2% 
 Computer use is the annual amount spent on computer use related to school work. It is 
reported as a weekly expenditure and multiplied by 43 for a 10 month school year. 
At least one imputed value: 0.5% 
Other are expenditures that do not fit into any category. These are reported in the 
frequency of the respondent’s choice and multiplied by the appropriate number to 
annualize for the 10 month school year. 
At least one imputed value: 1.3% 
Total household education expenditures is the sum of all the preceding household education 
expenditure variables. 




Target student education outcomes: 
Target student is in school is equal to one if the target student reports he/she is currently 
attending school and zero if he/she reports that he/she is not. 
Target student is in any private school is equal to one if the target student reports that he/she 
attends either parochial school or non-parochial private school. It is equal to zero if target student 
reports attending public school. For target students not currently in school the question refers to 
the last school they attended. 
Target student is in parochial school is equal to one if the target student reports that he/she 
attends parochial school. It is equal to zero if target student reports attending non-parochial 
private school or public school. For target students not currently in school the question refers to 
the last school they attended. 
Target student is in other private school is equal to one if the target student reports that he/she 
attends a non-parochial private school. It is equal to zero if target student reports attending 
parochial private school or public school. For target students not currently in school the question 
refers to the last school they attended. 
Target student labor force outcomes: 
Paid work is equal to one if the target student reports currently spending time working at a job 
where he/she receives pay and zero otherwise. 
Average hours per week paid work is the number of weekly hours the target student reports 
spending on average at the job(s) where he/she receives pay. It is equal to zero for target students 
who said they did not perform paid work. 
Unpaid work is equal to one if the target student reports currently spending time working at a job 
where he/she does not receive pay and zero otherwise. 
Average hours per week unpaid work is the number of weekly hours the target student reports 
spending on average at the job(s) where he/she does not receive pay. It is equal to zero for target 
students who said they did not perform unpaid work. 
Any work is equal to one if the target student reports doing any work and zero otherwise. It is 
derived from responses to paid work and unpaid work. 
Average hours per week any work is the number of weekly hours the target student report 
spending on average at any job. It is the sum of average hours per week paid work and average 
hours per week unpaid work. 




Remittances sent by migrant: 
All remittance variables refer to the total amount sent by the migrant since January 1, 2012. For 
each category (regular and special occasion remittances to the target household and other 
households) missing values are imputed to ensure consistent sample size. Imputations are done 
by regressing the amount in each category on migrant age, migrant gender, years the migrant has 
been in the US, annual regular and special occasion remittances to the target household and other 
households, migrant years of education, an indicator variable for whether or not the migrant’s 
spouse is in the US, the number of children the migrant has living in the US, and an indicator 
variable for whether or not the migrant has a child under 23 living in El Salvador using the 
control group. The data comes from the baseline survey. This regression is then used to predict 
values for the missing values. 
Remittances to target household is the total amount sent by the migrant to the target household 
since January 1, 2012. This equals the number of regular remittances sent since January 1, 2012 
multiplied by the average amount of each remittance. This is added to the total amounts reported 
to have been sent for special occasions in various categories since January 1, 2012. This figure 
does not include any funds that may have been sent as an EduRemesa. 
 Imputed value: 16.2% 
Remittances to other households is the total amount sent by the migrant to households that are 
not the target household since January 1, 2012. This equals the number of regular remittances 
sent to other households since January 1, 2012 multiplied by the average amount per regular 
remittance for each household. This is added to the total amounts reported to have been sent for 
special occasions in various categories. This figure does not include any funds that may have 
been sent as an EduRemesa. 
 Imputed value: 4.6% 
Overall total is the sum of remittances to the target household and to other household. 
 Imputed value: 19.6% 
Hyperbolic sine transformation of remittance variables is the three above remittance variables 










Acemoglu, Daron and Joshua Angrist (2001). “How Large are Human-Capital Externalities? 
Evidence from Compulsory-Schooling Laws.” In Ben S. Bernanke and Kenneth Rogoff 
(Eds.) NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15 (9 -74). Cambridge: MIT Press.  
Adams, Richard H. and Alfredo Cuecuecha (2010). “Remittances, Household Expenditure and 
Investment in Guatemala,” World Development, 38(11), 1626-41. 
Adams, Richard H. and John Page (2005). “Do International Migration and Remittances Reduce 
Poverty in Developing Countries?” World Development, 33(10), 1645-69. 
Afridi, Farzana (2010). “Child Welfare Programs and Child Nutrition: Evidence from a 
Mandated School Meal Program in India,” Journal of Development Economics, 92, 152-65. 
Akresh, Richard, Damien de Walque, and Harounan Kazianga (2012). “Alternative Cash 
Transfer Delivery Mechanisms: Impacts on Routine Preventative Health Clinic Visits in 
Burkina Faso,” NBER Working Paper 17785. 
Ambler, Kate (2012). “Bargaining with Grandma: The Impact of the South African Pension on 
Household Decision Making,” University of Michigan Population Studies Center Research 
Report 11-741. 
Ambler, Kate, Diego Aycinena, and Dean Yang (2013). “Subsidizing Remittances for Education: 
A Field Experiment Among Migrants from El Salvador,” working paper. 
Angelucci, Manuela and Orazio Attanasio (2009). “Program Effect on Consumption, Low 
Participation, and Methodological Issues,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
57(3). 
Angelucci, Manuela and Giacomo De Giorgi (2009). “Indirect Effects of an Aid Program: How 
do Cash Transfers Affect Ineligibles’ Consumption?” The American Economic Review, 
99(1), 486-508. 
Angelucci, Manuela, Giacomo de Giorgi, Marcos A. Rangel, and Imran Rasul (2010). “Family 
Networks and School Enrolment: Evidence from a Randomized Social Experiment,” Journal 
of Public Economics, 94(3-4), 197-221. 
Angrist, Joshua, Eric Bettinger, Erik Bloom, Elizabeth King, and Michael Kremer (2002). 
“Vouchers for Private Schooling in Columbia: Evidence from a Randomized Natural 
Experiment,” The American Economic Review, 92(5), 1535-58. 
166
Ardington, Cally, Anne Case and Victoria Hosegood (2009). “Labor Supply Responses to Large 
Social Transfers: Longitudinal Evidence from South Africa,” American Economic Journal: 
Applied Economics, 1(1), 22-48. 
Ashraf, Nava (2009). “Spousal Control and Intra-household Decision Making: An Experimental 
Study in the Philippines,” American Economic Review, 99(4), 1245-1277. 
Ashraf, Nava, Dean Karlan and Wesley Yin (2009). “Female Empowerment: Impact of a 
Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines,” World Development, 38(3), 333-44. 
Ashraf, Nava, Diego Aycinena, Claudia Martinez A., and Dean Yang (2012). “Remittances and 
the Problem of Control: A Field Experiment Among Migrants from El Salvador,” mimeo, 
The University of Michigan. 
Ashraf, Nava, Erica Field, and Jean Lee (2012). “Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An 
Experimental Study in Zambia,” mimeo. 
Baird, Sarah, Craig McIntosh, and Berk Ozler (2011). “Cash or Condition? Evidence from a 
Cash Transfer Experiment,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126, pg. 1709-53. 
Banerjee, Abhijit (2004). “Educational Policy and the Economics of the Family,” Journal of 
Development Economics, 74, 3-32. 
Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster and Cynthia Kinnan (2013). “The Miracle of 
Microfinance? Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation,” Working paper. 
Barrera-Osorio, F., M. Bertrand, L. Linden, and F. Perez-Calle (2011). “Improving the Design of 
Conditional Transfer Programs:  Evidence from a Randomized Education Experiment in 
Columbia,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3, 167-95. 
Becker, Gary (1974). “A Theory of Social Interactions,” Journal of Political Economy, 82(6), 
1063-94. 
Becker, Gary (1981). A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, enlarged 
edition 1991. 
Behrman, Jere R., Piyali Sengupta, and Petra Todd (2005). “Progressing through Progresa: An 
Impact Assessment of a School Subsidy Experiment in Rural Mexico,” Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 54(1), 237-75. 
Bénabou, Roland and Jean Tirole (2006). “Incentives and Prosocial Behavior,” American 
Economic Review, 96(5), 1652-78. 
Bertrand, Marianne, Sendhill Mullainathan, and Douglas Miller (2003). “Public policy and 
extended families: evidence from pensions in South Africa,” The World Bank Economic 
Review, 17(1), 27-50. 
Bloch, Francis and Vijayendra Rao (2002). “Terror as a Bargaining Instrument a Case Study of 
Dowry Violence in Rural India,” American Economic Review, 92(4), 1029-43. 
 
167
Brown, Richard P.C. (1997). “Estimating Remittance Functions for Pacific Island Migrants,” 
World Development, 25(4), 613-26. 
Burbidge, John B., Lonnie Magee, and A Leslie Robb (1988). “Alternative Transformations to 
Handle Extreme Values of the Dependent Variable,” Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 83(401), 123-27. 
Case, Anne and Angus Deaton (1998). “Large cash transfers to the elderly in South Africa,” 
Economic Journal, 108(450), 1330-1361. 
Chen, Joyce (2006). “Migration and Imperfect Monitoring: Implications for Intra-household 
Allocation,” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 96(2), 227-231. 
Chen, Joyce (2013). “Identifying Non-cooperative Behavior Among Spouses: Child Outcomes in 
Migrant-sending Households,” Journal of Development Economics, 100(1), 1-18. 
Chiappori, Pierre-André (1988). “Rational Household Labor Supply,” Econometrica, 56(1), 63-
89. 
Chiappori, Pierre-André (1992). “Collective Labor Supply and Welfare,” Journal of Political 
Economy, 100(3), 437-67. 
Chin, Aimee, Léonie Karkoviata and Nathanial Wilcox (2011). “Impact of Bank Accounts on 
Migrant Savings and Remittances: Evidence from a Field Experiment,” mimeo, University of 
Houston. 
Clemens, Michael (2011). “Economics and emigration: Trillion-dollar bills on the sidewalk?” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25 (3): 83–106. 
Clemens, Michael A., Claudio E. Montenegro, and Lant Pritchett (2009). “The Place Premium: 
Wage Differences for Identical Workers Across the U.S. Border,” Center for Global 
Development Working Paper 148. 
Cox Edwards, Alejandra and Manuelita Ureta (2003). “International Migration, Remittances, and 
Schooling: Evidence from El Salvador,” Journal of Development Economics, 72(2), 429-61. 
De Brauw, Alan and Daniel Gilligan (2011). “Using the Regression Discontinuity Design with 
Implicit Partitions: The Impacts of Comunidades Solidarias Rurales on Schooling in El 
Salvador,” IFPRI Discussion Paper 01116. 
De la Brière, Bènèdicte and Agnes Quisumbing (2000). “Final Report: The Impact of Progresa 
on Women’s Status and Intrahousehold Relations,” International Food Policy Research 
Institute report. 
De Laat, Joost (2008). “Household Allocations and Endogenous Information,” CIRPEE Working 
Paper No. 08-27. 
Dercon, Stefan  and Pramila Krishna (2000). “In Sickness and in Health: Risk Sharing within 
Households in Rural Ethiopia,” Journal of Political Economy, 108(4), 688-727. 
 
168
di Falco, Salvatore and Erwin Bulte (2011). “A Dark Side of Social Capital? Kinship, 
Consumption, and Savings,” The Journal of Development Studies, 47(8), 1128-1151. 
Dirección General de Estadística y Censos (2010). “Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos 
Múltiples 2009,” report. 
Dubois, Pierre and Ethan Ligon (2011). “Incentives and Nutrition for Rotten Kids: 
Intrahousehold Food Allocation in the Philippines,” CUDARE Working Papers, Paper 1114. 
Duflo, Esther (2000). “Child Health and Household Resources in South Africa: Evidence from 
the Old Age Pension Program,” The American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 
90(2), 393-98. 
Duflo, Esther (2003). “Grandmothers and Granddaughters,” The World Bank Economic Review, 
17(1), 1-25. 
Duflo, Esther and Christopher Udry (2004). “Intrahousehold Resource Allocation in Cote 
D’Ivoire: Social Norms, Separate Accounts and Consumption Choices,” NBER Working 
Paper 10498. 
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (2008). Subsidizing charitable contributions: a natural field 
experiment comparing matching and rebate subsidies. Experimental Economics, 11(3), 234-
252. 
Edmonds, Eric V., Kristen Mammen and Douglas Miller (2005). “Rearranging the family? 
Income support and elderly living arrangements in a low-income country,” Journal of 
Human Resources, 40(1), 186-207. 
Edmonds, Eric V. (2006). “Child Labor and schooling responses to anticipated income in South 
Africa,” Journal of Development Economics, 81, 386-414. 
Edmonds, Eric V. and Norbert Schady (2012). “Poverty Alleviation and Child Labor,” American 
Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4(4), 100-124. 
Fizbein, Ariel and Norbert Schady with Francisco Ferreira, Margaret Grosh, Nial Kelleher, Pedro 
Olinto, and Emmanuel Skoufias (2009). Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and 
Future Poverty. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Foster, Andrew D. and Mark R. Rosenzweig (2001). “Imperfect Commitment, Altruism, and the 
Family: Evidence from Transfer Behavior in Low-Income Rural Areas,” The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 83(30, 389-407. 
FUSADES (2011). “Tendencias en Educación,” Informe de Coyuntura Social. 
Gertler, Paul , Sebastian Martinez, and Marta Rubio-Codina (2012). “Investing Cash Transfers to 





Glewwe, Paul and Ana Lucia Kassouf (2012). “The Impact of Bolsa Escola/Familia Conditional 
Cash Transfer Program on Enrollment, Dropout Rates, and Grade Promotion in Brazil,” 
Journal of Development Economics, 97, 505-17. 
Goldberg, Jessica (2011). “The Lesser of Two Evils: The Roles of Social Pressure and 
Impatience in Consumption Decisions,” mimeo, University of Maryland.  
Goldstein, Markus, Alain de Janvry, and Elisabeth Sadoulet (2005), “Is a Friend in Need a 
Friend Indeed? Inclusion and Exclusion in Mutual Insurance Networks in Southern Ghana,” 
in Stefan Dercon, ed., Insurance against Poverty, Oxford University Press. 
Hamoudi, Amar and Duncan Thomas (2005). “Pension Income and the Well-being of Children 
and Grandchildren: New Evidence from South Africa,” Working paper, October. 
Hazan, Miryam (2012). “Beyond 3x1: Linking Sending and Receiving Societies in the 
Development Process,” International Migration, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2435.2012.00784.x 
Hoddinott, John (1994). “A Model of Migration and Remittances Applied to Western Kenya,” 
Oxford Economic Papers, 46(3), 459-76. 
Hoddinott, John and Emmanuel Skoufias (2004). “The Impact of PROGRESA on Food 
Consumption,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 53(1), 37-61. 
Hoel, Jessica (2012). “Heterogeneous Households: Laboratory Tests of Household Model 
Assumptions in Kenya,” mimeo. 
Islam, Mahnaz and John Hoddinott (2009). “Evidence of Intrahousehold Flypaper Effects from a 
Nutrition Intervention in Rural Guatemala,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
57(2), 215-38. 
Jacoby, Hanan G. (2002). “Is There an Intrahousehold ‘Flypaper Effect’? Evidence from a 
School Feeding Programme,” The Economic Journal, 112(476), 196-221. 
Jakiela, Pamela (2009). “How Fair Shares Compare: Experimental Evidence from Two 
Cultures,” working paper. 
Jakiela, Pamela and Owen Ozier (2012). “Does Africa Need a Rotten Kin Theorem? 
Experimental Evidence from Village Economies,” Policy Research Working Paper 6085: 
Impact Evalualtion Series No. 58, The World Bank Development Research Group. 
Jenson, Robert T. (2003). “Do Private Transfers ‘Displace’ the Benefits of Public Transfers? 
Evidence from South Africa,” The Journal of Public Economics, 88, 89-112. 
Karlan, D., & List, J. A. (2007). Does price matter in charitable giving? Evidence from a large-
scale natural field experiment. The American Economic Review, 1774-1793. 
Karlan, D., List, J. A., & Shafir, E. (2011). Small matches and charitable giving: Evidence from 
a natural field experiment. Journal of Public Economics, 95(5), 344-350. 
 
170
Lam, David, Murray Leibbrandt and Vimal Ranchhod (2006). “Labor Force Withdrawal of the 
Elderly in South Africa.” In Barney Cohen and Jane Menken (Ed.), Aging in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Recommendations for Furthering Research (214-249). Washington: National 
Academies Press. 
Laury, Susan K. (2005). “Pay One or Pay All: Random Selection of One Choice for Payment,” 
Adrew Young School of Policy Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper 06-13. 
Lee, David S. and Thomas Lemieux (2010). “Regression Discontinuity Design in Economics,” 
Journal of Economic Literature, 48(2), 281-355. 
Leibbrandt, Murray, Ingrid Woolard, and Louise de Villiers (2009). “Methodology: Report on 
NIDS Wave 1. Technical Paper no. 1,” NIDS Technical Papers. 
Leider, Stephen, Markus M. Mobius, Tanya Rosenblat, and Quoc-Anh Do (2009). “Directed 
Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks,” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 124(4), 1815-51. 
Ligon, Ethan and Laura Schechter (2012). “Motives for Sharing in Social Networks,” Journal of 
Development Economics, 99(1), 13-26. 
Loury, Glenn (1981). “Intergenerational Transfers and the Distribution of Earnings,” 
Econometrica, 49(4), 843-67. 
Lucas, Robert and Oded Stark (1985). “Motivations to Remit: Evidence from Botswana,” 
Journal of Political Economy, 93(5), 901-918. 
Lund, F. (1993). “State Social Benefits in South Africa,” International Social Security Review, 
46(1), 5-25. 
Lundberg, Shelly and Robert A. Pollack (1993). “Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage 
Market,” The Journal of Political Economy, 101(6), 988-1010. 
Lundberg, Shelly and Robert A. Pollack (1994). “Non-cooperative Bargaining Models of 
Marriage,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 84(2), 132-37. 
Lundberg, Shelly and Robert A. Pollack (1996). “Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage,” The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(4), 139-158. 
Lundberg, Shelly, Robert A. Pollack, and Terence J. Wales (1996). “Do Husbands and Wives 
Pool Their Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit,” Journal of 
Human Resources, 32(3), 463-80. 
Majlesi, Kaveh (2013). “Labor Market Opportunities and Sex-Specific Investment in Children’s 
Human Capital: Evidence from Mexico,” mimeo. 
Manser, Marilyn and Murray Brown (1980). “Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A 
Bargaining Analysis,” International Economic Review, 21(1), 31-44. 
 
171
Mazzucato, Valentina (2009). “Informal Insurance Arrangements in Ghanaian Migrants’ 
Transnational Networks: The Role of Reverse Remittances and Geographic Proximity,” 
World Development, 37(6), 1105-15. 
McElroy, Marjorie B and Mary Jean Horney (1981). “Nash Bargained Household Decisions,” 
International Economic Review, 22(2), 333-49. 
McKenzie, David, John Gibson, and Steven Stillman (2013). “A Land of Milk and Honey with 
Streets Paved with Gold: Do Emigrants have Over-optimistic Expectations about Incomes 
Abroad?” The Journal of Development Economics,102, 116-127.. 
Meier, S. (2007). “Do subsidies increase charitable giving in the long run? Matching donations 
in a field experiment,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 5(6). 
Mookherjee, Dilip and Debraj Ray (2003). “Persistent Inequality,” Review of Economic Studies, 
70, 369-93. 
Munshi, Kaivan (2003). “Networks in the Modern Economy: Mexican Migrants in the U.S. 
Labor Market,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(2), 549-599. 
OECD Aid Statistics (2013). http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/data.htm 
Payne, A. Abigail (2009). “Does Government Funding Change Behavior? An Empircal Analysis 
of Crowd-Out,” NBER Tax Policy and the Economy, 23, 159-84. 
Peltzman, Sam (1973). “The Effect of Government Subsidies-in-Kind on Private Expenditures: 
The Case of Higher Education,” Journal of Political Economy, 81(1), 1-27. 
Pew Hispanic Center (2002). Billions in Motion: Latino Immigrants, Remittances, and Banking. 
Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center and Multilateral Investment Fund, 2002. 
Poirine, Bernard (1997). “A Theory of Remittances as an Implicit Family Loan Arrangement,” 
World Development, 25(4), 589-611. 
Qian, Nancy (2008). “Missing Women and the Price of Tea in China: The Effect of Sex-specific 
Earnings on Sex Imbalance,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(3), 1251-85. 
Ranchod, Vimal (2006). “The Effect of the South African Old Age Pension on Labour Supply of 
the Elderly,” South African Journal of Economics, 74(4), 725-44. 
Rapoport, Hillel and Frédéric Docquier (2006). “The Economics of Migrants’ Remittances,” 
Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, 2, 1135-98. 
Ratha, Dilip and Ani Silwal (2012). “Migration and Development Brief 18,” World Bank. 
Ruggles, Steven, Trent Alexander, Katie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Matthew B. Schroeder, and 
Matthew Sobek (2010). Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0 [Machine-
readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 
 
172
Samuelson, Paul A (1956). “Social Indifference Curves,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
70(1), 1-22. 
Schaner, Simone (2012). “Do Opposites Detract? Intrahousehold Preference Heterogeneity and 
Inefficient Strategic Savings,” mimeo, Dartmouth College. 
Schultz, T. Paul (2004). “School Subsidies for the Poor: Evaluating the Mexican Progresa 
Program,” Journal of Development Economics, 74, 199-250. 
Seshan, Ganesh and Dean Yang (2012). “Transnational Household Finance: A Field Experiment 
on the Cross-Border Impacts of Financial Education for Migrant Workers,” mimeo, 
University of Michigan. 
Shi, Xinzheng (2012). “Does an Intra-household Flypaper Effect Exist? Evidence from the 
Educational Fee Reduction Reform in Rural China,” Journal of Development Economics, 99, 
459-73. 
South Africa Labour and Development Unit (1993). “The Project for Statistics of Living 
Standards and Development,” http://www.saldru.uct.ac.za/home/index.php?/PSLSD/pslsd 
South Africa Labour and Development Unit (2009). “The National Income Dynamics Survey 
Wave 1.” www.nids.uct.ac.za/home/ 
SouthAfrica.info (2008). “South Africa men get state pensions earlier,” available at 
www.southafrica.info/services/government/pension-160708.htm 
Stark, Oded (1995). Altruism and beyond: An Economic Analysis of Transfers and Exchanges 
within Families and Groups. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Stock, J. H., & Yogo, M. (2005). “Testing for weak instruments in linear IV regression,” Chapter 
5 in Identification and Inference in Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas J. 
Rothenberg, edited by D. Andrews and J. Stock. 
Terry, Donald F. and Steven R. Wilson, eds., (2005).  Beyond Small Change: Making Migrant 
Remittances Count. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank. 
Thomas, Duncan (1990). “Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach,” The 
Journal of Human Resources, 25(4), 635-64. 
Thomas, Duncan (1994). “Like Father, like Son; Like Mother, like Daughter: Parental Resources 
and Child Height,” The Journal of Human Resources, 29(4), 950-88. 
Torero, Maximo, and Angelino Viceisza (2013), “To Remit or Not to Remit: That is the 
Question. A Remittance Field Experiment,” Working paper, IFPRI. 
Udry, Christopher (1996). “Gender, Agricultural Productivity and the Theory of the Household,” 
Journal of Political Economy, 104(5), 1010-46. 
Woodruff, Christopher and Rene Zenteno (2007). “Migration Networks and Microenterprises in 
Mexico,” Journal of Development Economics, 82(2), 509-28. 
173
World Bank (2006). Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of Remittances 
and Migration. Washington, DC. 
World Bank (2007). Close to Home: The Development Impact of Remittances in Latin America. 
Washington, DC. 
World Bank, Migration and Development Brief 19, Migration and Remittances Unit, Washington 
D.C., 2012. 
World Health Organization (2006). WHO Child Growth Standards: Length/height-for-age, 
weight-for-age, weight-for-length, weight-for-height and body mass index for age: Methods 
and development. Geneva: World Health Organization. 
Yang, Dean and Claudia Martinez A. (2005). Remittances and Poverty in Migrants' Home Areas: 
Evidence from the Philippines. In Caglar Ozden and Maurice Schiff (Eds.), International 
Migration, Remittances, and the Brain Drain, World Bank. 
Yang, Dean (2008). “International Migration, Remittances and Household Investment: Evidence 
from Philippine Migrants’ Exchange Rate Shocks,” The Economic Journal, 118(528), 591-
630. 
Yang, Dean (2011). “Migrant Remittances,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(3), 129-52. 
174
